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Language processing is normally rapid, incremental and driven by online prediction-
making. However, the phenomenon of negation presents an interesting possible
exception to this case. Although at least some utterances involving negation seem
to induce eects on processing in which predictions cannot be made or their accu-
racy breaks down, evidence suggests that this is not the case when negations are
presented in contexts providing adequate pragmatic support. This thesis presents a
series of experiments using several methodologies (EEG, computer mouse-tracking,
and eye-tracking) to test the idea that this eect of pragmatic felicity can be at-
tributed to its association with predictability: that is, to investigate whether the
predictability of later material in a sentence can inuence the extent to which nega-
tion can be incorporated incrementally into the comprehender’s interpretation
of the partial sentence. This is achieved through the use of episodically-varying
contexts, presented prior to the accompanying linguistic input, which manipulate
the predictability of critical material in pragmatically licensed sentences. The
ndings lead to the overall conclusion that even pragmatically licensed negations
can incur more processing costs and result in the generation of more inaccurate
predictions than equivalent armatives. Furthermore, the most reliable strands
of evidence (from a sentence completion mouse-tracking task) suggest that, in
the type of paradigm in which prediction is manipulated using episodic contexts,
reducing predictability detrimentally aects armatives to a greater extent than
negations. This may indicate that accurate prediction-making is relatively dicult,
even in the easiest cases, for negative sentences when (1) predictions must be
formulated on the basis of episodic rather than long-term semantic associations
and (2) the combination of sentence structure and context mean that there is a
clash between the concepts activated by association with local components of the
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I have a vague early childhood memory of one of my parents occasionally handing
me a drink accompanied by a playful injunction to “keep it in the cup!”. Presumably,
their theory was that the negative instruction “don’t spill it!” would have involved
mentioning the very event that it sought to avoid, thereby increasing the already
all-too-high chances of an accident when putting a toddler’s clumsy hands and
suggestible mind in charge of anything. This idea may not have been far o the
mark in terms of how negations are processed, even by adult comprehenders.
As outlined below, incoming linguistic input is generally interpreted incremen-
tally, as it becomes available, but negation seems to be an exception to this rule, at
least under some circumstances. This phenomenon makes negation interesting in
at least two respects: rst, in its own right, as a kind of special case in terms of
how processing must be handled; and second, as a “failure case” for incrementality.
Investigating the circumstances under which a system breaks down is often a good
way of understanding some aspect of how the system works when it does.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organised as follows. First, the
evidence that linguistic processing normally does proceed incrementally is briey
reviewed. Second, a survey of views on the phenomenon of negation is presented;
this consists of a set of theoretical and philosophical approaches, followed by a
review of the psycholinguistic literature that is more directly pertinent to the
experiments described in this thesis. Finally, an overview of the experimental
chapters and their general motivation is provided.
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1.1 Incrementality and prediction-making
Speech presents a notoriously dicult perception and processing problem. Lis-
teners are confronted with an unbroken stream of auditory input, continously
unfolding over time and consisting of acoustic signals that do not map directly
onto linguistic units, but depend on characteristics of the speaker, environmental
surroundings, and context of a particular segment (see Nygaard & Pisoni, 1995,
for a review of these challenges). For these reasons, reliance solely on bottom-up
processing of the input would render the task of making sense of it impossible;
instead, comprehenders must draw on their knowledge of the language, speaker,
discourse context, pragmatic norms, and so on to engage in top-down process-
ing, in which partial representations of the utterance so far are continuously and
rapidly updated, and predictions formulated against which upcoming material can
be evaluated: this view is presented, for example, by Altmann and Mirković (2009)
and by Rayner and Clifton (2009). Pickering and Garrod (2007) argue that this
process is supported in particular by the production system, and Sturt and Lom-
bardo (2005) show that the continuously updated representation takes the form
of a connected syntactic structure — although such structures may not always be
consistent with the full input, especially when processing demands are high, and
must sometimes be reformulated when there is a clash between what is apparent
locally and the globally correct structure (e.g. Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002).
There is extensive evidence of many specic cases in which comprehenders
engage in active and incremental prediction. For instance, a verb can constrain
comprehenders’ predictions about likely upcoming arguments based on semantics,
such as the knowledge that the verb eat is likely to be followed by an edible
object such as cake (Altmann & Kamide, 1999). Similarly, arguments preceding a
verb allow comprehenders to constrain their predictions about the semantic and
syntactic characteristics of the verb phrase (Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003;
Kazanina, 2017). Such predictions are not simply reliant on the lexical associations
of preceding material, but are sensitive to the specic thematic roles of arguments
(Chow, Smith, Lau, & Phillips, 2016) and to pre-existing knowledge about how
events occur (Kim, Oines, & Sikos, 2016). However, the full extent and nature of
these prediction-making processes is still the subject of investigation and debate.
For instance, a nding that predictions about the semantics of an upcoming word
can generate predictions relating to the phonological form of a preceding article
(DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005) has recently been challenged by a large-scale
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study in which it was not replicated (Nieuwland et al., 2018).
Negation presents a case in which comprehenders’ predictions often appear
to fail to take into account all the available information immediately: specically,
the presence of the negating element itself. The details of this phenomenon are
discussed below, following a survey of the nature of negation itself.
1.2 Background on negation
1.2.1 Approaches from philosophy and semantics
A discussion of some of the historical and philosophical approaches to studying
negation may help to illuminate why its behaviour in language might exhibit
some properties worth studying: in particular, why we might a priori expect the
presence of negation to have an impact on the online, incremental processing of
sentences, and what form this impact might take.
Negation has troubled philosophers, logicians and linguists, all in slightly
dierent ways, over the centuries. The crux of the problem it presents is that
it seems simultaneously both primitive or basic — you can assert either that
something is, or that it is not — and also slippery, abstract and complex — what
does it really mean to assert that something lacks a particular property? Is every
negation simply the reversal of a corresponding armative, or is there more to it
than that? Can any given negation be couched as an armative equivalent, and
if so, why do we bother with them if we could simply express any proposition
using the far less perplexing armative? Negation seems to be a universal of
natural human languages (Greenberg, 1966), and at least some aspects of negation
appear developmentally early, although others prove dicult for young children
to grasp (Nordmeyer & Frank, 2014; Wode, 1977). Negating particles like not
seem fundamental to their languages and are extremely frequent, and yet they
are unusually subject to clines of lexicalisation or fossilisation, in which their
semantic force is gradually eroded and they are eventually replaced, often by a
former intensier — a process known as Jespersen’s Cycle following the original
observation by Jespersen (1917). This set of puzzles leads to a variety of approaches
and analyses, some of which provide important background for understanding
online comprehension of negation.
Horn (1989) provides a history of philosophical thinking on the topic, beginning
with Plato, who articulates the concept of negation in ontological terms, and
Aristotle, who supplies an early framework for negation in language and logic.
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Early approaches concentrated on categorising negation into various sub-types
of relationship: following Horn’s (1989) examples, Aristotle’s taxonomy includes
contrariety (e.g. the relationship between good and bad), privation (blind / sighted),
contradiction (he sits / he does not sit), and correlations between two relative
terms (double / half ), while the Stoics recognise three varieties: denial (no one
is walking), privation (this man is unkind) and negation (it is not the case that it
is day). The descendants of such taxonomic systems are still seen today in the
“square of opposition” (e.g., Sullivan, 1967) shown in Figure 1.1, which presents
the relationships between quantifying propositions. Aristotle also anticipates
important foundations of the logic of opposition which are still debated, including
the law of contradiction (it is impossible to be both P and ¬P simultaneously)
and the law of the excluded middle (either P or ¬P must be true in every case).
Particular armative
Some X are P
subcontraries
Particular negative
Some X are not P
Universal negative
No X are Pcontraries
Universal armative
All X are P
contradictoriessubaltern subaltern
Figure 1.1: Square of opposition
From the perspective of a philosopher or logician, understanding and formalis-
ing negation should involve either dening it rigorously, or demonstrating that
it is not a necessary component of a system by reducing it to more basic terms,
usually an armation plus some concept of falsehood. (The opposite approach is
also possible: for instance, Löbner (2000) proposes a denition of falsity in terms of
the truth value of syntactic negations.) It is important to distinguish this problem
from the problem of dening linguistic negation by simply pointing to negating
words like not in the linguistic form of a proposition. (Even this apparently more
straightforward classication is not without its grey areas. For instance, many se-
mantically rather than syntactically negative words license negative polarity items
(NPIs): contrast He refused to come and visit ever again with *He agreed to come and
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visit ever again. This grammatical eect of a semantic property of the verb refuse
shows that there is more to linguistic negation than whether a sentence contains
one of the obviously negating words not, never etc.) Philosophically speaking,
the form a particular proposition happens to be expressed in is less interesting
than whether there is some intrinsic asymmetry, regardless of particular linguistic
form, between a negative and an armative, where armation is basic, simple
and necessary, and negation is a layer of complexity built on top of this.
The “no” answer to this question is that of the symmetricalists, including Frege
(1960) and Geach (1965) as well as Plato and Aristotle, whereas the asymmetri-
calist camp propose to “explain away” negation by formulating every negative
proposition in terms of a corresponding armative. One approach to achieving
this is a truth-conditional semantic one: the notion that the negation of a state-
ment P is the statement that is true when P is false. Ayer (1952), also taking a
symmetricalist view, reviews this approach and discusses the problems it presents:
in order to check the relationship between an armative and a negative under
this formalisation, a way of verifying either negative predicates or negative facts
is needed. For example, to conrm that The sky is not red is the negation of The
sky is red, it must be veried that the former is true whenever the latter is false,
which in turn requires either dening a negative predicate not red, or dening
a state of aairs where the negative fact that the sky is not red obtains, both of
which prove epistemologically problematic. Ayer’s proposal is that rather than
resorting to truth conditions and operations on armatives to identify negations, a
distinction can be made between the two in that where a corresponding armative
and negative pair can be identied, the negation will be less informative than the
armation: for instance, The sky is red is much more informative than The sky is
not red, which leaves a practically innite variety of possible colours for the sky.
This is a stance which puts negation and armation on an equal footing in the
sense of distinguishing them without resorting to dening any given negation as
some transformation of an armation. Another symmetricalist stance, rejectivism,
is the notion that the primitive concept that needs to be handled in an analysis of
language is not the negation operator, but the more pragmatically based attitude
of rejection or speech act of denial: that is, negation should be explained in terms
of these concepts, rather than vice versa. This case is laid out, for example, by
Humberstone (2000) and Ripley (2011); there is further discussion of its application
to psycholinguistic questions below.
In formalising how negation is interpreted, some modern approaches make use
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of multi-valued logic, in which there is a third semantic value indicating neither
true nor false, but an indeterminate, vague, or somewhere-in-between value.
This allows for the distinction of three possible types of negation: choice negation
(or strong negation), where ¬P is dened as having the opposite truth-value to
P ; exclusion negation (or weak negation), where ¬P is dened as indicating “P
has some value other than true”; and intuitionistic negation (or Gödel negation),
where ¬P is dened as indicating “P has the value false”; see, for example,
Alxatib and Pelletier (2011) for discussion and experimental support for “vagueness”
in speakers’ interpretation of negations, Shramko (2005) for an outline of the
treatment and use of negation in “falsication logic”, a type of intuitionistic logic,
and Wansing (2016) for another type of bi-intuitionistic logic, which combines
intuitionistic verication and falsication in order to distinguish between support
of truth and support of falsity. This approach therefore allows for the existence of
armation-negation pairs that do not comply with the law of the excluded middle,
permitting some fuzzy ground in which, for instance, speakers might regard it as
correct to predicate both tall and not tall of a person of average height.
Another important problem in the interpretation of negation relates to presup-
position, or failure to refer. This is classically presented — originally by Russell
(1905) — as the question of whether the sentence The present King of France is not
bald is true or false, or has some other truth value, given that there is no such
entity as the King of France. Under an exclusion negation analysis, the sentence
presupposes the existence of the predicate’s argument and predicates of it that
it has the property of being not bald; whereas under a choice negation analysis,
the sentence has no presupposition but simply denies the state of aairs that the
King of France is bald: its truth conditions might be met by his failing to exist and
therefore failing to have, among many other properties, the property of baldness.
(A related problem is the category error problem, in which a proposition such as
Justice is not purple denies the predication of something of an argument to which
the predicate is not applicable.)
Aside from the handling of the truth conditional analysis problems presented by
this presupposition problem, the choice-exclusion ambiguity can be treated under
a syntactic analysis as one of scope, in which negation involves a covert syntactic
transformation dictating the domain (in this case, either the predicate bald or the
full proposition) over which the negation operates (Chomsky, 1970). The listener
must resolve the ambiguity based on pragmatic considerations, which could range
from contextual knowledge to intonational information or explicit cancellation of
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the available presupposition by the speaker: The King of France isn’t bald; there
is no King of France! A semantic treatment of the issue is the Atlas-Kempson
thesis, reviewed by Atlas (1977), which proposes that this type of negation is not
necessarily ambiguous, but may be semantically “general, non-specic, or vague”.
That is, although the speaker might intend either the choice or the exclusion
interpretation in particular, they might also be in a state of equivocation between
the two interpretations and intend to communicate the possibility of either to the
listener.
The above set of problems, questions and approaches to analysis relating
to negation range from the highly abstract and philosophical to those whose
relevance to the interpretation of negation in natural language is clearer. Given the
thorny collection of such issues that negation presents, it is worth returning to the
question of why natural languages (seemingly without exception) deploy it at all.
Would it not be easier to nd a corresponding armative for every statement we
wanted to make and use that instead? Price (1990) oers a rejectivist answer based
on pragmatic rather than syntactic or semantic considerations — a reasonable
approach given that ultimately humans interpret communication on a pragmatic
level. He argues that negation has an evolutionarily crucial function, namely the
ability to highlight and draw attention to incompatibilites between perspectives
by explicitly rejecting an interlocutor’s statement or a shared presupposition. A
similar stance is formalised by Berto (2015) with a model of negation as a modal
operator, in a possible worlds semantics framework, with a meaning based on the
core concept of (in)compatibility.
Along with other evidence from approaches to interpreting negation, Price’s
argument for the importance not just of logical meaning but of directing the
comprehender’s attention to an implication of the speaker’s meaning underscores
the role of pragmatic context in understanding how negations are processed by
comprehenders. The importance of this factor has become increasingly apparent as
experimental and psycholinguistic work on negation has developed. For humans,
context matters for logical operations: adjusting the pragmatic context of a task,
even though its logical contents are unchanged, can have a dramatic eect on
people’s performance (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Manktelow & Over,
1991). As the next section will demonstrate by examining the psycholinguistics of
negation and how it is processed online, negation seems to be no exception to this
rule.
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1.2.2 Psycholinguistic work so far
Early work in the psycholinguistics of negation focused on the comprehension
of full propositions, demonstrating that at least supercially, there appeared to
be an asymmetry in the processing of negations and armations. For example,
Wason (1959, 1961) presented armative and negative statements with missing
information, asking participants to ll in the required information to render them
either true or false, and found that they were quicker to do so for armative
sentences, regardless of target truth value, even though the task for false negations
was eectively equivalent to the task for true armatives. Polarity also interacted
with truth value, a nding replicated in a similar experiment by Gough (1965),
who concluded that any hypothesis based on comprehenders performing a covert
transformation of a negation into a “kernel” armative therefore could not fully
account for this asymmetry. Wason (1961) proposed three possible explanations:
that people nd “positive information” to be more valuable, as it is more specic and
informative, and therefore respond more readily to it; that “negative information”,
being more abstract and therefore more distant from perceptual experience, is
harder to access; and that negative terms may carry emotional connotations that
disrupt the processing of expressions containing them.
Wason and Jones (1963) tested this last hypothesis with an experiment in
which neutral nonsense words were used in place of the English word not to
tag statements as armatives or negatives. Participants who reported mentally
converting the nonsense word to a linguistic equivalent showed more similar
response patterns to a control group tested on normal English sentences, compared
to those who reported making their decisions based on the form of the nonsense
word itself, suggesting that connotations of not might indeed partially account
for the asymmetry. However, there were also early indications that that this
asymmetry might also be at least partially dependent on contextual factors: for
instance, Johnson-Laird and Tridgell (1972) asked participants to draw inferences
from pairs of premises, varying the forms of these premises. They found that when
the rst one provided a context in which a negation would be more helpful than
an armative in drawing attention to an available inference (for example: “Either
John is intelligent or he is rich. John is not rich”), people were quicker to respond
than if an equivalent armative was presented instead.
To explore the details of what types of negation aect processing in this way,
Just and Carpenter (1971) compared quantied negations in three forms, which
they referred to as explicit syntactic negations (e.g. “None of the dots are red”),
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implicit syntactic negations (e.g. “Few of the dots are red”), and semantic negations
(e.g. “A minority of the dots are red”). Participants’ speed in making truth value
judgments of these sentences with respect to a display were most dierent from
comparable armatives in the case of semantic negations; the authors claimed
that this was because syntactic negation focused their attention on the larger
subset of items in the display, whereas semantic negation focused their attention
on the smaller subset, which made the sentence more dicult to verify. Instructing
participants explicitly on which type of encoding to use when looking at the
display was successful in modulating this eect, showing that participants’ frame
of attention and encoding was critical for how they processed negations. Thus,
the process of shifting attention from a negated state of aairs to an actual state
of aairs is what incurs extra costs.
More recently, research has examined the possible mechanisms underlying the
processing and representation of negations. This work is motivated not only by
hypotheses fundamentally distinguishing negations from armatives, but also by
some lines of evidence that negation may present a case where fully incremental
processing of language is not possible. Because of the challenges involved in speech
perception, as mentioned above, it is well recognised that top-down processing,
taking into account the comprehender’s pre-existing and updating knowledge
of the context, speaker, current discourse referents, and so on, forms a major
part of this task. Example demonstrations of such top-down processing and
prediction include Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, and Carlson (1999) on the use
of contextual information to anticipate relevant contrastive interpretations of
adjectives, Kutas and Federmeier (2000) on the application of semantic knowledge
to pre-activation of relevant concepts, and Hagoort and van Berkum (2007) on the
parallel integration of information from multiple levels of interpretation during
processing. As a component of this mode of processing, and as evidenced in these
studies, comprehenders must constantly update their interpretations of partial
utterances, actively forming partial representations and rening predictions that
will help them to integrate upcoming material.
Nevertheless, some components of language lend themselves more readily than
others to immediate integration into mental representations. Certain elements
may require more time, more processing steps, or perhaps more information from
still-unfolding parts of the utterance, before they can be fully integrated; these may
include certain quantiers (Huang & Snedeker, 2011; Urbach & Kutas, 2010) and
scalar implicatures. The latter were investigated using a computer mouse-tracking
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methodology by Tomlinson, Bailey, and Bott (2013), who presented participants
with sentences of the form “Some elephants are mammals”. This has the literal and
immediately available meaning “At least some elephants are mammals”, but also
carries the implicature “Not all elephants are mammals”; the authors demonstrated
that this appears to be derived only at a subsequent stage of processing. This
indicates that the full suite of possible meanings of some is not equally active at
the point of its incremental interpretation, and in fact the most relevant meaning
is only brought to bear after the full proposition has been processed. Furthermore,
sometimes there may be a clash between expectations suggested by dierent levels
of analysis of the information encountered so far. Negation is a prime example
of this type of clash, and this presents a possible explanation for the ndings
discussed above attributing processing diculties to negation.
One possible factor in producing these diculties is that the presence of a
negating element such as not tends to generate situations in which activating
concepts semantically related to or commonly collocated with the material so far
directly opposes a prediction-making strategy that takes into account an incom-
plete semantic representation of the utterance and the Gricean assumption that
the speaker will produce a true sentence. This may explain the nding by Fischler,
Bloom, Childers, Roucos, and Perry (1983) that false sentences like “A robin is
not a bird” elicit a reduced N400 ERP component (generally taken to indicate
conformance with semantic expectations or ease of integration) in comparison
to true sentences like “A robin is not a tree”. However, it is not always the case
that semantic activation spreads indiscriminately of syntactic and semantic roles:
predictions for upcoming verbs are sensitive to which preceding material is and
is not an argument of the verb (Chow et al., 2016); and in the case of negation,
concepts are activated to a lesser extent when negated (MacDonald & Just, 1989).
This eect is also sensitive to whether or not the negation specically indicates
absence of an entity from the described situation, as in “Sam wished / was relieved
that Laura was not wearing her pink dress” (Kaup, 2001; Kaup & Zwaan, 2003).
Another reason for asymmetric processing of the contents of armatives and
negations may be that negations activate associations that are incongruent with the
message of the full proposition. There are conicting ndings on this. MacDonald
and Just (1989) used a probe task following a sentence in which either the probe
or another noun was negated (e.g., “Elizabeth bakes some bread but no cookies”)
and found that negation did suppress activation (as measured by response times
to the probe) specically for the noun with which it was associated. However,
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the results did not follow this pattern when the probe was not the noun itself but
an associate of the negated noun (“butter”/“cookies”). It is unclear whether this
was due to small eects of spreading activation overall, or because negation failed
to suppress associated concepts even though activation of the negated concept
itself was suppressed. Mayo, Schul, and Burnstein (2004) found that the negations
did activate concepts related to the negated concept: participants were slower
to reject incongruent probes like “Tom’s clothes are folded neatly in his closet”
after a negation “Tom is not a tidy person” than to reject incongruent probes after
armatives. However, this was dependent on the type of negation presented:
negations of predicates that could be conceptualised in a bipolar fashion, such
as “not tidy” (i.e., messy), were more likely to be processed as integrated units (a
“fusion” model of processing) than those for which this was not necessarily the case,
such as creative. In addition to such eects on processing and initially responding
to information presented in a negated form, research on the storage and access of
such information has shown that this is sometimes dicult: encountering negated
information may make people more likely to believe this information, even though
they have been exposed to it in negated form (Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990; Mayo,
Schul, & Rosenthal, 2014).
Some researchers take the view that the information provided by negative
statements is constructed by a kind of two-step perceptual simulation, in which
the world described by the negated material is simulated and this information
used to produce a simulation of the full proposition. This is a generalisation of the
notion of representation through the use of possible world models, or “situation
models”, in which perceptual aspects of a described world are simulated (e.g.
Zwaan, Staneld, & Yaxley, 2002) and deductions can be made by comparing
and discarding possible models of the world (e.g. Barres & Johnson-Laird, 2003;
Khemlani, Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 2012; Johnson-Laird, 1983). Evidence for
this view of negation processing has been obtained from studies showing that
perceptual aspects of the embedded proposition are primed when negations are
presented: for instance, picture-naming studies using a priming paradigm suggest
that comprehenders must at some stage switch their attention from simulating
the negated situation to simulating the actual described situation (Kaup & Zwaan,
2003; Kaup, Lüdtke, & Zwaan, 2006; Kaup & Lüdtke, 2007); further discussion and
evidence for this perspective is provided by Hasson and Glucksberg (2006), who
used evidence from negated metaphors to avoid issues with lexical priming in
concluding that comprehenders switch to representing a full negative proposition
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around 500 to 1,000 ms after it is read, and also by Anderson, Huette, Matlock,
and Spivey (2010) and Tian, Breheny, and Ferguson (2010). However, a simulation
model of negation processing does not necessarily mean that a two-stage account
is necessary. Huette and Anderson (2012) present a recurrent network model
proposing that a simulation account can handle at least some types of negation in
a single step, without the need to simulate the world described by the embedded
proposition or to use any kind of logical tag, as in schema-plus-tag accounts.
It became clear relatively early that any processing slowdown, two-step process,
or other type of diculty caused by negation is not constant across all contexts
or situations in which negations can be presented. Wason (1965) showed that
participants were quicker to verify negative descriptions of a set of items when
they were rst described in terms of an “exceptional item and a residual class”,
rather than in terms of a larger set and a smaller set. Early links made between the
philosophical and semantic approaches described in section 1.2.1 above and early
psycholinguistic ndings led to the suggestion that some of the eects observed
might be accounted for by the specics of the purposes for which negation is
used naturalistically (Apostel, 1972a; Wason, 1972). These observations can be
summarised by Apostel’s suggestion that the use of a negation not-q tends to mean
or imply “incompatible with q but in the neighbourhood of q” (Apostel, 1972b).
Along similar lines, De Mey (1972) makes the case that negation can only be made
sense of as an invitation for the comprehender to shift their attention, and thus to
understand it fully in psycholinguistics, it is crucial to present fully eshed-out
contexts: “‘Natural’ negation only involves objects or elements a speaker or a
listener is attending to. Negation then appears as a ‘meta-operator’, instructing
the listener to attend no longer to a possibility he is considering. It makes no sense
to instruct a listener to suppress a thought he is not considering or an idea he is
not having” (p. 149).
Thus, a case can be made that a critical factor in determining the approach
a comprehender must take to processing negation is the extent to which a clear
concept for the communicated state of aairs is both dened and available. This
dening can take place on one of several levels: for example, in the lexical semantics
of the words chosen to express the negation, or on a pragmatic level where the
context of an utterance constrains the meaning of a lexically ambiguous word to
make the current negation of it obvious. The rst case is what we would ordinarily
describe as bipolar negations: even in the absence of any particular context, there is
a clear opposite (e.g., clean, the negation of which clearly implies dirty). The second
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case involves negated forms that may be unipolar if presented in isolation, but that
present a clear opposite in the specic context given. For instance, not creative
could imply dull in a context like “John never came up with new ideas. He was
simply not creative” or unartistic in a context like “John never made much progress
in his art class. He was simply not creative”. The pragmatics of the context clearly
select from among these possibilities. This may have the eect, in processing
terms, of transforming a unipolar negation into a bipolar negation. Löbner (2000)
discusses pragmatic and cognitive aspects of this type of polarisation, arguing that
this process can be understood as a simplication strategy for conveying useful
insights about the real world without introducing too much complexity. Thus, the
context of a negative statement can set up a “contrast frame” or “contrast set” that
aids the comprehender in interpreting what is conveyed by it, creating a locally
constructed polarity contrast dened by the relevant discourse presuppositions.
This type of argument leads towards the hypothesis that an adequately realistic
usage of negation, in a pragmatically enriched discourse context, may present
a meaningfully more straightforward processing problem — to a greater extent
than is true for armatives. Approaches such as those by Glenberg, Robertson,
Jansen, and Johnson-Glenberg (1999) and Giora (2006) present the modern view
that there is arguably no fundamental processing asymmetry between armatives
and negations when the higher-level pragmatic functionality is taken into account;
similarly, Lea and Mulligan (2002) show that where negative information is useful
in making deductions, it is readily incorporated.
These views are supported empirically by more recent studies nding that,
given adequate pragmatic context and support for the use of negation, incrementally-
formulated predictions made by comprehenders can take negation into account.
These include Nieuwland and Kuperberg’s (2008) nding that the pattern of ERP
ndings observed by Fischler et al. (1983) can be reversed when pragmatically
felicitous negative sentences are presented (e.g., “With proper equipment, scuba
diving is not very dangerous and often good fun”), as well as similar work by Dale
and Duran (2011) using a computer mouse-tracking methodology and Orenes,
Moxey, Scheepers, and Santamaría (2016) using an eye-tracking approach. These
ndings are discussed in more detail in the introductory sections of the relevant
chapters below.
Taking together these empirical ndings that pragmatic context is a critical
factor in what comprehenders can do with an incomplete proposition involving
negation and the other work, described above, on the processing mechanisms
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involved (e.g., creation of a relevant contrast set that allows the negation and
negated concept to be treated as a unit with coherent meaning), an explanation can
be proposed for why pragmatic felicity has such a major impact on the processing of
negation. Increasing the felicity of a negative statement, through the presentation
of a particular discourse context, renders upcoming content more predictable,
which has the eect of making negations more easily “solved” under this type of
processing. This means that, once a negating element such as not is encountered, it
is both easier to interpret this element and easier to predict what is likely to follow
it (i.e., to be negated), since the possible space of likely upcoming communicative
messages has been constrained.
Under this view, prediction forms a critical component of why increasing the
pragmatic felicity of a piece of linguistic input has such eects on the processing
of negation. The hypothesis that pragmatic and semantic predictability constitutes
the underlying factor governing the extent to which negation can be processed
incrementally is the overriding driver of the work presented here, which is briey
introduced in section 1.3 below.
1.3 Introduction to experimental work
The following chapters present a set of experimental approaches to investigating
the specic role of predictability — as divorced from pragmatic felicity — in the
incremental processing of negation. To achieve this, the general approach is to
manipulate episodic contextual information supplied along with each instance of
linguistic input. For example, in Chapter 2, brief animations are presented along
with sentences describing the events that occur (or do not occur) in them, such
as “The wizard didn’t raise the position of the basket”. This strategy allows for
the presentation of only sentences that are pragmatically licensed by the context,
without relying on real-world semantic knowledge and associations to support
the licensing; furthermore, by varying the context presented, the same sentence
can be employed in conditions with dierent levels of predictability. This type of
design is explained in more detail in the relevant sections of each experimental
chapter.
The overarching hypothesis is that, even in the case of sentences that are
all equally pragmatically felicitous, predictability should be expected to have an
impact on the extent to which negative sentences can be processed as readily as
armatives. Specically, when predictability is high, negations should be expected
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to behave very much like armatives, in that measures tapping into comprehen-
ders’ predictions about upcoming material should be expected to show that they
take into account all available information, including the presence of negation;
conversely, when predictability is low, negations should be expected to behave
(at least during early stages of processing) less like armatives, with predictions
formulated less readily and perhaps actively containing mistakes, demonstrating
that they have been formulated without taking negation into account.
Several methodological approaches are employed to test this broad hypoth-
esis by accessing such mid-processing predictions. Chapter 2 presents an EEG
experiment measuring modulation of the N400 component. Next, three computer
mouse-tracking experiments are presented, in which participants’ mouse trajecto-
ries while making truth value judgements (Experiment 1, Chapter 3) and selecting
picture-based sentence completions (Experiments 2 and 3, Chapter 4) are examined.
Finally, a preliminary eye-tracking experiment (Chapter 5) explores the scope for
use of this type of paradigm in investigating the impact of various factors, includ-
ing predictability, on the incremental processing of negation. Chapter 6 provides
a general discussion and conclusion drawing together the evidence provided by





2.1.1 Electroencephalography in language research
Electroencephalography (EEG) is a technique in which electrical signals generated
by the activity of the brain’s neurons are measured, generally using electrodes
placed on the scalp. Unlike imaging techniques such as fMRI, EEG provides
only impoverished information on the location of brain activity, but one of its
advantages is extremely high resolution in time (e.g. Luck, 2005). By correlating
the presentation of stimuli with variations in the characteristics of the signal,
researchers can observe the eects of manipulating these stimuli. Over time,
various useful components of this time-locked response (the event-related potential,
or ERP) have been identied; these have been found to represent responses to
particular aspects of certain stimuli, and thus, their magnitudes can usefully be
employed as dependent measures. Some of these components, which may be both
event-preceding and event-following, are reviewed by Coles and Rugg (1995).
Several ERP components have proven particularly relevant to language-related
research questions. One of these is the N400, which was rst reported by Kutas
and Hillyard (1980) to be elicited by words that were semantically incongruous
in a sentence context, e.g., “He spread the warm bread with socks”. The N400 is a
negative-going component that occurs late after the onset of stimulus presentation,
usually with a peak latency around 400 ms. The component has been the subject of
extensive debate (reviewed by Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, 2011) as to its properties,
the nature of the underlying cognitive processes that it can be taken to reect,
and how variations in its amplitude should be interpreted. The component is
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modulated primarily by semantic violations of various kinds: according to Kutas
and Hillyard (1984), its magnitude is roughly the inverse of a critical word’s cloze
probability (the relative frequency with which readers select the word in question
as a candidate for the next word when presented with the partial sentence up to
that point). The component has also been found to be sensitive to the distinction
between within-category and between-category violations. For example, in a
context (“They wanted to make the hotel look more like a tropical resort. So along
the driveway, they planted rows of...”) in which palms is expected, tulips (between-
category violation) elicits a larger N400 than pines (within-category violation),
even though both completions are an equally poor t (Federmeier & Kutas, 1999).
It should be noted that Rayner and Clifton (2009) oer some cautions for the
use of ERPs in language research, given the speed and incrementality of linguistic
processing. To an extent, they point out, the focus on later components (which
may completely miss some of the relevant processes) may arise from the use of
rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), in which a sentence is presented visually
word-by-word, to avoid the timing and artefactual (eye movement) problems that
may arise in such experiments from the use of presentation methods like spoken
presentation or natural reading. They note that the use of spoken presentation
may produce results that dier in important ways, particularly at earlier stages of
processing.
2.1.2 Using the N400 to investigate incrementality and negation
As outlined in the General Introduction, the extent to which language comprehen-
sion proceeds incrementally, with continuously updated, active predictions, has
been a topic of extensive research. ERPs provide a highly useful measure for this
line of investigation, and the N400 component is especially relevant because of
the way it can be used as a proxy for the extent to which part of a sentence was
semantically expected or predicted by the comprehender, or the ease with which it
is integrated into the comprehender’s representation of the sentence. Thus, it can
be used to answer questions about various levels of linguistic processing. For ex-
ample, van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Hagoort, and Brown (2003) presented sentences
containing critical words with opposite meanings, in which either was equally
acceptable given only the local content of the sentence (e.g., “Jane told her brother
that he was exceptionally quick/slow”). They found that when additional discourse
content was introduced preceding this sentence, rendering one of the alternatives
contextually appropriate and the other contextually anomalous, an N400 eect
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appeared in which a larger N400 was evoked by the anomalous word, showing that
the wider discourse is integrated rapidly into the comprehender’s interpretation
of and predictions for the sentence. Hagoort and van Berkum (2007) review a
number of eects relating to the integration of more general world knowledge and
speaker knowledge; the overall picture suggests that contextual knowledge and
the meaning of the sentence are immediately and continuously used to update the
comprehender’s interpretation of an utterance, in contrast with two-step models
suggestion that the meaning of each part of a sentence must be computed before
integrating it into the surrounding structure. More recently, in the domain of
syntactic interpretation, Chow et al. (2016) used stimuli in which the syntactic
roles of arguments were exchanged to show that comprehenders’ predictions about
upcoming material (as indexed by their N400 responses) are inuenced system-
atically by the syntactic roles of words, and not merely by semantic associations
with a “bag of words” regardless of their relationships to each other.
Tackling a topic with more direct similarities to the subject of particular in-
terest here, Urbach and colleagues used N400 amplitudes to investigate whether
quantiers are interpreted incrementally, a question that has many commonalities
with questions about the processing of negation (such as the relevance of scope and
the possibility for various types of two-stage processing). Urbach and Kutas (2010),
using sentences of the form “Most/few farmers grow crops/worms as their primary
source of income”, found that the magnitude of the N400 component was reduced
in response to worms (and increased for crops) when most was replaced with few,
but a full reversal of the eects was not observed, suggesting that incorporation of
the full meaning of quantiers into the sentence representation is not immediate,
but is also not fully delayed. A later study including pragmatically-supportive dis-
course contexts for similar sentences (e.g., “Alex was an unusual toddler. Most/Few
kids prefer sweets/vegetables...”) suggested that the presence of such contexts
induced a full reversal of the eects depending on which quantier was presented,
once again highlighting the relevance of the pragmatic context to incremental
interpretation (Urbach, DeLong, & Kutas, 2015). In this case, a quantier with
negative force was sucient to reverse participants’ expectations about upcoming
material.
Turning to N400 research specically examining the processing of negation,
an early study by Fischler et al. (1983) investigated the eects on N400 amplitude
of presenting true and false negative sentences such as “A robin is (not) a bird/tree”.
They found that sentences of this type elicited a large N400 to tree and a reduced
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N400 to bird regardless of whether not was present in the sentence (and therefore,
whether it was true or false), concluding that the N400 therefore reects the
strength of the semantic associations between the critical word and preceding
information (in this case, bird is closely associated with robin, whereas tree is
not), rather than the truth value of the sentence, and that the embedded (negated)
proposition in such sentences may be interpreted before applying the negation.
More recent work, however, has produced more mixed ndings, identifying
various scenarios in which the N400 in negative contexts can in fact be modulated
by truth value or oine cloze probability, rather than primarily by semantic
associations. For example, Lüdtke, Friedrich, de Filippis, and Kaup (2008) presented
German sentences describing a positional relationship between two objects, e.g.,
“Vor dem Turm ist ein / kein Geist” (In front of the tower there is a / no ghost).
Each sentence was followed by a picture that was either congruent or incongruent
with the sentence: in the example case, there was either a ghost or a lion in front
of a tower. They found that when the picture was presented after a short delay
(250 ms) following the sentence, the amplitude of the N400 (as well as behavioural
responses) elicited by the picture was simply a function of whether the object
present in the picture was the one mentioned in the sentence or not, regardless
of whether the picture was congruent with the actual meaning of the sentence.
However, when the delay was much longer (1,500 ms), main eects of truth value
and negation were also observed (i.e., the extent to which the N400 response was
governed solely by whether the gure present in the picture matched the entity
mentioned in the sentence regardless of negation was reduced), suggesting that
the eects of the negation on participants’ predictions about the image could be
added to the priming eects, partially cancelling them out, given sucient time.
Ferguson, Sanford, and Leuthold (2008) measured N400 responses as well
as eye-movements in response to semantically congruent or anomalous critical
words in sentences preceded by counterfactual scenarios in which real-world
expectations were negated but no explicit alternative scenario was constructed:
for example, “If cats were not carnivores they would be cheaper for owners to look
after. Families could feed their cat a bowl of carrots / sh and it would gobble it
down happily”. Based on both measures, they drew similar conclusions to Lüdtke
et al. (2008), nding that the introduction of a negated-world (as opposed to a real-
world) context was insucient to immediately update comprehenders’ predictions
about the input, which was instead tested against real-world knowledge. This
nding does not constitute strong evidence that negation was the sole cause of
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this incomplete updating, as counterfactual sentences couched in an armative
manner were not tested, but it was taken by the authors to show that negation
does not always act purely to suppress concepts related to the negated entity. They
propose that instead it acts as a prompt to initiate a search for specic alternatives
to the negated concept.
Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) noted that one potential confounding factor
in the original sentences used by Fischler et al. (1983) was that the negative
sentences tended to be pragmatically infelicitous: that is, there was no particular
discourse or other context making the production of sentences like “A robin is
not a tree” relevant. Since negations are normally used to deny or otherwise
contradict a proposition that may already be under consideration for some reason,
they are more sensitive than armatives to licensing conditions rendering them
pragmatically felicitous or infelicitous. Nieuwland and Kuperberg tested the
hypothesis that the infelicity of these sentences formed part of the explanation for
the the failure of their truth value to modulate the N400 by crossing pragmatic
felicity with truth value. They presented armative or negative and true or
false sentences that were rated as either natural (e.g. “With proper equipment,
scuba diving is/isn’t very safe/dangerous and often good fun”) or unnatural (e.g.
“Bulletproof vests are/aren’t very safe/dangerous and used worldwide for security”).
For unnatural (i.e., pragmatically unlicensed) sentences, they replicated Fischler
et al.’s original (1983) ndings, but for licensed sentences, they found that N400
responses followed the same pattern for negatives as for armatives: that is, a
critical word rendering the sentence false elicited a large N400, and one rendering
the sentence true elicited a reduced N400, regardless of whether negation was
involved or not. They concluded that, provided that negative sentences are used
to present information that is pragmatically licensed by a real-world context, the
presence of negation poses no particular obstacle to the incremental updating of a
sentence representation that incorporates all available information.
More recently still, Xiang, Grove, and Giannakidou (2016) examined N400
responses to ever, a negative polarity item (NPI) that must be licensed by a negative
context. The authors compared NPIs licensed by asserted negation (e.g. “The
teacher brought a tarantula to class. No/Few/Only third-graders had ever seen one
before”) and by implied negation (e.g. “She was surprised that third-graders had
ever seen one before”). They found that, in all of these cases, the NPI elicited a
smaller N400 than in the case of use of an NPI without a licensing context (e.g.
“*Third-graders had ever seen one before”), further supporting the view that the
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presence of a (pragmatically appropriate) negation can incrementally inuence
comprehenders’ preparation for or responses to upcoming material. In this case, the
predicted or readily interpreted material was dependent on a syntactic relationship
(licensing) arising from the availability of semantic or pragmatic information,
illustrating the multiple levels over which negative information can be accessed
and incorporated.
2.1.3 The role of pragmatic licensing and predictability
Nieuwland and Kuperberg’s (2008) study is one of several, across various method-
ologies, nding that pragmatic licensing is an essential predictor of whether com-
prehenders can incrementally incorporate negation into their interpretation of a
sentence and update their predictions accordingly. However, it is not clear exactly
why pragmatic licensing has this eect, since people are easily able to judge the
truth value of negated sentences whether they are licensed or not. One possibility
is that pragmatic felicity is intrinsically related to predictability. This relates to the
abovementioned “search-for-alternatives” described by Ferguson et al. (2008), in
that the scope of this search can be narrowed considerably by contextual informa-
tion that increases the predictability of the sentence. In the absence of pragmatic
context providing information on why a particular proposition specically has
been selected to be negated (e.g., a correction of an intelocutor’s mistaken belief), it
is very dicult for a comprehender to make predictions about upcoming material
in a sentence that incorporate the interpretation of the negation. In other words,
there is no completion with a particularly high cloze probability. The case can be
made that the probability distribution over possible subsequent words tends to
look rather dierent in the case of armative sentences: even in the absence of a
similar type of context to that which renders negations more predictable, there
are more concepts that are associated with the information available as part of the
utterance so far than there are concepts that are not associated. Thus, although
there may be no single completion with an extremely high cloze probability, the
overall distribution is much more likely to be centred on a relatively small number
of relatively high-probability possibilities.
In fact, in many cases, among the best predictions a comprehender can make
during incremental interpretation of a negative sentence might be those that would
seem to render the sentence false, because in the absence of any other context, the
speaker might be intending to deny a commonly accepted belief that they claim is
a misconception (“The food that Marie Antoinette is supposed to have suggested
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the peasants should eat wasn’t cake, actually — it was brioche.”). That is, in the
absence of any richer context, bird is not such a poor bet to complete the sentence
“A robin is not a ...”, even though it produces a falsehood; and it is much easier to
predict than tree, as without any further information for the context in which the
statement is being made, there are virtually innite options for nal words that
could complete the sentence to make it equally true. Including a richer pragmatic
context has the eect of narrowing the eld of possibilities for the pragmatic force
that the speaker intends their negative utterance to have, perhaps identifying a
relevant reference class, thus allowing the possibility of making predictions that
take into account the negation.
The research question tackled in the present study was whether this predictabil-
ity can in fact be regarded as the “active ingredient” in the pragmatic felicity: that
is, whether predictability inuences the extent to which negation can be processed
incrementally, in the absence of any associated variation in pragmatic felicity.
2.1.4 The present study
In view of the fact that few previous experiments have examined predictability
separately from pragmatic factors as a possible factor in the ease and incrementality
of processing of negations, an experimental paradigm that would permit this was
designed. In particular, the aim was to present participants with only pragmatically
licensed sentences, while varying the predictability of a critical word.
To achieve this, episodic scenarios were presented visually using brief anima-
tions; these constructed temporary relationships between objects and predicates
(in this case, actions applied to the objects by a character) in a highly constrained,
simulated world. Each animation was accompanied by a sentence describing what
had happened in the animation, mentioning only actions and objects that had
featured in it. These sentences could be true or false. Although information that is
only relevant episodically may not always be added in a lasting way to real-world
long-term knowledge, it has been found that the N400 can be modulated on the
basis of this type of information. In addition to the studies described above that
made use of episodic information, this has been tested specically, for example by
Fischler, Childers, Achariyapaopan, and Perry (1985), who presented participants
with a list of facts about the supposed occupations of ctional characters (e.g.
“Mary is a lawyer”) prior to EEG recordings of their responses to true and false
sentences based on this information. A larger N400 was elicited by false (i.e., not
in accordance with the provided information) statements of the form than by
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true statements, even though there was no pre-existing or real-world association
between “Mary” and “lawyer” and the participants presumably did not update
their real-world judgements about the occupations of any people. Contextual
information can also override responses that would be strongly evoked in the
absence of such information, for example in the case of an animacy violation. This
was demonstrated by Nieuwland and van Berkum (2006), who found that through
the presentation of sucient preceding context (a story about a peanut singing a
song about his girlfriend), a larger N400 component could be elicited in response
to the normally acceptable and somewhat predictable sentence “The peanut was
salted” in comparison to the normally unacceptable and surprising sentence “The
peanut was in love”. On the basis of such ndings, it was anticipated that, in the
present experiment, true and false sentences would modulate the N400 in the same
way as sentences whose truth value is based on long-term, real-world semantic
memory.
This approach has several advantages over presenting sentences that are true
or false based on general, real-world knowledge. First, it is not always possible to
be certain that assumed real-world information is shared by all participants, or
to the same degree. Even if a statement is universally agreed to be true, its truth
might be more obvious or more readily accessible to some participants than to
others, for example if they are more or less familiar with the domain in question.
In contrast, presenting an episodic context clearly rendering the statement true or
false immediately prior to the statement ensures that the truth value of the latter
is equally unambiguous and equally accessible to all participants. Second, it is
dicult to control for the eects of the actual linguistic input (e.g., the lengths
of words or their associations with other words) when presenting statements
based on real-world knowledge, as the sentence must be formulated around the
real-world information, and true and false sentences must obviously dier from
one another, such as through the use of contrasting predicates (e.g., in Nieuwland
& Kuperberg, 2008: “With proper equipment, scuba diving is very safe / dangerous
and often good fun”). When the truth or falsity of a sentence is instead based
on episodic information, it is possible to present exactly the same sentence to
dierent participants and (through the use of dierent episodic contexts) have it
represent a true sentence in one case and a false sentence in the other. The same
is true for the other independent variable manipulated in the present experiment,
namely predictability. Thus, this design allowed the presentation of linguistic
stimuli that were perfectly controlled for content across participants, while their
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truth value and the predictability of the critical word were manipulated by altering
the accompanying animation.
Third, and most crucial to the aim of the present experiment, this approach
enabled the manipulation of predictability independently of pragmatic felicity
or licensing. When real-world information is used to vary the predictability of
a critical word in a sentence, its pragmatic felicity tends to vary in the same
direction (and vice versa), because, as discussed above, highly felicitous sentences
are likely to be very predictable. For example, although Nieuwland and Kuperberg
(2008) did not obtain predictability norms in Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008),
intuition suggests that the critical word was considerably more predictable in their
pragmatically licensed sentences (“With proper equipment, scuba-diving is very...”)
than in the unlicensed sentences (“Bulletproof vests are very...”). (In both these
cases, the completion was safe.) Although the correlation between felicity and
predictability in such sentences is not perfect, it is rather dicult to assess them
independently in this type of paradigm.
In a related experiment with quantiers, Nieuwland (2016) did collect measures
of predictability in the form of cloze probabilities: for example, in the stimulus set
“Many/few gardeners plant their owers during the spring/winter for best results”,
the critical word (in this example, the name of the season) was highly predictable in
the case of the true pair of sentences. The authors found that sentences with high
cloze probability showed a pattern similar to that associated with sentences in the
pragmatically licensed condition in Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008), with N400
amplitude at the critical word modulated in the same way by truth value regardless
of whether a positive or negative quantier was used, suggesting that participant
were able to incrementally incorporate information from quantiers into their
interpretations of such sentences, whereas low cloze probability sentences elicited
an interaction between truth value and quantier type. This constitutes further
evidence that predictability forms an important component of such incremental
processing eects, although because this paradigm also relied on world knowledge
to manipulate truth value, predictabilty could not be completely dierentiated
from variables such as felicity and lexical co-occurrence of the words in each
sentence.
In contrast, manipulating the truth value of sentences using episodic informa-
tion means that predictability is not only independent of felicity, it is also tightly
and quantiably controlled. Furthermore, because all the sentences used in the
present experiment were rather predictable (the critical word could be predicted
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with a probability of 1 in predictable conditions and 0.5 in unpredictable con-
ditions), it was expected that they would elicit particularly large N400 eects,
because comprehenders would be able to make strong predictions that would be
either clearly met or clearly violated. In turn, this anticipated large eect size could
make the eects of polarity easier to detect, by providing scope for an interaction
that could also have a larger eect size.
2.1.5 Design and hypotheses
The independent variables manipulated on each trial were polarity of the sentence
and predictability of the critical word. Truth value of the sentence was also
manipulated in order to compare the N400 response to true and false sentences
in each condition. Thus, the experiment employed a 2 (polarity: armative or
negative) × 2 (truth value: true or false) × 2 (predictability: high or low) design.
All variables were manipulated within participants, with counterbalancing for
extraneous variables, such as features of the stimuli (animations and sentences)
carried out between participants (see Methods for full design details).
In the case of highly predictable sentences, a replication of Nieuwland and
Kuperberg’s (2008) ndings was anticipated: namely, that processing would be
equally easy and incremental for both armatives and negations (all being prag-
matically licensed). Reecting this, large N400s to false sentences and reduced
N400s to true sentences were expected, regardless of polarity. However, in the
case of (relatively) low predictability, it was expected that even these pragmati-
cally licensed sentences would present processing diculties in the presence of
negation, evoking similar eects to those seen by Fischler et al. (1983) in the case
of pragmatically unlicensed sentences. Reecting this, an attentuation or even
reversal of the pattern predicted for highly predictable sentences was predicted
in the case of negations. Specically, in the case of low predictability sentences,
large N400s to false sentences and reduced N400s to true sentences were expected
for armatives (as with high predictability sentences), but for negations, in the
case of the most extreme form of this eect, reduced N400s to true sentences and
large N400s to false sentences could be expected.
Thus, the hypotheses were as follows: (1) a main eect of truth value would be
observed, with true sentences overall eliciting reduced N400s; (2) a truth value ×
polarity interaction would occur, in which the N400 reduction for true sentences
value would be attenuated or even reversed in the case of negations; and (3) a
truth value × polarity × predictability interaction would occur, in which the
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aforementioned reversal of the truth value eect for negations would be found to




Stimuli consisted of short animated scenes, each paired with a sentence describing
an aspect of the corresponding scene. In each animation, three everyday objects
(from a set selected for their high recognisability and nameability) appeared and
a “magical” character (e.g., wizard or fairy) interacted with them by casting two
dierent spells (Figure 2.1). For each spell, the intended outcome was represented
in the form of a thought bubble showing that the character was thinking about a
particular action. Following the thought bubble, the spell was directed towards all
three objects, as shown by star-shaped “sparks”, accompanied by a sound eect.
The outcome of the spell was displayed for each object in turn, from left to right.
First, the image of the object blinked three times to indicate that its outcome would
now be displayed. In the case of each object, the spell could either succeed or
fail. If it succeeded, a chime sound eect was played and the animation showed
the action being carried out for that object (e.g., a square dropped into the scene
over it, or the colour was gradually drained from the object). If it failed, a buzzer
sound eect was played and nothing changed about the object. This process was
displayed for each object and for each spell. After the second spell, the nal frame
from the animation (with all actions completed) remained on the screen as a still
for 500 ms. In total, each animation lasted approximately 15 s.
For animations associated with critical trials, one of the two spells always
succeeded for exactly one of the objects (the critical object) and failed for the
other two, while the other spell always succeeded for the two non-critical objects
and failed for the critical object. For animations associated with ller trials, these
constraints did not apply, and the outcome of each spell (success or failure) was
decided independently for each object. Thus, on ller trials, objects could be
aected by both actions, or by neither action.
For critical trials, each animation could be paired with eight dierent sentences,
of the form “The fairy deposited / didn’t deposit a square around the leaf in that
scene” (Table 2.1). The sentence could be armative or negative (deposited vs.
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Figure 2.1: EEG experiment visual context stimulus: example frames from an
animation presented before a critical sentence. In the rst panel, the character
thinks about performing the “deposit a square around” action. This action is
attempted on each object in turn; in the second panel, it can be seen that it has
succeeded for the leaf, but failed for the foot and the blanket. In the third panel,
the character thinks about performing the “fade the colour of” action. Again, this
action is attempted on each object in turn; in the fourth panel, it can be seen that
it has succeeded for the foot and the blanket, but failed for the leaf. This state of
aairs sets the stage for each of eight possible critical sentences (see Table 2.1).
Armative Negative
High predictability
True: The fairy deposited
a square around the leaf
in that scene.
True: The fairy didn’t fade
the colour of the leaf in
that scene.
False: The fairy deposited
a square around the foot
in that scene.
False: The fairy didn’t
fade the colour of the foot
in that scene.
Low predictability
True: The fairy faded the
colour of the foot in that
scene.
True: The fairy didn’t de-
posit a square around the
foot in that scene.
False: The fairy faded the
colour of the leaf in that
scene.
False: The fairy didn’t de-
posit a square around the
leaf in that scene.
Table 2.1: EEG experiment linguistic stimuli: all possible sentences that could
follow the example animation shown in Figure 2.1.
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didn’t deposit), true or false (in reference to the animation), and predictable or
unpredictable. In the case of predictable sentences, at the point immediately
preceding the object name, there was only one possible object (the critical one
in the animation) whose name could complete the sentence to make it true. In
the case of unpredictable sentences, there were two possibilities (either of the
non-critical objects). All sentences ended with post-critical material of at least two
words, to avoid end-of-sentence eects in the ERP to the object name. For ller
trials, the sentences took the same form, but because there was no critical object
in the corresponding animation, they did not generally fall into the categories of
“predictable” or “unpredictable”.
All sentences were considered to be pragmatically licensed, because each
sentence referred to an action and an object that had featured in the episodic
context (nothing was mentioned “out of the blue”); furthermore, even when an
action had not applied to a particular object, an attempt had always been made
by the character to apply it, meaning that it was felicitous to deny that this
had happened. Nevertheless, the predictability of the critical word could still be
manipulated. This was achieved by the fact that, on critical trials, one of the actions
applied to two dierent objects, while the other action applied only to a single
object, meaning that in some conditions, only a single object name could complete
the sentence to make it true, whereas in others, either of two object names would
accomplish this.
In total, 176 animations were created. Of these, 56 were were associated with
ller trials, which were completed by every participant. For the remaining 120
(associated with critical trials), two dierent versions of the animation were created
(for a total of 240), in which the critical object exchanged roles with one of the
non-critical objects. This ensured that pairs of trials with identical linguistic stimuli
could be presented (to dierent participants) in each predictability condition, by
using the same sentence accompanied by each version of the animation, thus
controlling for any item-related eects of the identity of the named object (for
example, its salience or nameability).
Each of these 120 pairs of animations was associated with eight possible
sentences, producing 16 possible trials, for a total of 1,920 possible trials. The
allocation of trials to participants was counterbalanced such that no participant
saw more than one trial from a set of 16, while each participant saw an equal
number of trials in each condition and each possible trial was presented exactly
twice (to dierent participants).
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Animations were created, stimuli displayed, and participants’ responses recorded
using the Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems), which was also used
to output timing markers to the software recording the EEG signal (see below).
Memory test
Sets of sentences were also constructed for use in a memory test following the
main experiment. The stimuli for each participant consisted of 48 sentences of
the same form as the sentences presented in the main experiment, each being
associated in the same way as in the main experiment with one of the animations
that the participant had seen. Half of the sentences had in fact featured in the main
experiment in the form used in the memory test, whereas the other half were new
sentences that the participant had not already seen. Additionally, half the sentences
were true (with reference to the relevant animation seen by the participant) and
the other half were false; and half were armative and half negative. All memory
test sentences would have fallen into the low predictability condition in the main
experiment.
EEG recording apparatus
Scalp EEG was recorded continuously from each participant during the main
experiment, using an Acticap elasticated cap (Brain Products) with 32 active
Ag/AgCl electrodes referenced online to FCz (Figure 2.2). Data from each electrode
were sampled at a rate of 1,000 Hz, amplied using a BrainAmp DC amplier
(Brain Products), and recorded using the Vision Recorder software (Brain Products)
on a separate computer to the one used to present stimuli and record responses.
The recordings were also marked, using port transmissions from the stimulus-
presenting computer, to indicate the timings of critical events, including the onset
of each word presented in the sentence and the participant’s behavioural responses
to the task.
During EEG recording, the participant was seated in a sealed Faraday cage to
reduce electrical noise in the EEG signal.
2.2.2 Participants
A total of 32 participants, 25 female, aged 18–23 years (M = 19.6, SD = 1.3) were
recruited from in and around the University of Bristol community. All were native




























Figure 2.2: Electrode layout during recording in EEG experiment. M1 and M2 were
placed on the left and right mastoids in place of electrodes at TP9 and TP10. Fz was
used as a ground and all channels were referenced online to FCz. For analysis, data
from each channel was rereferenced to the mean of M1 and M2. Green electrodes
represent the centroparietal region of interest.
(Mandarin, French, or Hebrew) to an advanced or uent standard. Three were
left-handed and the handedness of one participant was not recorded.
All participants gave their informed consent to participate and were compen-
sated for their time with course credit or a small payment. Ethical approval for
the experiment was granted by the University of Bristol Faculty of Science Ethics
Committee (ethical approval code 18541).
2.2.3 Procedure
Prior to providing their infomed consent to participate, each participant was
familiarised with the EEG laboratory and materials, including the Faraday cage
chamber, cap and electrodes, syringes and needles used for gelling, and intercom
through which they could communicate with the experimenter. The correct cap size
for the participant was selected based on head measurements and 32 electrodes
tted to the cap according to the standard layout, with the exceptions of the
electrodes designated TP9 and TP10 (Figure 2.2).
Following this process, the participant was seated in a chair a comfortable
distance from the screen inside the Faraday cage. The appropriate cap was tted
carefully, with measurements taken to ensure that it was positioned correctly, and
secured using a chin-strap. Electrodes TP9 and TP10 were placed underneath the
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cap at the left and right mastoids (M1 and M2), respectively, and axed to the skin
using microporous tape. Saline gel was then applied to the hair and scalp at the
site of each electrode to ensure good conductivity between the scalp and electrode.
In most cases, impedances at each electrode were 5 kΩ or below. Impedances could
not be recorded for three participants due to a software error, although visual
inspection of the signal suggested that they were at an adequate level.
Once gelling was complete, the participant was instructed on the task and asked
to avoid blinking and moving to the greatest extent possible during presentation of
sentences. They wore headphones, placed over the electrode cap, through which
sound eects forming part of the animations were presented, and held a gamepad
controller that was used to give responses. The door to the Faraday cage was
sealed and the experiment began when the participant was ready.
On each trial, the participant watched a brief animation (see Materials section
above). Following the animation, the question “True or false?” was displayed in
the centre of the screen for 300 ms, followed by a blank screen for 200 ms. Each
word in a sentence was then displayed individually in the centre of the screen
for 300 ms, with a 200 ms blank screen between each word. After the nal word,
the prompts “True” and “False” appeared on the left and right sides of the screen,
respectively, with arrows indicating that the participant should respond using the
corresponding button on the gamepad. No feedback on responses was provided.
Following the response, the screen displayed a message inviting the participant to
begin the next trial by pressing a button on the game pad.
Trials were presented in eight blocks, each consisting of 22 trials. Participants
were invited to take a longer break to move around (while remaining seated and
wearing the cap), rest, etc. between blocks. In total, each participant completed
176 trials, presented in a random order, of which 120 were critical (15 in each
experimental condition) and 56 were llers.
After the main experiment, the cap was removed and the participant was given
the opportunity to walk around and take a longer break. Subsequently, they were
asked to complete a memory task in which they were presented with sentences
that either had or had not been included in the main experiment. Sentences were
presented visually in the centre of the screen using the MouseTracker software
(Freeman & Ambady, 2010), and participants clicked “Read” or “Not read” response
buttons to indicate for each sentence whether they believed they had encountered
it during the main experiment. Responses and mouse trajectories were recorded,































































































Figure 2.3: EEG experiment response accuracy violin plot: proportion of correct
responses in the truth value judgement task for each condition. Dots represent
the mean; horizontal lines represent quartiles.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Behavioural response accuracy
Participants’ mean response accuracy across all conditions in the truth value judge-
ment task was 88%. Figure 2.3 illustrates accuracy for each condition. Dierences
between conditions were analysed as follows.
To test for eects of truth value, polarity and predictability on response ac-
curacy, mixed eects logistic regression models (with a binomial family error
distribution and logit link function) were constructed over proportion of correct re-
sponses using the glmer function of the R package lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, &
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Walker, 2015). The full model included terms representing xed eects of all three
independent variables, their two-way interactions, and a three-way interaction
among all of them, as well as a random eect by participant of truth value. (Models
with a more complex random eects structure failed to converge.) To establish
which terms in the model represented signicant eects, comparisons between
the full model and nested models were made to check whether the inclusion of
each term improved the t of the model.
The full model represented a better t to the data than one including xed
eects only of polarity, predictability and their interaction (χ2(4) = 10.55, p =
.032), indicating that there was either a main eect of truth value or an interaction
involving this variable. However, this was not the case for models omitting polarity
(χ2(4) = 5.50, p = .240) or predictability (χ2(4) = 6.20, p = .185), suggesting that
there were no signicant main eects or interactions involving either of these
factors.
The full model also represented a marginally better t to the data than one
including all terms except interactions involving truth value (χ2(3) = 8.29, p =
.040), suggesting that truth value was involved in an interaction. However, as
interactions involving the other two factors did not improve the model t and the
signicance of this improvement was marginal, this was taken as an indication
that any interaction involving truth value was a weak eect, and its primary eect
on response accuracy was a main eect.
Coecients representing the simple eects of each factor at each level of the
other factors were computed based on the full model. These are listed in Table 2.2;
each coecient represents the dierence in the log odds ratio of obtaining each
outcome at the listed level of the factor and its reference level. The main eect
of truth value indicated by the model comparisons described above was found
to operate specically in the case of low predictability, armative sentences. A
weaker simple eect of predictability in the case of true, armative sentences was
also identied. No other coecients representing simple eects were signicant.
2.3.2 Event-related potentials
Data preparation
Continuous EEG was re-referenced to the mean of the signal at M1 and M2 and
segmented into epochs for analysis of ERPs. Based on previous ndings indicating
the region in which the N400 component is detected (e.g., Kutas & Federmeier,
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A. –0.01 –0.04 .971 –0.40 0.38
Neg. –0.03 –0.13 .898 –0.42 0.37
Low pred.
A. –0.67* –3.23 .001 –1.08 –0.26
Neg. –0.04 –0.22 .827 –0.44 0.35
High pred.
True
A. –0.43* –2.13 .033 –0.83 –0.03
Neg. 0.02 0.10 .922 –0.36 0.39
False
A. 0.23 1.29 .197 –0.12 0.59
Neg. 0.04 0.19 .848 –0.33 0.41
Negation
True
High pred. 0.05 0.20 .772 –0.32 0.33
Low pred. –0.39 –1.94 .052 –0.79 0.00
False
High pred. 0.04 0.19 .847 –0.33 0.41
Low pred. 0.23 1.29 .197 –0.12 0.59
Table 2.2: EEG experiment: simple eects on response accuracy of each factor
at each level of the other factors. For example, the rst row provides the eect
of falsity on the proportion of correct responses in a high predictability, ar-
mative condition. The reference levels of each factor are true (truth value), low
(predictability), and armative (polarity).
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2011), a region of interest was dened in the centroparietal area, consisting of
channels C3, Cz, C4, CP1, Pz and CP2.
The onset of presentation of the critical word (the object name) in each critical
(non-ller) trial was taken as the zero time point, and the signal was extracted for
200 ms preceding and 800 ms following this point, for each channel. In this window,
the signal was corrected for artefacts arising from blinks using the automatic
procedure available in the BESA software package (BESA 5.2, BESA GmbH; Berg
& Scherg, 1994). Filler trials and trials with incorrect responses to the truth value
judgement task were excluded from the analysis (12% of all critical trials); in total,
20,244 electrode-epochs from 3,374 trials were extracted from the recordings. All
subsequent cleaning and analysis procedures, including rejection of noisy channels
and movement artefacts, were carried out using R (R Core Team, 2018).
Each data point in each epoch was normalised to a baseline by subtracting
the average magnitude of the signal in the 200 ms prior to the zero time point. To
identify artefacts, epochs were binned by taking the average magnitude of the
signal in each 20 ms window and comparing adjacent bins; epochs with more
than a 20 µV dierence between adjacent bins were rejected (5% of all extracted
epochs). Epochs containing values falling outside the range of –30 to 30 µV were
also rejected (2% of the remaining epochs). Next, based on visual inspection of the
data for noisy or otherwise bad channels, data from a small number of channels
were rejected wholesale for some participants (channels CP1, C3 and Pz were each
rejected in the case of single participants; for a fourth participant, C4 and CP2 were
both rejected). Additionally, another participant’s data were rejected completely
due to anomalous data across multiple channels. Following this procedure, 17,054
epochs from 3,149 trials were retained for analysis.
Data from the retained epochs were ltered using an order 3 Butterworth
passband lter with a low pass cuto value of 40 Hz and a high pass cuto value
of 0.1 Hz, and detrended by subtracting the overall linear trend of the epoch.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the mean overall pattern seen at each electrode of interest
over the timecourse of the epoch, for each condition.
To compare conditions in the time window of interest, the average magnitude
of the signal between 300 and 400 ms after the onset of critical word presentation























































































condition True Aff True Neg False Aff False Neg
Figure 2.4: Mean timecourse of EEG in the window of interest: the mean signal
recorded at each electrode, across all participants, by condition. The 0 ms time
point represents the onset of presentation of the critical word (the name of the
critical object in the sentence). Solid lines represent high predictability conditions;
dotted lines, low predictability conditions.
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Modelling of eects
To compare the magnitude of the N400 response across experimental conditions, a
multi-level linear regression model was constructed over the average magnitude
of the signal recorded on each trial, across all electrodes of interest, in the 300
to 400 ms time window, using the lmer function of the same R package used for
accuracy data. A full model (formula 2.1), containing terms for the xed main
eects of each of these factors and their interactions (including the three-way
interaction among all variables) and a random eect of truth value by participant
(the maximal random eects structure that allowed the model to converge) was
compared to models omitting the main eects and interactions of each factor in
turn, using the same approach as for the behavioural data described above.
amplitude ∼ polarity ∗ predictability ∗ truth value + (truth value|participant)
(2.1)
The full model represented a better t to the data than the model without
terms involving truth value (χ2(4) = 295.6, p < .001), indicating the presence of
either a main eect of or an interaction involving truth value; the same was true
for the model without predictability (χ2(4) = 299.2, p < .001). However, the full
model did not represent a signicantly better t to the data than the model without
terms involving polarity (χ2(4) = 2.6, p = .631), indicating that there was no main
eect of polarity and that this factor was not involved in any interactions.
To test specically for an interaction between truth value and predictability,
the full model was compared to a model with only a xed eect of each of these
variables. The full model represented a better t to the data in the case of truth
value (χ2(3) = 293.1, p< .001) and predictability (χ2(3) = 292.7, p< .001), indicating
the presence of an interaction between these factors.
Following these tests, coecients were estimated for the full model to examine
the simple eects of each factor at each level of the other factors. As shown in
Table 2.3, these indicated that false sentences elicited a larger N400 (M = –1.57 µV,
SD = 5.83) compared to true sentences (M = 2.22 µV, SD = 6.17) in the case of high
predictability sentences, whereas (in a surprising nding, especially as it was the
case for armatives as well as negatives), true sentences elicited a larger N400 (M
= –1.78 µV, SD = 5.28) compared to false sentences (M = 1.41 µV, SD = 6.31) in the
case of low predictability sentences. These ndings are illustrated in Figure 2.5.
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A. –4.01* –9.92 380.37 < .001 –4.87 –3.26
Neg. –3.64* –8.94 372.58 < .001 –4.44 –2.84
Low pred.
A. 2.90* 7.09 379.39 < .001 2.10 3.70
Neg. 3.49* 8.51 381.89 < .001 2.69 4.30
High pred.
True
A. 4.14* 10.38 3100.45 < .001 3.36 4.92
Neg. 3.89* 9.67 3102.88 < .001 3.11 4.68
False
A. –2.83* –6.92 3102.76 < .001 –3.63 –2.03
Neg. –3.24* –8.02 3105.07 < .001 –4.03 –2.45
Negation
True
High pred. –0.26 –0.65 3102.25 .518 –1.05 0.53
Low pred. –0.02 –0.04 3098.54 .968 –0.80 0.77
False
High pred. 0.17 0.42 3104.99 .674 –0.62 0.96
Low pred. 0.57 1.40 3103.33 .161 –0.23 1.38
Table 2.3: EEG experiment: simple eects on N400 amplitude of each factor at each
level of the other factors. For example, the rst row provides the eect of falsity










































Figure 2.5: EEG experiment: mean N400 amplitudes in each condition. Error bars
represent standard errors.
2.3.3 Memory test
Participants performed around or slightly above chance across all conditions (Ta-
ble 2.4). The relevant coecient of a logistic regression model over the proportion
of correct responses, including xed and random eects of polarity, suggested that
there was no signicant eect of polarity, β = –0.00, z = –0.00, p = .997, 95% CI =
[–0.49, 0.49].
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Truth value Polarity Familiarity Proportion correct
M SD
True Armative Old 0.54 0.19
True Armative New 0.49 0.23
True Negative Old 0.49 0.24
True Negative New 0.68 0.19
False Armative Old 0.56 0.18
False Armative New 0.66 0.22
False Negative Old 0.55 0.22
False Negative New 0.63 0.21
Table 2.4: EEG experiment memory test: proportion correct in each condition of
the memory test following the main experiment.
2.4 Discussion
This experiment examined the eects of manipulating the predictability of a critical
word in a sentence on processing of armative and negative sentences, which
could be true or false, while presenting only pragmatically felicitous sentences in a
highly constrained, episodically-manipulated context. The results of a behavioural
truth value judgement task showed that participants were approximately equally
good at judging whether these sentences were true or false, with slightly worse
performance for false sentences in a small subset of conditions. However, the N400
responses evoked by the critical words in the sentences varied greatly and did not
conform to the original hypotheses.
Contrary to hypothesis 1, there was no main eect of truth value. Instead, a
strong interaction between truth value and predictability was observed, with true
sentences eliciting a reduced N400 compared to false sentences in the case of high
predictability and an enhanced N400 in the case of low predictability. This was
the case regardless of polarity, contrary to hypotheses 2 (that truth value would
interact with polarity) and 3 (that this interaction would operate specically in
the case of low predictability, producing a three-way interaction). Although the
ndings were not in line with hypothesis 3, it is possible that this was a result
of insucient power to detect the three-way interaction, as the conditions did
approximately follow the hypothesised pattern, but the interaction did not reach
signicance in the model comparisons.
The pattern of eects is readily interpretable in the case of the highly pre-
dictable conditions. Here, a critical word that met the strong prediction that could
be generated elicited a reduced N400, whereas one that violated the strong predic-
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tion elicited a large N400. This was the case regardless of whether the sentence
was armative or negative, representing a replication of previous ndings that
negation can be interpreted incrementally, producing the same results as ar-
matives, when it is pragmatically felicitous. Here, the pragmatic felicity of the
sentences may have been further enhanced by the constrained episodic contexts
meaning that there was only a single possibility to complete the predictable sen-
tences truthfully. However, the pattern observed for low-predictability sentences
is more dicult to interpret and may indicate that the interpretation just described
does not capture the eects actually driving the pattern obtained.
If the reversal of the N400 eect between low- and high-predictability sen-
tences had been observed only in the case of negative sentences (as in the original
hypotheses), this would have been a strong indication that participants were not
able to interpret negation incrementally online in a low-predictability condition,
leading them to make erroneous predictions about the critical word even though
the sentences were pragmatically licensed. However, this reversal was also seen in
the case of armative sentences, where it cannot be explained by a failure to in-
crementally incorporate information. Therefore, it is most likely that this reversal
can be attributed to some other factor common to both armative and negative
sentences. The eect is particularly surprising because even low-predictability
conditions featured a rather predictable critical word (with only two available
possibilities) compared to most sentences encountered in natural language.
There are two main and related possible explanations for the overall pattern
of ndings. Both relate to the fact that all the conditions could also be categorised
according to whether the object mentioned in the sentence (i.e., the critical word)
was the unique object (that is, the action that succeeded for this object failed
for the other two objects in the animation) or one of the non-unique objects
(that is, the action that succeeded for this object also succeeded for a second
object in the animation). This is illustrated in Figure 2.6. In the case of both
armatives and negatives, the true, high predictability condition and the false,
low predictability condition involved mentioning the unique object; these were
also the same conditions that elicited a reduced N400, wheras the remaining four
conditions, in which a non-unique object was mentioned, elicited a large N400.
This possible confound could have given rise to the overall pattern in two
dierent ways. First, the simple salience of the unique object within the animation
may have been sucient to activate this concept to a greater extent than either






















































































condition Unique object named Non−unique object named
Figure 2.6: Re-visualisation of mean timecourse of EEG: this gure shows the same
data as Figure 2.4, with conditions colour-coded according to whether the object
mentioned in the condition is the unique object (the one sharing an action outcome
with no other object) or one of the non-unique objects, rather than according to
experimental condition. This visualisation illustrates the fact that this aspect of
how the conditions were constructed may account for the overall pattern of eects.
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virtue of participants’ paying more attention to this aspect of animation. Thus,
regardless of the sentence’s meaning or truth value, a mention of the primed object
elicited a reduced N400.
Alternatively, participants may have employed a deliberate or unconscious
strategy in completing the task that exploited the uniqueness of one of the objects
as a memory aid. The truth value judgement task was not an easy one, as the
animation proceeded quickly and in order to make a correct judgement about the
sentence, the participant needed to remember associations between three dierent
objects and two dierent actions. However, because only actions and objects
that had in fact featured in the animation could be mentioned in the sentence, an
available strategy to reduce this memory load would have been to ensure that a
single relationship was memorised for each animation: the combination of the
unique object and the action that was applied to it. This information would enable
the participant to judge any sentence true or false (in the case of critical trials).
Thus, participants had good reason to focus on the unique object (enhancing
the potential priming eect based on its salience) and, furthermore, may have
formulated their predictions about upcoming material as (for example) either “leaf ”
or “anything but leaf ”. Thus, although the participant may have been making
a correct prediction in this scenario, either case may have enhanced activation
of the unique object, even when the prediction was eectively “not the unique
object”. The presence of llers, in which there was often no unique object, may
have discouraged the use of this strategy to an extent; however, llers were only
about half as numerous as critical trials, and even if participants could not use
this strategy in the case of llers, it remained available to them on the majority
of trials. If participants did use this strategy, it does appear that they were able
to do so equally eectively for armatives and negations; however, it is dicult
to interpret the ndings as concrete evidence that processing proceeded equally
incrementally in both cases, because the rst account suggested here (in which
the pattern emerged purely as a result of the salience of the unique object) does
not require any sentence interpretation to have occurred at all in order to obtain
the pattern of results observed.
One piece of evidence suggesting that the former interpretation may be more
likely than the latter (which relies on the participant’s use of a particular strategy,
beyond the possibly automatic eects of salience) is the fact that encountering a
negation of a concept (as in “not leaf ” or “anything but leaf ”) does not activate the
mental representation of that concept to as great an extent as the same concept
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presented with negation elsewhere in the sentence. For example, MacDonald and
Just (1989) found that presenting negated concepts such as “not bread” primed
related probes (in this case, “butter”) to a reduced extent in comparison to non-
negated concepts (“bread”). This is in line with the view that negation should be
interpreted as an instruction to shift one’s attention away from the negated entity
or proposition and towards another (e.g., De Mey, 1972). Therefore, the use of a
strategy in which a participant formulates the prediction “not leaf ” or “anything
but leaf ” might not be expected to produce as complete a reversal of the eects
between the high-predictability and low-predictability conditions as seen here.
Another concern for the interpretation of the results might be how the inde-
pendent variables interacted with one another in determining whether a sentence
could be regarded as “predictable” or not. The condition into which each sentence
fell was designated on the basis that the participant would make predictions about
upcoming material using the assumption that the sentence would be true. This
is a reasonable Gricean assumption to make during everyday use of language (as
pointed out in the context of negation processing by Tian & Breheny, 2015), but
in the context of a series of articially-constructed sentences that were equally
as likely to be false as true, it is possible that this designation may not have been
completely valid: that is, participants may have been unable to formulate strong
predictions about some sentences designated highly predictable, and vice versa.
The predictability of sentences becomes further dicult to interpret if participants
did in fact have diculty incrementally incorporating negation into their repre-
sentations, and thus into their predictions. If negation was initially not taken into
account, participants could have formulated an erroneously strong prediction in
the case of unpredictable sentences, and vice versa. For instance, in the case of the
scenario illustrated in Figure 2.1, the negative sentence “The fairy didn’t deposit
a square around the...” could have two possible completions to make it true (foot
or blanket), meaning that a participant who had taken account of the presence of
negation incrementally would generate a weak prediction. However, a participant
who had not done so (and was therefore focusing on objects for which the “deposit
a square” action had succeeded, rather than failed) would make an erroneously
strong prediction of leaf. Their predictions would then turn out to be valid in the
case of a true sentence and invalid in the case of a false sentence, as intended
by the experimental design; however, the reversal of predictability in these cases
increases the diculty of interpreting the ndings.
The fact that participants were explicitly asked to evaluate the truth value of the
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sentences in the behavioural task may have further enhanced some of these issues,
for example by increasing their focus on considering which objects were paired
with which action to a greater extent than would be the case in a more natural
setting. The operation of a “truth-evaluation mindset” for sentence processing
could also in itself have inuenced participants’ cognition during the task. This type
of eect has been shown by Wiswede, Koranyi, Müeller, Langner, and Rothermund
(2013), who identied a late negative-going ERP component, specic to false
armative sentences, that was present only in a group of participants in which
such a mindset was induced by the use of a truth value judgement task, compared
to a sentence-matching task. Although this component is distinct from the N400,
the fact that it can be identied (signicantly prior to the actual response, which
was delayed for 1,500 ms) suggests that this type of mindset may meaningfully
impact how sentences to be evaluated are processed online, beyond the need to
provide a judgement after processing.
Overall, the pattern of results indicates that the experimental manipulations
were unlikely to have been the main drivers of the eects observed, because in this
case, the N400s evoked by armative, unpredictable sentences are very dicult to
explain. The most likely explanation is that the N400 was mainly inuenced by the
salience of the unique object in the animations associated with critical trials. This
means that although the ndings provide no evidence that predictability aects the
incremental processing of negative, pragmatically felicitous sentences, they also
cannot be interpreted as concrete evidence that this is not the case (i.e., that even
low-predictability negations are processed as readily as armatives given adequate
pragmatic licensing). An alternative paradigm is required to tackle this question
further, either by avoiding the confounding eects of uniqueness (a dicult propo-
sition when it is this factor that permits manipulation of the predictability of the
sentence) or by unpicking whether this is in fact the relevant generator of these
eects or can be discounted. One possibility for the latter approach would be
to test multiple levels of predictability: for example, by including a condition in
which there are three alternatives for the critical word, as well as one and two.
If predictability exerts much more inuence on processing in the shift from one
to two available predictions than in the shift from two to three, this could be an






3.1.1 Negation and predictability
It has long been clear, as discussed in the General Introduction and in the preceding
chapter, that sentences containing negation appear to impose extra processing
costs compared to armatives. Various studies (e.g., Fischler et al., 1983; Kaup &
Lüdtke, 2007; Tian et al., 2010) have suggested that this cost may take the form
of impairment to the usually incremental nature of processing, in which new
information is interpreted online and predictions for upcoming material updated
continuously (Altmann & Mirković, 2009; Rayner & Clifton, 2009).
However, more recently it has emerged that, given the right conditions, this
processing disparity between negatives and armatives can be mitigated or even
erased. In particular, Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) demonstrate that, when
negated sentences are presented in a context that makes them fully pragmatically
licensed, the distinction between armatives and negatives (as indexed in this case
by the N400 component of the event-related potential to a critical word) disappears.
Similar results have been obtained using a mouse-tracking method (see below) by
Dale and Duran (2011).
Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) draw the conclusion that earlier studies (e.g.,
Fischler et al., 1983) have misinterpreted the nature of negation processing by
unfairly presenting infelicitous negations for comparison with more felicitous
armatives. It is generally implicit in the formation of a negation that some
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state of aairs under discussion requires denial or contradiction (see General
Introduction), otherwise there would be no Gricean reason to communicate a
negative; for instance, doing so would be less than maximally informative (Grice,
1975). Thus, the pragmatic context required to license a negative statement is
much more constrained than the context required to license an armative, and to
a corresponding extent, laboratory studies not accounting for this disparity have
tended to compare armatives and negatives diering in the extent to which they
are felicitous.
However, this confound cannot account for all the evidence comparing arma-
tives and negatives. If this were the case, pragmatically licensed armatives and
negatives should be equally easy to process (as in the above-mentioned studies),
but poorly licensed armatives and negatives should also be equally dicult to
process; this is inconsistent with Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008), who report an
interaction between polarity and pragmatic felicity, with a larger eect of infelicity
on negatives. Therefore, it seems that the eect cannot simply be attributed to
the fact that armative sentences are generally less heavily unlicensed when pre-
sented outside an appropriate pragmatic context; instead, there is something about
pragmatic infelicity that interacts with negation to produce a stronger impact on
processing.
As discussed in Chapter 2, one aspect of pragmatic infelicity to which this eect
could potentially be attributed is a lack of predictability. Although predictability
and pragmatic felicity are related, they are not reducible to one another; predictabil-
ity is simply a component or common side-eect of strong felicity. Therefore, the
hypothesis that predictability is the “active ingredient” in pragmatic felicity with
respect to its interaction with polarity can be tested by manipulating the former
while holding the latter constant.
One way of doing this is through the use of contexts that produce episodic
associations between concepts or entities, inducing comprehenders to make pre-
dictions on the basis of these local, temporary associations rather than on the basis
of broad semantic knowledge (which is more commonly relied upon in this type
of manipulation, as discussed in Chapter 2). In the presence of a visual stimulus,
utterances describing the image may be highly felicitous (because the presence of
the image places its contents or characteristics in the domain of discourse), and,
separately, contain highly predictable or less predictable elements (depending,
for example, on how many entities in the image match a particular description).
For instance, the sentence “The top shelf contains a candle” may have a highly
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predictable nal word (if the candle is the only item on the top shelf, in the visual
context) or a less predictable one (if multiple items meet this criterion), but is no
more or less felicitous in either case.
There are several advantages to this approach to manipulating predictability.
First, this is a tightly controllable manipulation, because the number of candidates
for the critical word in such a sentence can be xed precisely by the content of the
visual context. Second, and relatedly, the participant’s ability to make a prediction
does not rely on their world knowledge or pre-existing associations, which may
vary between participants, vary in strength, or dier from the researcher’s expecta-
tions in unpredictable and undetectable ways. Finally, the problem of interference
from semantic priming of associated concepts is avoided.
For these reasons, the present experiment investigated the relationship between
predictability and polarity in their impact on online sentence processing, through
the use of sentences presented in episodic visual contexts.
3.1.2 The mouse-tracking methodology
As outlined in the preceding chapter, EEG (and specically, in this case, the N400
component of the ERP) provides extremely useful access to early cognitive pro-
cesses, avoiding many of the pitfalls associated with behavioural methods. How-
ever, plenty of detailed information on participants’ cognitive processing can also
be accessed without directly measuring brain activity. Although many traditional
behavioural measures (such as response accuracy or speed in completing a task)
yield only oine measures, in which all cognitive processes underlying a task are
represented by a single datapoint, online behavioural measures are also available
to a greater or lesser degree. These purport to oer insight into participants’
cognitive processing or mental states at intermediate stages during a task.
Computer mouse-tracking is one such methodology, which exploits the idea
that when participants use a computer mouse or similar pointing device to respond
to stimuli, the trajectory followed by the cursor represents aspects of their cognition
while formulating and executing stages of the response. This notion is based on
the underlying principle that there is a close link between cognition and action.
The strongest form of this principle draws on theories of embodied cognition (see,
e.g., Barsalou, 2010), although the notion that motor actions can provide access
to information about cognition does not necessarily rely on this view, especially
when cognition is ongoing and updated during the process of making a motor
response.
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Use of a computer mouse is not only routine and intuitive for participants,
but also somewhat automatic, in that very little cognitive overhead is involved in
operating the mouse and participants perceive almost no task demands relating
to this method of responding. This is in contrast to some other measures which
purport to give similarly detailed levels of information, such as the signal-to-
respond paradigm (Kent, Guest, Adelman, & Lamberts, 2014), which requires
intensive training to allow participants to respond when cued to do so, and even
after such training imposes a high level of demand in addition to the task of interest.
Additionally, mouse movements are very cheap and easy to record (Freeman &
Ambady, 2010, provide a simple interface for presenting stimuli and recording
data in this paradigm) and there are no requirements for set-up overhead time,
technical skills, or equipment beyond a standard computer and mouse, enabling
quick and easy collection of potentially large amounts of data.
As a result of these advantages of the methodology, its use is becoming in-
creasingly widespread in several areas of cognitive psychology, including language
research. Kent, Taylor, Taylor, and Darley (2017) review the theory underlying
the mouse-tracking approach and its application to various topics of interest in
memory and language, including categorisation (Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007),
decision-making (McKinstry, Dale, & Spivey, 2008), and two-step interpretation of
scalar implicatures (Tomlinson et al., 2013).
3.1.3 Design and hypotheses
Mouse-tracking Experiment 1 aimed to analyse mouse trajectories collected dur-
ing truth-value judgements of sentences varying in polarity and predictability, to
assess whether the predictability of a critical word modulates the extent to which
comprehenders can incorporate negation incrementally into their predictions.
If participants are able to process incoming elements of a sentence online and
formulate predictions for upcoming material on the basis of these incremental
interpretations, this should facilitate performance in a truth-value judgement task:
if their prediction is fullled by the critical word in the sentence, it should be
relatively straightforward to make a true judgement, and similarly, if it is contra-
dicted, a false judgement should be easy to arrive at. In contrast, if participants
cannot make a useful prediction for the critical word, they should respond more
hesitantly or erroneously; and if they have made an incorrect prediction (for exam-
ple, by failing to incorporate incrementally the correct interpretation of a negating
element), they may be initially drawn towards the foil response (true for a false
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sentence, and vice versa).
To test this, participants completed a task in which, on each trial, they made a
truth value judgement of a sentence relating to an image presented immediately
beforehand. Each image consisted of a 3 × 2 grid in which one of the rows was
lled with three objects and the other could contain one, two, or three objects
(see Figure 3.1 in the Methods section). Sentences were of the form “The top row
contains / doesn’t contain the lamp”, meaning that their predictability could be
manipulated by varying the number of objects in the row in question. Participants
provided their judgements by moving the mouse from the bottom of the screen to
true and false response boxes in the top left and right corners, respectively. Thus,
a 2 (polarity: armative or negative sentence) × 3 (predictability: high, medium,
or low) design was employed for the independent variables of interest. Sentences
could also be true or false.
The hypotheses for this experiment were based on the notion that predictability
is the component of pragmatic felicity that disproportionately aects processing
of negative sentences. However, because only pragmatically felicitous sentences
were included, no main eect of polarity was expected on any of the dependent
measures indexing processing. Predictability, in contrast, was expected to exert
such a main eect, with ease of processing correlating with increased predictability.
Most importantly, if (as hypothesised) predictability is an important component of
infelicity in its impact on the processing of negations, polarity should be expected
to interact with predictability. In particular, the detrimental eect of reducing
predictability from high to medium and from medium to low was expected to have
a stronger impact on participants’ performance in the case of negative sentences;
furthermore, the increase in the proportion of mouse trajectories exhibiting active
attraction towards the wrong answer as predictability was reduced was expected
to be greater in the case of negations compared to armatives.
Assessing “anti-prediction”
Three levels of polarity were specically compared in order to assess the impact
of the possible “anti-prediction” strategy discussed in Chapter 2. This strategy
would only be available to participants if they were making mistaken predictions
as a result of failing to update on the basis of negating elements in a sentence. For
example, if the participant (incorrectly) believes that the sentence could truthfully
end with any of three dierent items (A, B, or C), but can exclude a fourth (D),
a strategy to minimise resource consumption may be to predict “not D” rather
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than “A, B, or C” (c.f. Orenes, Beltrán, & Santamaría, 2014). Doing so could cause
activation of D in memory (even though it is precisely the opposite of the concept
referred to), in turn causing initial attraction towards true as a response upon
hearing D, even though it is the converse of the prediction. This could aect the
interpretation of results, because an initial attraction towards D would be taken
in this paradigm as evidence of incremental processing, whereas it in fact results
from the compounding of two “errors” (failing to process negation incrementally,
and attraction towards the opposite of an erroneous prediction).
This strategy, if employed by participants, should only aect the high pre-
dictability condition (and then only in the case of non-incremental intepretation of
negative sentences), because predictions like “not D or E” are much less likely to be
eective in terms of resource consumption. Therefore, investigating three levels of
predictability would allow a comparison between the impact of high and medium
predictability in particular. If the dierence in measures of processing ease for
negations shows a much larger advantage of high over medium predictability than
that of medium over low predictability, this might constitute a suggestion that
participants’ use of an anti-prediction strategy was articially responsible for their
apparently enhanced performance in high predictability negations.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Materials
Stimuli consisted of images of highly-identiable, easily-named, everyday inani-
mate objects, selected for consistent naming by a small sample of British English
speakers. On each trial, images were presented in a grid of three columns and
two rows, accompanied by a sentence presented auditorily, of the form “The top /
bottom row contains / doesn’t contain the balloon”. Either the top or the bottom
row of the grid always contained three images, while the other row could contain
one, two, or three images. In this way, the predictability of the critical object name
that would appear at the end of the sentence to make it true was manipulated.
High-predictability sentences only had one possible ending that would make them
true; for medium-predictability sentences, there were two possibilities; and for
low-predictability sentences, there were three possibilities.
In total, 72 sets of visual stimuli were constructed, each consisting of 18 ver-
sions: six with four objects, six with ve objects, and six with six objects. Within
each of these subsets, the critical object exchanged roles with one of the objects
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in the other row in half the versions; and within each of these three subsets, the
critical object appeared in the left, centre, or middle column of the grid. The
variable number of objects appeared on the top row in half the image sets and on
the bottom row in the other half. Each of the 18 versions within each set could
be associated with four possible sentences: armative or negative, and true or
false. Thus, each set of images was associated with 18 × 4 = 72 possible trials, of
which half were critical trials and half llers. Critical trials (design illustrated in
Table 3.1) were equally distributed across conditions in a 2 (polarity: armative
or negative sentence) × 3 (predictability: high, medium, or low) × 2 (truth value:
true or false sentence) design. Filler trials did not t into this scheme and were
therefore not of experimental interest; there were always three possible candidates
for a critical word that would make the sentence true, meaning that predictability
was not manipulated. They were included so that participants would not alter their
focus of attention or their strategy based on the knowledge that (on trials with
fewer than the full 6 objects) those objects on the row that was not completely
lled would always be the candidates for the critical word that would make the
sentence true. Each participant completed a total of 216 of the 72 × 72 = 5,184
trials constructed, divided evenly across critical conditions and their equivalents
among the llers.
Audio recordings of the required sentences were prepared using the Natural-
Reader software (NaturalReader Version 11, NaturalSoft Ltd, 2015), employing a
female British English speaker’s voice with natural-sounding prosody. The audio
les were manipulated using the Audacity(R) recording and editing software (Au-
dacity 2.1.2, Audacity Team, 1999–2016), in order to homogenise the time elapsing
from the onset of the sentence fragment to the onset of the critical word that would
allow the participant to distinguish an armative and a negative sentence (i.e.,
contains or doesn’t).
Trials were presented using the MouseTracker software package (Version 2.82,
Freeman & Ambady, 2010), on a 60 cm monitor in which the grid of images, when
visible, occupied an area of the centre of the screen measuring approximately 18
× 12 cm. Response buttons, consisting of black rectangles overlaid with white text
reading TRUE and FALSE, were located in the top-left and top-right corners of the
screen, respectively.
In addition to the main set of trials, “catch trials” were included to encourage
participants to pay careful attention to the objects in each grid. These consisted of







































Table 3.1: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1 example stimulus sets. Critical trials only
are shown, using 36 of the 72 possible trials based on one set of images. The other
36 (llers) use the “missing” sentences (e.g. “The bottom row doesn’t contain the
basket/lamp”).
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in the grid for that trial, and a pre-printed grid on paper for use in completing this
task.
3.2.2 Procedure
Participants were seated in a quiet lab at a comfortable distance from the monitor.
They were tested individually, with zero, one, or two other participants present, in
sessions that lasted approximately 60 minutes.
The experiment began with a verbal explanation of the task from the experi-
menter, accompanied by practice trials, including a “catch trial” practice. Partic-
ipants were asked to look carefully at every item in the grid on each trial, and
to focus on clicking on the correct response button (“TRUE” or “FALSE”). They
were informed that on catch trials, they should try to ll in the name of every
object that had been present in the grid in the correct location; however, if they
remembered that a particular location had contained an object but not the identity
of the object, they could indicate this with an X. After four practice trials, each
participant completed eight blocks, each consisting of 27 randomly ordered trials.
They were encouraged to take a break between blocks. Catch trials appeared
randomly throughout the experiment (30 per participant, with 10 at each level of
predictability).
Each trial began with a screen containing a “START” button in the bottom
centre location; participants were required to click here to initiate each trial, so
that the mouse and cursor were reset to the same starting position. The visual
stimulus (i.e., the grid of images) was then displayed in the centre of the screen
for 3,000 ms, plus a further 1, 500 ms for every additional object above 4 (i.e., 4,500
ms for 5-object trials and 6,000 for 6-object trials). After this time had elapsed,
the grid disappeared and auditory presentation of the sentence (through stereo
headphones) began. At the same time as the onset of the audio, the response
options (“TRUE” and “FALSE”) appeared in the top-left and top-right corners of the
screen, respectively, and the cursor was released to allow participants to complete
their response when ready. Participants were required to initiate their response
(by moving the mouse) within 5,000 ms; if they failed to do so, they received a
warning message (“Please start moving as soon as you’ve nished, even if you are
not fully certain of a response yet”). Mouse coordinates were sampled online every
32 ms during the response phase of each trial, based on a virtual coordinate space
ranging from –1 to 1 in the x axis and 0 to 1.5 in the y axis, with the origin at the













Figure 3.1: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1 example trial. Participant clicks the
START button; visual stimulus is displayed; sentence is played and response
options appear; participant makes their selection using the mouse. Stimuli and
response buttons are for illustration and not to scale.
times and accuracies were also collected. After completing their response, the
participant received feedback in the form of a green O (correct) or red X (incorrect)
displayed for 300 ms. For trials accompanied by a catch trial, the memory test
prompt appeared after the feedback; there was no time limit for responses to this
part of the task. Figure 3.1 illustrates an example trial.
3.2.3 Participants
A total of 24 participants (21 female, aged 18–24 years [M = 19.5, SD = 1.7]) were
recruited from in and around the University of Bristol community. All were native
speakers of English, and all but two (Thailand, the Netherlands) had grown up
primarily in the United Kingdom. Most were monolingual, but four had a second
language of a good, advanced, or uent standard (Thai, Welsh, or Dutch).
Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to their participation,
and they were compensated for their time with course credit or a small payment.
Ethical approval for the experiment was granted by the University of Bristol’s
Faculty of Science Research Ethics committee (ethical approval code 31441).
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Data preparation and analysis
Across all participants (N = 24), the range of error rates was 3% to 22% (M = 9%).
Trials with incorrect responses were discarded from the analyses (i.e., 9% of all
trials). Those trials with response completion times longer than 6,000 ms, and trials
on which the participant took longer than 4,000 ms to initiate their response, were
also excluded (a further 3% of the remaining trials). These thresholds were selected
on the basis of visual examination of the distributions of response initiation and
completion times.
For ease of comparison across all trials, data from trials with the correct
answer “TRUE” (i.e., for which the target response was located on the left side
of the screen) were reected (all x-coordinates were sign-reversed) using the
MouseTracker software package’s inbuilt analysis features (Freeman & Ambady,
2010).
The dependent measures analysed were response accuracy, response initiation
time (measured from the time of cursor release to the onset of the participant’s
mouse movement) and completion time (measured from the same starting point
to the participant’s mouse click on the target response), and a proxy for trajectory
shape (see below).
Data are presented below predominantly in the form of “violin” plots (produced
using the ggplot2 package in R; Wickham, 2016), which illustrate the overall shape
of the data across dierent conditions, allowing for visual comparison not only
of means but also of the dierent degrees of skewness across conditions, and so
forth.
Analysis of trajectory shapes
To characterise the shape of a path followed by the cursor from the starting position
to the target response button, generally useful metrics are the “area under the
curve” (AUC) and the “maximum deviation” (MD).
The former represents the total area of the screen lying between an ideal
straight-line trajectory drawn between the starting and nishing points and the
actual trajectory taken, and the latter the distance, at the furthest point as measured
by an orthogonal line, between this ideal straight-line trajectory and the actual
trajectory (see Figure 3.2). A greater AUC and MD may each represent a trial












Figure 3.2: The calculation of area under the curve and maximum deviation as
characterisations of a path. The solid line between the starting and nishing points
represents the actual trajectory (in normalised time); the dotted line represents a
straight line between the starting and nishing points.
of attraction to the foil can be inferred), although they provide slightly dierent
characterisations: for example, a path where the participant wanders slightly
around the screen throughout the trial could have a relatively low MD but a
somewhat high AUC.
Both metrics were computed using the MouseTracker software package’s
inbuilt analysis features. The package employs a time-normalised version of the
data for this function, in which all samples from each trial are divided into 101
bins of equal duration (regardless of the duration of the full trial) and the average
x- and y-coordinates during each bin used to represent the location of the cursor
during that time bin.
Because these measures typically fall into a bimodal distribution across a
dataset of this type (including in the present case, as shown below), it is dicult
to apply standard analysis techniques. Furthermore, neither metric necessarily
captures the most pertinent characteristics of a given trajectory, or of a set of
trajectories produced in a given task, as they reduce a rich set of time-course based
data to a single stastistic. Therefore, in addition to these measures, a clustering
approach was used as a data-driven method of assessing whether trials exhibited
attraction to the foil response. This approach was based on the notion (supported
by bimodality observed across multiple dependent variables) that trajectories
produced by participants fell broadly into two main categories: those in which the
mouse was moved rather quickly and directly to the correct response option, and
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those exhibiting some degree of attraction towards the wrong answer, with the
latter type also tending to be initiated and completed more slowly. Categorising
trajectories into these two clusters, which could dier between participants in
their typical shape, could oer a way to identify the proportion of trials in each
condition that exhibited some level of attraction towards the incorrect response
option.
Trajectories were assigned to clusters based on their shape using the Hartigan
and Wong (1979) implementation of the k-means algorithm with k = 2. Trials were
rst separated by participant so that clustering could be performed separately for
each participant, and were represented as a vector of x and y coordinates at each
timestep. (For trials shorter than the maximum response time cut-o, timesteps
following the end of the trial were considered to have the same coordinates as
the nal timestep of the trial.) The algorithm randomly selected k vectors to
represent the initial cluster centres, allocated all vectors to the nearest of these
(such that the squared Euclidean distance was minimised), recalculated the cluster
centres by taking the mean vector within each new cluster, and iterated this
process either a maximum of 1,000 times or until convergence. The best outcome
resulting from 1,000 dierent random starting congurations was selected, with
a seed for the whole analysis set at 1. After this process was complete for every
participant, the data were re-integrated for analysis of cluster allocation, so that a
given participant’s trial cluster represented by the cluster centre most similar to a
straight line was treated as equivalent to that of other participants.
Statistical modelling of eects
Response accuracy, response initiation and completion time, and trajectory cluster
allocation were each modelled separately to analyse the eects of the indepen-
dent variables on these measures, using the R package lme4 (Bates et al., 2015).
For proportional data (i.e., response accuracy and cluster allocation), the glmer
function was used to examine a mixed eects logistic regression model with a
logit link function; for continuous data (i.e., initiation and completion time), the
lmer function was used to examine a mixed eects linear regression model. The
independent variables of interest were sentence polarity (armative or negative)
and predictability of the nal word in the sentence (high, medium, or low, based
on how many objects tting the criteria at the beginning of the sentence were
present in the image).
Although truth value of the sentence was also manipulated, this was for the
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purpose of creating a viable task, rather than because this was also a variable
of interest. Because true and false sentences were evenly distributed across the
other conditions, ideally truth value would be ignored in the analysis, with any
main eect applying equally across conditions. However, a problem with this
approach is that truth value might also interact with the variables of interest. In
particular, there is reason to expect an interaction between truth value and polarity
(as observed, for example, by Gough, 1965; Wason, 1959, 1961), perhaps because of
an intrinsic association between negation and falsity. In addition, although there
is less of an a priori reason to expect that predictability might interact with truth
value, or that a three-way interaction among all three variables might emerge, this
cannot be ruled out. Thus, the eects of truth value might not be equal across
all conditions in this design. Therefore, truth value was entered into the analysis
alongside predictability and polarity, plus terms representing the interactions
among these three variables, so that its eects could be taken into account.
For each dependent variable, a full model was constructed including xed
factors for all the above eects, as well as the maximal random eects structure
that allowed the model to converge. Formula 3.1 exemplies the full model using
response time as the dependent variable. Here, the maximal possible random
eects structure is given for illustration purposes, although this structure did not
reach convergence for any of the dependent variables.
response time ∼ polarity ∗ predictability ∗ truth value
+ (polarity ∗ predictability ∗ truth value|participant)
(3.1)
Next, this full model was compared to various nested models to investigate the
presence of main eects and interactions, using the following procedure:
1. The full model was compared to models including only the xed eects of, and
interaction between, each of only two factors: e.g., polarity× predictability only.
If the former represented a signicantly better t to the data, this was taken as
an indication of either a main eect of the third factor, or its involvement in an
interaction.
2. For each factor for which this was the case, its involvement in an interaction
specically was tested by comparing the full model to a model including the
xed eects of, and interaction between, each of the other two factors, plus a
xed eect of the factor in question. If the full model represented a signicantly
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better t to the data, this was taken as an indication that this factor was involved
in an interaction with at least one other factor.
3. If the above tests indicated the presence of interactions, the full model was
compared to a model including xed eects of all three factors, plus each of the
possible two-way interactions (polarity × predictability, polarity × truth value,
and predictability× truth value). If the former represented a signicantly better
t to the data, this was taken as an indication of the presence of a three-way
interaction.
Following these tests, the full model was used to estimate coecients for
the simple eects of each factor at each level of the other factors, and (where
applicable) for the simple interactions of each pair of factors at each level of the
third. Associated condence intervals (using the Wald method) and p values (using
the Satterthwaite approximation) were also computed.
3.3.2 Response accuracy
Although participants found this task challenging according to their informal
reports to the experimenter, they were generally able to complete the main task
accurately, providing correct responses on the majority of trials (proportion correct:
M = 0.89, SD = 0.06). Some conditions were more dicult than others, with a
more skewed distribution of accuracies tending to appear for false sentences and
negated sentences (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.4 summarises the dierences in response accuracy across all conditions.
As described above, these dierences were modelled across all conditions, with
a full set of xed factors and a random eect of polarity included by participant
(models involving a more complex random eects structure failed to converge).
This model is shown in formula 3.2.
cbind(prop. correct, prop. incorrect) ∼ polarity ∗ predictability ∗ truth value
+ (polarity|participant), family = binomial(link = “logit”)
(3.2)
Model comparisons testing for the presence of main eects and/or interactions
were signicant for polarity (χ2(6) = 36.89, p < .001), predictability (χ2(8) = 95.78,
p < .001), and truth value (χ2(6) = 36.33, p < .001). Model comparisons testing





























































































(c) False sentences only
Figure 3.3: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1 response accuracy violin plots: the
distributions of participant accuracy rates for trials in each condition. Black circles



























Figure 3.4: Mouse-tracking Experiment
(χ2(5) = 11.40, p = .044), predictability (χ2(6) = 16.18, p = .013), and truth value
(χ2(5) = 18.60, p = .002). Finally, the model comparison testing for the full three-way
interaction indicated that this was present (χ2(2) = 6.19, p = .045).
Coecients estimated for simple eects in the full model are listed in Table 3.2.
In terms of simple interactions, there was a signicant interaction between the
eects of negative polarity and decreasing from medium to low predictability for
false sentences (β = 1.21, z = 3.03, p = .002, 95% CI = [0.43, 2.00]), and between the
eects of falsity and decreasing from medium to low predictability for negative
sentences (β = –0.67, z = –2.49, p = .013, 95% CI = [–1.19, –0.143]). No other simple
interactions were signicant.
80




A. –0.99* –3.05 .002 –1.62 –0.35
Neg. –0.22 –0.95 .342 –0.69 0.24
Med. pred.
A. –0.22 –0.82 .412 –0.75 0.31
Neg. 0.00 0.00 .999 –0.40 0.40
Low pred.
A. –0.69* –3.05 .002 –1.13 –0.25
Neg. –0.67* –3.87 .001 –1.00 –0.33
Med. pred.
True
A. –0.70* –2.08 .038 –1.36 –0.04
Neg. –0.28 –1.30 .194 –0.70 0.14
False
A. 0.07 0.26 .795 –0.43 0.57
Neg. –0.50* –2.23 .026 –0.95 –0.06
Low pred.
True
A. –0.29 –1.08 .282 –0.81 0.24
Neg. –0.31 –1.57 .117 –0.69 0.08
False
A. –0.75* –3.29 .001 –1.20 –0.30
Neg. –0.97* –5.32 < .001 –1.33 –0.61
Negation
True
High pred. –1.29* –3.95 < .001 –1.93 –0.65
Med. pred. –0.87* –3.33 .001 –1.38 –0.36
Low pred. –0.89* –3.75 < .001 –1.35 –0.42
False
High pred. –0.08 –0.29 .771 –0.59 0.44
Med. pred. –0.65* –2.61 .009 –1.13 –0.16
Low pred. –0.86* –4.44 < .001 –1.24 –0.48
Table 3.2: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1: simple eects on response accuracy of
each factor at each level of the other factors. For example, the rst row provides
the eect of falsity on the proportion of correct responses in a high predictability,
armative condition. The reference levels of each factor are true (truth value),
high (for medium predictability), medium (for low predictability), and armative
(polarity).
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3.3.3 Response initiation time
Responses were initiated relatively slowly in this experiment, with participants
often taking longer than 2,000 ms to begin moving the mouse. However, as seen
in Figure 3.5, there was a clear bimodal distribution of initiation times, with
many responses also being initiated much more rapidly. This was conrmed by a
signicant Hartigan’s dip statistic (D = .06, p < .001). The largest peak occurred at
2,500 ms. The secondary peak contained two sub-peaks (Figure 3.5a), located at
583 and 573 ms.
Figure 3.6 summarises the dierences in initiation time across conditions. As
described above, this variable was modelled across all conditions, with a full set
of xed factors and a random eect of polarity included by participant (models
involving a more complex random eects structure failed to converge). Model
comparisons testing for the presence of main eects and/or interactions were
signicant for polarity (χ2(6) = 29.82, p< .001) and for predictability (χ2(8) = 51.42,
p < .001), but not for truth value (χ2(6) = 4.27, p = .640).
As this pattern indicated the absence of any main eect or interaction involving
truth value (including a three-way interaction), the analysis proceeded with a
two-way model including only polarity, predictability, and their interaction as
xed factors. This reduced model was compared to a new set of nested models to
explore the main eects and interaction of these factors in more detail.
The two-way model was a signicantly better t to the data than a model
including only a xed eect of predictability (χ2(3) = 27.14, p < .001), conrming
a signicant main eect of polarity or its involvement in an interaction, and a
model including only a xed eect of polarity (χ2(4) = 47.39, p < .001), conrming
a signicant main eect of predictability or its involvement in an interaction.
However, the two-way model did not represent a signicantly better t to the data
than a model including xed eects of both these factors, but not their interaction
(χ2(2) = 1.55, p = .462), suggesting a lack of a signicant polarity × predictability
interaction.
Simple eects and interactions were investigated by estimating coecients
for the full (three-way) model. The former are listed in Table 3.3; there were no
signicant simple interactions.
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Figure 3.5: Mousetracking Experiment 1 initiation time: distributions of response
initiation times, (a) using kernel density estimation, and (b), (c), and (d) across con-





















Figure 3.6: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1: mean response initiation time across
each level of polarity and predictability, collapsing over truth value. Error bars
represent 95% condence intervals.
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A. –22.76 –0.38 4860.60 .707 –141.40 95.88
Neg. –52.54 –0.75 4589.37 .395 –173.62 68.54
Med. pred.
A. 3.62 0.06 4589.37 .953 –115.79 123.03
Neg. –73.61 –1.17 4860.65 .243 –197.29 50.07
Low pred.
A. –0.86 –0.01 3504.03 .989 –123.29 121.56
Neg. 95.29 1.43 4318.23 .154 –35.65 226.23
Med. pred.
True
A. 112.30 1.86 4860.59 .062 –5.73 230.33
Neg. 153.19* 2.45 4317.96 .014 30.51 275.86
False
A. 138.68* 2.26 4046.65 .024 18.67 258.68
Neg. 27.04 0.43 4589.43 .664 –95.05 149.12
Low pred.
True
A. 69.73 1.14 4589.37 .253 –49.83 189.29
Neg. 64.99 1.02 4860.61 .380 –60.03 190.02
False
A. 65.25 1.05 4589.28 .296 –57.02 187.52
Neg. 223.89* 3.54 5132.11 < .001 104.23 363.56
Negation
True
High pred. 149.54* 2.37 705.03 .018 25.68 273.40
Med. pred. 190.43* 2.97 735.69 .003 64.75 316.11
Low pred. 185.70* 2.85 740.68 .004 58.10 313.29
False
High pred. 224.84* 3.53 704.27 < .001 100.13 349.55
Med. pred. 113.20 1.76 743.83 .079 –12.92 239.32
Low pred. 281.85* 4.12 923.56 < .001 147.64 416.06
Table 3.3: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1: eects on initiation time of each factor
at each level of the other factors. For example, the rst row provides the eect of
falsity on the time taken to initiate a response in a high predictability, armative
condition. The reference levels of each factor are true (truth value), high (for
medium predictability), medium (for low predictability), and armative (polarity).
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3.3.4 Response completion time
Commensurately with the slow initiation times, response completion times were
also generally rather slow. After trimming as described above, the distribution still
exhibited a positive skew (Figure 3.7) around a peak located at 3,347 ms. However,
although Hartigan’s dip statistic suggested signicant non-unimodality (D = .001,
p = .001), no clear second peak was evident in this case.
Figure 3.8 summarises the dierences in initiation time across conditions. As
described above, this variable was modelled across all conditions, with a full set
of xed factors and a random eect of polarity included by participant (models
involving a more complex random eects structure failed to converge). Model
comparisons testing for the presence of main eects or involvements in an inter-
action were signicant for polarity (χ2(6) = 102.42, p < .001), predictability (χ2(8)
= 118.16, p < .001), and truth value (χ2(6) = 85.68, p < .001). Model comparisons
indicating involvement in an interaction specically were signicant for polarity
(χ2(5) = 32.37, p < .001), and for truth value (χ2(5) = 27.18, p < .001), but not for
predictability (χ2(6) = 6.02, p = .421).
As this pattern indicated the absence of any main eect or interaction involving
predictability (including a three-way interaction), the analysis proceeded with
a two-way model including only polarity, truth value, and their interaction as
xed factors. This reduced model was compared to a new set of nested models to
explore the main eects and interaction of these factors in more detail.
The two-way model was a signicantly better t to the data than a model
including only a xed eect of truth value (χ2(2) = 96.85, p < .001), conrming
a signicant main eect of polarity or its involvement in an interaction, and a
model including only a xed eect of polarity (χ2(2) = 81.33, p < .001), conrming
a signicant main eect of truth value or its involvement in an interaction. It was
also a signicantly better t to the data than a model including xed eects of
both these factors, and their interaction (χ2(1) = 27.15, p < .001), suggesting a
signicant polarity × truth value interaction.
Although there was no three-way interaction, simple eects and interactions
were investigated by examining coecients for the full (three-way) model.
Simple eects on response time are given in Table 3.4. The only signicant
simple interactions were between negative polarity and falsity at high (β = –204.34,
t(4589.57) = –3.89, p < .001, 95% CI = [–307.24, –101.44]), medium (β = –129.16,
t(4575.92) = –2.42, p = .016, 95% CI = [–233.76, –24.55]), and low (β = –138.17,
t(4374.21) = –2.48, p = .013, 95% CI = [–247.24, –29.09]) predictability.
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Figure 3.7: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1: distributions of response completion
times, (a) using kernel density estimation, and (b), (c), and (d) for trials in each




















Figure 3.8: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1: mean response completion time across
each level of polarity and predictability, collapsing over truth value. Error bars
represent 95% condence intervals.
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A. 219.58* 5.98 4591.60 < .001 146.55 291.60
Neg. 15.24 0.41 4485.96 .684 –58.25 88.72
Med. pred.
A. 180.65* 4.87 4573.96 < .001 108.00 253.31
Neg. 51.50 1.34 4576.14 .180 –99.16 114.20
Low pred.
A. 184.94* 4.87 4373.77 < .001 110.45 259.44
Neg. 46.77 1.15 4474.62 .250 –32.90 126.45]
Med. pred.
True
A. 126.01* 3.36 83.58 .001 52.48 199.54
Neg. 133.53* 3.29 85.49 .001 54.09 212.97
False
A. 86.93* 2.33 4372.94 .020 13.91 159.95
Neg. 169.32* 4.47 4474.84 < .001 95.03 243.61
Low pred.
True
A. 50.63 1.36 4573.96 .173 –22.11 123.38
Neg. 94.99* 2.45 4574.73 .014 18.92 171.07
False
A. 54.92 1.45 4775.09 .148 –19.47 129.32
Neg. 90.27* 2.24 4476.14 .025 11.36 169.18
Negation
True
High pred. 582.51* 13.49 66.50 < .001 497.88 667.14
Med. pred. 589.75* 13.78 166.24 < .001 505.86 673.65
Low pred. 634.11* 14.63 174.49 < .001 549.15 719.07
False
High pred. 378.21* 8.89 162.02 < .001 294.84 461.57
Med. pred. 460.59* 10.73 168.06 < .001 476.43 544.75
Low pred. 495.94* 10.96 205.36 < .001 407.25 584.63
Table 3.4: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1: simple eects on response completion
time of each factor at each level of the other factors. For example, the rst row
provides the eect of falsity on the time taken to respond in a high predictability,
armative condition. The reference levels of each factor are true (truth value),
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Figure 3.9: All response trajectories in mouse-tracking Experiment 1: a repre-
sentation of all trials included in the analysis; each line represents the trajectory
followed during a single trial, from the starting point in the centre at the bottom
of the screen to the nishing point at the target image.
3.3.5 Trajectory shapes
As suggested above by the bimodal distribution of response initiation times, the
overall trajectory shapes were not uniform. On many trials, participants moved
somewhat directly from the starting point to the target response, taking a relatively
straight line. On others, the shape of the trajectory exhibited a degree of “attraction”
towards the foil response. This could involve anything from a slightly enhanced
curve in the trajectory to a full movement of the cursor all the way to the foil
response button and then laterally across the screen to nish at the target.
Figure 3.9 depicts all trials across the experiment in order to demonstrate these
types of trajectory. The high density of trials falling in a straight line between the
starting and nishing points and in a straight line between the foil and target can
be observed. This data is also represented in Figure 3.10, which illustrates how
frequently every location on the screen was visited during the course of a trial,
across the whole experiment.
























Figure 3.10: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1 heat map of cursor locations: a repre-
sentation of how frequently, across all trials, any participant’s cursor was sampled
at each location, using 6,400 (80 × 80) location bins. Darker colours indicate more
frequently visited locations. As in Figure 3.9, the starting point is in the centre at
the bottom of the screen, the target response button in the top right corner, and
the foil response button in the top left corner. As all included trials were ultimately
answered correctly, the extremely dark patches at the starting point and the target
response are expected.
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(a) Area under the curve
















Figure 3.11: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1 area under the curve and maximum
deviation: distributions of measures characterising the deviance of individual trials,
across all conditions, using kernel density estimation. X axes represent arbitrary
units in each case, measuring (a) total area between the trajectory and a straight
line between its starting and nishing points, and (b) the distance between the
trajectory and the same ideal straight line, at its furthest point.
marised by the AUC and MD. Two clear peaks are evident for both measures: a
large one encompassing the majority of trials, with a very small AUC and MD
(indicating a relatively direct path from the starting point to the target); and a
smaller one representing much more deviant paths. Thus, a signicant minority
of trials showed evidence of attraction to the foil response. These distributions
also appeared to vary across conditions (Figure 3.12).
These characteristics of the data were taken as further evidence that response
trajectories tended to fall broadly into two clusters: one representing almost a
straight line with an AUC and MD close to zero, and one representing signicant
































Figure 3.12: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1 distributions of maximum deviation
(from a straight line between the starting and nishing points) of trajectories on
trials across each condition, using kernel density estimation. Blue plots represent
armatives; red plots, negations.
3.3.6 Clustering of trajectories
Trajectories were allocated to two clusters, separately for each participant, using
a k-means algorithm as described above. Figure 3.13 illustrates the two cluster
centres that emerged for each individual participant; Figure 3.14 shows the results
of these cluster allocations combined for all participants.
Figure 3.15 summarises the pattern of allocations to each cluster for all condi-
tions of polarity and predictability, collapsing across truth value. The proportion
of trials falling into each cluster was modelled across all conditions, with a full set
of xed factors and a random eect of polarity included by participant (models
involving a more complex random eects structure failed to converge).
Model comparisons testing for the presence of main eects or involvement in an
interaction were signicant for polarity (χ2(6) = 22.96, p< .001), predictabiliy (χ2(8)
= 77.51, p < .001), and truth value (χ2(6) = 58.45, p < .001). Model comparisons
indicating involvement in an interaction specically, however, were not signicant
for polarity (χ2(5) = 5.10, p = .404), predictability (χ2(6) = 9.80, p = .133), or truth
value (χ2(5) = 8.18, p = .147), indicating that only main eects were present for
each of the three factors.
Simple eects and simple interactions were investigated by estimating coe-
cients for the full model. The former are listed in Table 3.5. No simple interactions
were present, except the interaction between falsity and decreasing from medium
to low predictability for armative sentences (β = –0.48, z = –2.08, p = .038, 95%
CI = [–0.94, –0.03]).










































































Figure 3.13: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1 individual participant trajectories: the














−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
TARGET IMAGEFOIL IMAGE
Figure 3.14: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1 trajectory clusters emerging from the
cluster analysis. The trajectories of all trials are represented by thin lines (cf
Figure 3.9), colour-coded according to the cluster they fall into. Heavy lines


































Figure 3.15: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1 eects on cluster trajectory: the mean
proportion of trials falling into the more foil-skewed cluster across each condition.
Error bars represent 95% condence intervals.
95




A. –0.35* –2.01 .044 –0.69 –0.01
Neg. 0.26 1.73 .084 –0.04 0.56
Med. pred.
A. –0.35* –2.17 .030 –0.67 –0.03
Neg. –0.56* –3.45 .001 –0.88 –0.24
Low pred.
A. –0.84* –5.01 < .001 –1.17 –0.51
Neg. –0.53* –3.01 .003 –0.87 –0.18
Med. pred.
True
A. –0.41* –2.39 .017 –0.75 –0.07
Neg. –0.43* –2.80 .005 –0.73 –0.13
False
A. –0.42* –2.52 .012 –0.74 –0.09
Neg. –0.73* –4.57 < .001 –1.04 –0.42
Low pred.
True
A. 0.15 0.90 .367 –0.18 0.49
Neg. –0.19 –1.20 .230 –0.50 0.12
False
A. –0.33* –2.08 .037 –0.64 –0.02
Neg. –0.16 –0.90 .371 –0.51 0.19
Negation
True
High pred. –1.33* –4.22 < .001 –1.95 –0.71
Med. pred. –1.35* –4.31 < .001 –1.96 –0.73
Low pred. –1.69* –5.35 < .001 –2.31 –1.07
False
High pred. –1.24* –3.97 < .001 –1.85 –0.63
Med. pred. –1.55* –4.95 < .001 –2.17 –0.94
Low pred. –1.38* –4.32 < .001 –2.01 –0.76
Table 3.5: Mouse-tracking Experiment 1: simple eects of each factor on the
proportion of trials falling into the more direct cluster at each level of the other
factors. For example, the rst row provides the eect of falsity on the proportion
of direct cluster trials in a high predictability, armative condition. The reference
levels of each factor are true (truth value), high (for medium predictability), medium
(for low predictability), and armative (polarity).
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more deviant cluster, rather than representing any particular attraction to the foil
response, might simply represent trials where the participant happened to initiate
their response more quickly by making an initial guess at the correct answer
and updating their guess part-way through the trajectory. This would mean that
trials falling into the more direct cluster would disproportionately represent those
on which the participant hesitated before initiating their response, masking any
attraction to the foil.
To rule out this interpretation, initiation times for trials falling into each cluster
were compared. In fact, a paired samples t test showed that there was no signicant
dierence in initation time between clusters (t(23) = –1.81, p = .08), and the mean
across all conditions was in any case greater for trials falling into the more deviant
cluster. This shows that trials falling into the more direct cluster cannot be taken
to arise simply as a result of participants pausing or initiating their response more
slowly.
3.3.7 Memory test
Before turning to a discussion of the results of the main experiment, the results
of the “catch trial” memory test are reported briey. Participants’ performance
on this task was scored by awarding 4 points for each correct item in the correct
location; 2 points for each correct item positioned in the wrong location; and 1
point for each incorrect item or X positioned in a location that had contained an
item. The total number of points was then divided by the maximum available for
that trial (16, 20, or 24 for 4-item, 5-item, and 6-item trials, respectively).
As a percentage of the maximum points available, participants on average
scored 76% on 4-item trials, 71% on 5-item trials, and 65% on 6-item trials. A one-
way analysis of variance showed that the eect of number of items was signicant,
F (2,23) = 18.3, p < .001.
3.4 Discussion
Two ndings are strongly in evidence from the data presented here: the main eects
of polarity and predictability. Both negative polarity and decreasing predictability
had detrimental eects on all dependent variables, causing participants to respond
less accurately, take longer to initiate and complete their correct responses, and
follow mouse trajectories more likely to veer initially towards the foil answer.
However, the eect of truth value on their responses is less clear: falsity had an
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inconsistent, detrimental main eect, with this eect appearing only in the cases
of response completion time and trajectory cluster.
In spite of the strength of the principal main eects, the pattern of interactions
between variables was dicult to interpret. There was some evidence of a truth
value × polarity interaction (aecting response completion time, with a reduced
eect of negation for false sentences), and the suggestion of a three-way interaction
among all the independent variables (aecting response accuracy). However, the
lack of a clear pattern here makes it dicult to interpret these ndings as reliable
evidence for any particular conclusion.
Based on previous ndings by Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) and Dale
and Duran (2011), alongside the notion that predictability might function as the
“active ingredient” in pragmatic felicity in terms of its interaction with polarity,
the hypotheses were that no main eect of polarity or predictability would be
observed, but that an interaction between predictability and polarity would show
that low predictability hinders incremental processing of negations, generating
initially mistaken predictions to a much greater extent than these would appear for
armatives. None of these hypotheses were strongly supported by the evidence.
First, the main eects of polarity and predictability suggest that neither prag-
matic felicity nor predictability can account for all the processing diculties
associated with negation. All sentences presented in this experiment were equally
pragmatically felicitous (within the episodic context provided by the visual image
and the experimental task). Aside from truth value and polarity, the conditions var-
ied only in predictability of the critical object name and the memory load required
to store all objects and their locations in order to make a prediction mid-sentence.
Despite this, negation consistently rendered participants slower, less accurate, and
more attracted to the foil response option. A possible explanation for the consistent
main eect of polarity might be located in the specic details of the context that
made these sentences felicitous. Dale and Duran (2011) observed that the main
eect of negation only disappeared entirely in the case where they provided the
richest versions of their contextual “preambles” (Experiment 3); these sentences
were also the most similar to those presented by Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008)
in the licensed condition. In the case of the present experiment, although the visual
contexts licensed all the sentences presented, it is possible that their episodic na-
ture interfered with the mechanism facilitating incremental processing of negation
in more felicitous contexts. There may be a meaningful distinction, in this case,
between the long-term, stable associations in memory between everyday objects
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and their properties (for example), and the weak, temporary associations formed
between locations and object names for a task such as this one. In this way, the
sentences presented here may have been more comparable to those presented by
Dale and Duran (2011) in their Experiment 2: felicitous, but only weakly contextu-
ally enriched. The pattern of main eects observed matches between these two
experiments.
Second, the inconsistent pattern of interactions means that it is dicult to say
whether there was an underlying interaction between polarity and predictability
in any aspect of processing, as hypothesised. If such an interaction was present,
it was very weak (although in the same direction as the hypothesis: i.e., with
a reduced impact of negation in higher-predictability sentences), and perhaps
masked by two limitations of the experimental design and data analysis: rst,
the confounding eects of truth value, and second, the weakness of the cluster
analysis.
Regarding the confounding eect of truth value, the interaction of truth value
judgement and polarity in sentence processing — specically, that it is easier for
participants to judge a negative than an armative sentence false — has been
consistently reported over a long period (e.g., Gough, 1965; Wason, 1959, 1961).
This interaction appears to have been in operation in the present experiment for
response completion time and as part of a three-way interaction for response
accuracy. This eect is problematic, because in the current experimental design,
the manipulation of truth value was not as an independent variable of theoret-
ical interest, but purely a mechanism for producing a task that would tap into
participants’ ability to process the sentences incrementally and update their pre-
dictions for upcoming material. Ideally, the analysis would simply collapse across
truth value, ignoring its eects; this would also cancel out the confound between
truth value and position of the target and foil response options (true was always
presented on the left side of the screen and false on the right), with inuences
perhaps caused by handedness or reading order forming a component of any main
eects of truth value. However, because of the interactions involving truth value,
this approach to analysis was not possible, and the eects of the independent
variables of interest cannot be fully disentangled from the eects of truth value.
Furthermore, inserting the metalinguistic task of truth value judgement into the
naturalistic task of sentence processing may have dierent eects on the responses
to true and false sentences, with the latter being easier to verify (see, e.g., Tian &
Breheny, 2015, for discussion).
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Regarding the cluster analysis, Figures 3.13 and 3.14 illustrate the relative
weakness of the trajectory clustering in this experiment. For most of the individual
participants, and in the combined analysis, the two cluster centres were not very
convincingly distinct. Based on the bimodal distributions of area under the curve
and maximum deviation (Figure 3.12) and a visual evaluation of the clustering
patterns across all trials (Figures 3.9 and 3.10), the cluster analysis would have
been expected to produce two clearly distinguishable clusters, one with a much
more pronounced attraction towards the foil response; this was the case for only
a small number of participants. This outcome can probably be attributed to two
main factors: rst, the relatively slow overall response times, meaning that not all
stages of initial processing may have been captured by the trajectories; and second,
an inadequate number of datapoints. Both these factors imply that the cluster
analysis is likely to have underestimated the size of any relevant eects; more
specically, a polarity × predictability interaction, as hypothesised, could have
been present in the underlying processes but have failed to achieve signicance
under this analysis.
As a result of the above limitations and the overall lack of clarity provided
by the results of this experiment, an alternative approach is required in order to
better understand the combined eects of polarity and predictability in this type
of paradigm. The desiderata for an improved approach are as follows: to avoid the
confounding eects of truth value judgement; to elicit faster responses (in terms
of both initiation and completion); and to collect more datapoints per participant.
The latter two changes would improve the power of the experimental design to
capture and detect underlying eects on the shape of the response trajectories.
The rst requires a more fundamental change to the experimental design; however,
this experiment has shown that avoiding truth value judgement is essential for
this design.
In addition to the confounding problems discussed above, using truth value
judgement as the response task introduces several additional problems. First, there
is evidence that sentence processing carried out under a “truth evaluation mindset”
may dier in important ways from sentence processing in the absence of this
mindset (Wiswede et al., 2013), constraining the generalisability of any ndings
observed using a truth value judgement task. Second, the dependent variable in the
mouse-tracking paradigm does not rely upon a measure that is expected to dier
intrinsically according to whether the sentence is initially judged true or false (as
in the amplitude of the N400 in an EEG paradigm), but rather upon the behavioural
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output of an explicit truth value judgement. Not only is this fact responsible for
some aspects of the confounding, it also means that the dependent variable in
this experiment relies on a relatively slow, dicult task that requires conscious
processing, impairing its ability to access the automatic, rapid cognitive processes
that are of greater interest. Finally, the use of truth value judgement as a task may
also create an environment in which participants are unusually disincentivised to
engage in the very kind of processing that is of interest: incremental prediction-
making. Because half of all sentences presented in the experimental context are
false, generating predictions on the assumption that a sentence will be true is an
unusually poor strategy for generating accurate predictions in this context. Even
if comprehenders do generally employ this strategy, its eects might be attenuated
(whether consciously or unconsciously) in such a context.
In sum, truth value judgement acts as an additional layer of complexity and set
of processing requirements, providing only indirect, noisy, and impaired access to
the cognitive content that is truly of interest: participants’ predictions for upcoming
material in the sentence. In the next chapter, mouse-tracking Experiments 2 and
3 adopt a new methodological approach that avoids the need for truth value
judgements, in order to address these limitations and obtain clearer evidence




and 3: Sentence Completion
4.1 Introduction
The ndings of mouse-tracking Experiment 1 represented an ambiguous set of
results. As discussed in Chapter 3, the interaction of the truth-value judgement
task with the independent variables of interest, combined with a perhaps slightly
underpowered dataset for the cluster analysis of trajectories, made it dicult to
draw rm conclusions. In Experiments 2 and 3, the aim was to improve on the
design and methodological approach to obtain unambiguous evidence on the same
research question.
Experiments 2 and 3 were therefore based on the same underlying idea as
Experiment 1, and adopted broadly the same methodology. However, the truth-
value judgement task was, crucially, replaced with a sentence completion task. In
this paradigm, rather than hearing complete sentences and judging their truth or
falsity, participants were presented with incomplete sentence fragments; their task
was to select the picture of the object that would truthfully complete the sentence
fragment, given the visual context of the trial.
This task oered several advantages over the truth value judgement task
used in Experiment 1. First, it was expected to be a quicker and easier task for
participants to perform, freeing up cognitive resources previously expended on the
task itself — perhaps for use in more accurate or more dicult prediction-making.
Since explicit truth-value judgements are not part of ordinary sentence processing,
this should also more closely approximate non-laboratory conditions. Second,
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and relatedly, this task should more directly tap the actual cognitive process of
interest, namely prediction. Relatively few assumptions are required to expect that
participants might exhibit initial attraction towards their predicted completion for
the sentence fragment, in comparison to the additional layer of processing strategy
required to make this assumption in relation to truth value judgement. The task
should also incentivise participants to make predictions to a greater extent than in
Experiment 1, which contained as many false as true sentences. Third, because the
response options in the picture choice task change on every trial, it is possible to
counterbalance their location on the screen (left or right), thus avoiding potential
confounds associated with true responses always involving a leftward movement,
and false responses always a rightward movement. Finally, on a relatively minor
note aecting only a few experimental trials, the use of images avoids problems
with the naming of items. (Despite the careful selection of images, it was apparent
from the memory test responses in Experiment 1 that participants’ names for
object sometimes did not match those used in the sentences: for instance, in the
absence of a clear scale for size, a bracelet was frequently mistaken for a necklace.)
Because the sentence fragments never contain the names of any items, participants
are free to make predictions on the basis of their own labels for them, without
aecting the data.
It was anticipated that the sentence completion task would yield quicker re-
sponse initiation and completion times across the board compared to the truth
value judgement task. However, it was important to be sure of collecting data
as early in participants’ cognitive processing stages as possible. Therefore, Ex-
periment 3 was simply a speeded version of Experiment 2, with added auditory




The visual materials were identical for Experiments 2 and 3. A set of 216 images
of everyday objects, selected for their ease and consistency of recognition and
naming, were used in creating the stimuli. Each stimulus consisted of a 3×2 grid
containing 4, 5 or 6 of these object images, paired with a sentence fragment that
was presented auditorily. The sentence fragment described a target location so that
the sentence could be completed by the participant having observed the associated
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image.
In total, 216 sets of 8 stimuli were prepared such that each participant would
see 1 stimulus from each set. Within a set, 4 stimuli fell into critical conditions (2
with armative sentence fragments and 2 with negative) and the other 4 were used
in “constant-predictability” trials; their predictability was always low (because
the row referred to was always the one containing three objects). These were
included for counterbalancing purposes (so that participants would be unable to
predict which object would be the target answer by its position alone). In each
armative/negative pair of conditions, the sentence fragment and the set of objects
in the image were kept the same, but the locations of two critical objects in the
image were exchanged in order to counterbalance the identity of the target.
Each participant in each experiment thus completed 108 critical trials (18
in each of 6 conditions: armative or negative sentence fragment crossed with
group size of 4, 5 or 6 for high, medium or low predictability of target), 108
constant-predictability counterbalancing trials, and also 108 ller trials, each using
a dierent group of images (although individual objects were repeated, an equal
number of times, between trials).
For critical and constant-predictability conditions, all sentence fragments took
the form: “The top/bottom row contains/doesn’t contain...”. For ller trials, the
sentence fragment referred instead to the left side or right side. Audio recordings of
these fragments (which were also identical for Experiments 2 and 3) were prepared
and edited in the same way as for Experiment 1. Table 4.1 summarises how the
Experiment 2 and 3 stimuli were constructed.
Additionally, a 2,000 ms audio clip was created in Audacity for use in Experi-
ment 3 only. This consisted of an initial beep to signal that the participant should
begin their answer followed by a series of beeps, at decreasing intervals and in-
creasing in amplitude, intended to increase the participant’s sense of time pressure.
For Experiment 3, this clip was superimposed onto each sentence fragment audio
to produce the nal auditory stimuli, so that the initial signal beep coincided
with the onset of the critical word (contains or doesn’t). The clip began at a low
amplitude so that the critical word was not masked and remained clearly audible.
No catch trials (the grid recall task) were included in Experiments 2 or 3.
Based on the slow response times, overall accuracy rates, and informal reports
of participants, it was judged that participants may have been over-expending
resources on the memory task, to the detriment of their performance in the primary














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.1: Mouse-tracking Experiments 2 and 3 examples stimulus sets. One
example set is shown for each level of predictability. Each pair of grid images
produced 8 trial conditions (4 critical, 4 for counterbalancing purposes), 1 of which
was seen by any given participant. The appearance of empty cells on the top or
bottom row, and thus the conditions that particular sentence fragments fell into,









played; at onset of critical
word, response buttons
appear and participant
makes selection using the
mouse. In Experiment 3,
the escalating beep signal
applying pressure to
respond also begins at the
same time as the onset of
the critical word. Stimuli
and response buttons are












avenue by which to assess the eects of memory load (see Discussion).
4.2.2 Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except in the following respects.
During each trial, between 690 and 902 ms after the start of the audio, depending
on its contents, the onset of the critical word (contains or doesn’t) occurred, and at
the same time, the response options appeared as images located in the top-right
and top-left corners of the screen. The response signal tone also occurred and
the mouse cursor was released at this time. In Experiment 2, participants were
required to initiate their response (by beginning a mouse movement) within 5,000
ms of this time; in Experiment 3, they were required to complete their response
(by clicking on either the target or the foil image) within 2,000 ms of this time.
In either case, if they failed to do so, they received a warning message. After
completing their response, the participant received feedback in the form of a green
O (correct) or red X (incorrect) displayed for 300 ms. An example trial is shown in
Figure 4.1.
Participants completed two practice trials, followed by the 324 experimental
trials (critical, constant-predictability, and ller conditions) separated into 9 blocks
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of 36 trials and presented in a random order. Mouse coordinates were sampled
online every 20 ms during each trial; other dependent variables were measured in
the same way as for Experiment 1.
4.2.3 Participants
In both experiments, informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to
their participation, and they were compensated for their time with course credit
or a small payment. Ethical approval for Experiments 2 and 3 was granted by
the University of Bristol’s Faculty of Science Research Ethics committee (ethical
approval code 35142).
Experiment 2
Twenty-four participants, none of whom had participated in mouse-tracking Ex-
periment 1, were recruited from in and around the University of Bristol community
(6 male, aged 18–23 years [M = 19.7, SD = 1.1]). All were native speakers of English
and all but three (USA/France, Cyprus, Switzerland) had grown up primarily in
the United Kingdom. Most were monolingual but 11 had second languages of a
good, advanced or uent standard (Cantonese, Portuguese, French, Spanish, Greek,
German, Dutch and Turkish represented). Due to experimenter error, age was not
recorded for one participant and age, country during childhood, and additional
languages were not recorded for a second participant.
Experiment 3
Thirty-three participants, none of whom had participated in mouse-tracking Ex-
periments 1 or 2, were recruited from in and around the University of Bristol
community. All were native speakers of English, and all but six (France (2), Macau,
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Ireland) had grown up primarily in the United King-
dom. Most were monolingual but 10 had second languages of a good, advanced or
uent standard (French, Polish, Arabic, Cantonese, Mandarin, Italian and Malay
represented).
One participant was rejected from the analyses due to anomalously high error
rate (36%, compared to a mean error rate among all other participants of 12%). Of
the remaining 32 participants, nine were male and the age range was 18–34 years
(M = 23.5, SD = 4.5).
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Data preparation and analysis
Among all participants in Experiment 2 (N = 24), the range of error rates across
all critical conditions was 0.5% to 51%. In Experiment 3 (N = 32), the range was 1%
to 26%.
Filler trials and those included for counterbalancing purposes were excluded
from the analysis for both experiments. From a total of 2,592 critical trials (108 per
participant) in each experiment, those with incorrect responses were discarded
(15% of critical trials in Experiment 2, and 12% in Experiment 3). For Experiment
2, trials with response completion times longer than 4,000 ms, and on which the
participant took longer than 2,000 ms to initiate their response, were also excluded
(a further 6% of the remaining critical trials). For Experiment 3, the bounds were at
2,000 ms and 1,000 ms, respectively, which led to exclusion of a further 8% of the
remaining critical trials after the exclusion of incorrectly answered trials. These
thresholds were selected on the basis of visual inspection of the distribution of
initiation and completion times (see Figures 4.4, 4.6, 4.17, and 4.20 below).
Data from trials in which the target response was located on the left side of
the screen were reected in the same way as for Experiment 1. All other aspects
of data preparation and computation of dependent measures for both Experiments
2 and 3 were the same as for Experiment 1.
4.3.2 Statistical modelling of eects
The same approach to modelling of each dependent measure was applied to both
Experiments 2 and 3 as for Experiment 1; however, because truth value was not
manipulated in the former cases, it was not included as a factor for any analysis.
The procedure for model comparison to establish to presence of main eects and
interactions was therefore simplied by the presence of only two factors:
1. The full model (including xed eects of polarity, predictability, and their inter-
action) was compared to models including only the xed eect of predictability,
and only the xed eect of polarity. (An example of the formula used for this
model, using response time as the dependent variable and a maximal random
eects structure, is given in formula 4.1.) If the full model represented a signi-
cantly better t to the data, this was taken as an indication of either a main eect,
or the involvement in an interaction, of predictability or polarity, respectively.
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2. To test for a polarity× predictability interaction, the full model was compared to
a model including only the xed eects of each factor, and not their interaction.
response time ∼ polarity ∗ predictability
+ (polarity ∗ predictability|participant)
(4.1)
Following these tests, the full model was used to estimate coecients for the
simple eects of each factor at each level of the other factor.
4.3.3 Experiment 2
Response accuracy
Participants were generally able to complete the task accurately across all condi-
tions, although these varied in diculty (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.3 summarises the dierences in response accurary across conditions.
Accuracy was modelled across all conditions, with a full set of xed factors and
a random intercept by participants (models involving a more complex random
eects structure failed to converge). A set of models nested in the full model were
compared to explore the main eects. Model comparisons testing for the presence
of main eects or involvement in an interaction were signicant for both polarity
(χ2(3) = 17.6, p < .001) and predictability (χ2(4) = 32.2, p < .001). However, the full
model did not represent a signicantly better t to the data than a model including
xed eects of both these factors, but not their interaction (χ2(2) = 3.8, p = .15),
indicating a lack of a signicant polarity × predictability interaction.
Although there was no interaction, simple eects were investigated by esti-
mating coecients for the full model as part of planned comparisons. These are
listed in Table 4.2.
Response initiation time
Participants generally started to move the mouse within 500 ms of the cursor
being released, and often much more quickly, across all conditions, although
there was variation in the shape of the distribution by condition (Figure 4.4). In
general, initiation times were distributed bimodally (Figure 4.4a), as conrmed by
a signicant Hartigan’s dip statistic (D = .046, p < .001), with peaks at 333 and 63
ms.
Figure 4.5 summarises the variation in initiation time across conditions. This
































Figure 4.2: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2 response accuracy violin plots: the
distributions of participant accuracy rates for trials in each condition. Black circles
represent means; horizontal lines represent quartiles. The violin plots illustrate
the skewness of the data, to dierent extents across dierent conditions.
Variable β z p 95% CI
lower upper
Negation
High pred. –0.68* –3.15 .002 –1.11 –0.26
Med. pred. –0.47* –2.59 .01 –0.82 –0.11
Low pred. –0.16 –0.89 .38 –0.50 0.19
Med. pred.
A. –0.74* –3.43 .001 –1.16 –0.32
Neg. –0.52* –2.87 .004 –0.88 –0.17
Low pred.
A. –0.22 –1.21 .23 –0.58 –0.14
Neg. 0.09 0.52 .605 –0.25 0.42
Table 4.2: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2: simple eects of each factor on the pro-
portion of correct responses at each level of the other factors. For example, the rst
row provides the eect of negative polarity on the proportion of correct responses
in the high predictability condition. The reference levels of each factor are high



























Figure 4.3: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2 response accuracy eects: mean propor-
tion of correct responses across all conditions. Error bars represent 95% condence
intervals.
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(b) Response initiation times by condition
Figure 4.4: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2: distributions of response initiation
times, (a) using kernel density estimation, and (b) across conditions, measured

















Figure 4.5: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2: mean response initiation time across all
conditions. Error bars represent 95% condence intervals.
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Variable β t d.f. p 95% CI
lower upper
Negation
High pred. 150.44* 5.35 109.12 < .001 95.38 205.51
Med. pred. 101.82* 3.49 124.25 < .001 44.69 158.95
Low pred. 65.51* 2.24 127.28 .03 8.20 122.82
Med. pred.
A. 82.84* 3.03 101.57 .003 29.33 136.36
Neg. 34.22 1.21 114.75 .229 –21.26 89.69
Low pred.
A. 72.38* 2.76 276.02 .006 20.89 123.87
Neg. 36.07 1.33 296.37 .183 –16.94 89.07
Table 4.3: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2: simple eects of each factor on response
initiation time at each level of the other factors. For example, the rst row provides
the eect of negative polarity on initiation time in the high predictability condition.
The reference levels of each factor are high (for medium predictability), medium
(for low predictability), and armative (for negative polarity).
by participant of both polarity and predictability, but not their interaction. (Models
including the interaction in the random eects structure failed to converge.) Model
comparisons testing for the presence of main eects or interactions were signicant
for polarity (χ2(3) = 25.4, p < .001) and predictability (χ2(4) = 24.3, p < .001).
However, the full model was not a signicantly better t to the data than a model
including xed eects of both these factors, but not their interaction (χ2(2) = 5.6,
p = .06), indicating that the polarity × predictability interaction was (marginally)
not signicant.
Although there was no interaction, simple eects were investigated by esti-
mating coecients for the full model. These are listed in Table 4.3.
Response completion time
The distribution of response completion times (after trimming as described above)
was slightly skewed around a peak at 1,118 ms (Figure 4.6); although Hartigan’s
dip statistic suggested signicant non-unimodality (D = .025, p = .03), no clear
second peak was evident in this case (Figure 4.6a).
Figure 4.7 summarises the variation in response completion time across con-
ditions. This was modelled across all conditions, with a full set of xed eects
and the same random eects structure as for initiation time (models including
the interaction in the random eects structure again failed to converge). Model
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(b) Response completion times by condition
Figure 4.6: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2: distributions of response completion
times, (a) using kernel density estimation, and (b) for trials in each condition,


















Figure 4.7: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2: mean response time across all conditions.
Error bars represent 95% condence intervals.
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Variable β t d.f. p 95% CI
lower upper
Negation
High pred. 358.97* 7.38 74.29 < .001 263.69 454.25
Med. pred. 243.46* 4.84 84.20 < .001 144.92 341.99
Low pred. 253.46* 5.02 85.72 < .001 154.28 351.75
Med. pred.
A. 276.05* 5.86 60.16 < .001 183.78 368.33
Neg. 160.54* 3.30 67.37 .002 65.10 255.99
Low pred.
A. 92.35 1.99 62.35 .051 1.30 183.40
Neg. 101.91* 2.14 67.65 .036 8.44 195.37
Table 4.4: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2: simple eects of each factor on response
completion time at each level of the other factors. For example, the rst row
provides the eect of negative polarity on response time in the high predictability
condition. The reference levels of each factor are high (for medium predictability),
medium (for low predictability), and armative (for negative polarity).
comparisons testing for the presence of main eects or interactions were signi-
cant for both polarity (χ2(3) = 36.1, p < .001) and predictability (χ2(4) = 40.9, p <
.001). However, the full model did not represent a signicantly better t to the data
than a model including xed eects of both these factors, but not their interaction
(χ2(1) = 4.7, p = .09), indicating that the interaction was not signicant.
Simple eects were investigated by estimating coecients for the full model.
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Figure 4.8: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2: a representation of all trials included
in the analysis; each line represents the trajectory followed during a single trial,
from the starting point in the centre at the bottom of the screen to the nishing
























Figure 4.9: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2 heat map of cursor locations: a represen-
tation of how frequently, across all trials, any participant’s cursor was sampled at
each location, using 6,400 (80 × 80) location bins. Darker colours indicate more
frequently visited locations. As in Figure 4.8, the starting point is in the centre
at the bottom of the screen, the target image in the top right corner, and the foil
image in the top left corner.
117
Trajectory shapes
The patterns described above, with signicant bimodality especially in initiation
times, again suggested some level of clustering in the trajectory shapes; see also
Figures 4.8 and 4.9, which represent all trial trajectories and all datapoints sampled
throughout the experiment, respectively.
This picture is further supported by clear bimodalities in the AUC and MD,
computed for each trial as described above (Figures 4.10 and 4.11). The clustering
analysis using k = 2 therefore remained a valid approach to analysis for this
experiment.
Clustering of trajectories
K-means clustering was carried out as described above, yielding two clusters of
trajectories. Figure 4.12 illustrates the two cluster centres that emerged for each
individual participant; Figure 4.13 shows the results of these cluster allocations
combined for all participants.
Figure 4.14 shows the proportion of trials falling into each cluster across condi-
tions. The proportion of direct-cluster trials was modelled across all participants,
with a full set of xed factors and a random eect of polarity included by participant
(models with a more complex random eects structure failed to converge).
Model comparisons testing for the presence of main eects or interactions
were signicant for both polarity (χ2(3) = 30.0, p < .001), and predictability (χ2(4)
= 88.7, p < .001). The full model was also a signicantly better t to the data than a
model including xed eects of both these factors, but not their interaction (χ2(2)
= 10.5, p = .005), indicating a signicant polarity × predictability interaction.
Simple eects were investigated by estimating coecients for the full model.
These are given in Table 4.5.
As in Experiment 1, a concern for the interpretation of this data might be that
trials falling into the more deviant cluster, rather than representing any particular
attraction to the foil response, might simply represent trials where the participant
happened to initiate their response more quickly by making an initial guess at
the correct answer and updating their guess part-way through the trajectory. To
rule out this interpretation, initiation times for trials falling into each cluster were
compared. In fact, the mean initiation time was greater for trials falling into the
more deviant cluster, and a paired samples t test showed that this dierence was
signicant (t(23) = –6.69, p < .001).
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(a) Area under the curve
















Figure 4.10: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2 area under the curve and maximum
deviation: distributions of measures characterising the deviance of individual trials,
across all conditions, using kernel density estimation. X axes represent arbitrary
units in each case, measuring (a) total area between the trajectory and a straight
line between its starting and nishing points, and (b) the distance between the


































Figure 4.11: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2: distributions of maximum deviation
(from a straight line between the starting and nishing points) of trajectories on
trials across each condition, using kernel density estimation. Blue plots represent








































































Figure 4.12: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2 individual participant trajectories: the
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Figure 4.13: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2 trajectory clusters emerging from the
cluster analysis. The trajectories of all trials are represented by thin lines (cf
Figure 4.8), colour-coded according to the cluster they fall into. Heavy lines

































Figure 4.14: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2 eects on cluster trajectory: the mean
proportion of trials falling into the more foil-skewed cluster across each condition.
Error bars represent 95% condence intervals.
Variable β z p 95% CI
lower upper
Negation
High pred. –1.37* –6.02 < .001 –1.81 –0.92
Med. pred. –0.79* –3.90 < .001 –1.19 –0.39
Low pred. –0.50* –2.55 .01 –0.89 –0.12
Med. pred.
A. –1.07* –5.22 .001 –1.47 –0.67
Neg. –0.50* –2.80 .005 –0.85 –0.15
Low pred.
A. –0.53* –3.02 .003 –0.87 –0.19
Neg. –0.24 –1.34 .180 –0.59 0.11
Table 4.5: Mouse-tracking Experiment 2: simple eects of each factor on the
proportion of trials falling into the more direct cluster at each level of the other
factors. For example, the rst row provides the eect of negative polarity on the
proportion of direct-cluster responses in the high predictability condition. The
reference levels of each factor are high (for medium predictability), medium (for




Based on analysis of their responses, participants were again generally able to
complete the task accurately across all conditions, although some were easier than
others (Figure 4.15). The mean accuracy rate (88%) was slightly higher than in
Experiment 2 (85%), indicating that the increase in time pressure had no detrimental
eect on accuracy.
Figure 4.16 summarises the variation in response accuracy across conditions.
This was modelled across all conditions with a full set of xed factors and a
random factor of polarity included by participant. (Models involving a more
complex random eects structure failed to converge.) Model comparisons testing
for the presence of main eects or interactions were signicant for both polarity
(χ2(3) = 32.5, p < .001) and predictability (χ2(4) = 80.6, p < .001), as in Experiment
2. However, unlike in Experiment 2, the full model was also a signicantly better t
to the data than a model including xed eects of both these factors, but not their
interaction (χ2(2) = 14.6, p< .001), indicating a signicant polarity× predictability
interaction.
Simple eects were investigated by estimating coecients for the full model.
These are listed in Table 4.6.
Response initiation time
As in Experiment 2, participants generally started to move the mouse within 500
ms of the cursor being released, and often much more quickly, across all condi-
tions, although there was variation in the shape of the distribution by condition
(Figure 4.17). Also as in Experiment 2, initiation times were distributed bimodally
(Figure 4.17a), as conrmed by a signicant Hartigan’s dip statistic (D = .046, p <
.001), with peaks at 39 ms and 306 ms.
Figure 4.18 summarises the variation in response initiation time across con-
ditions. This was modelled across all conditions, with a full set of xed factors
and a random eect of predictability by participant. (Models with a more complex
random eects structure failed to converge.) Model comparisons testing for the
presence of main eects or interactions were signicant for both polarity (χ2(3) =
54.9, p < .001) and predictability (χ2(4) = 32.9, p < .001), as in Experiment 2. The
full model was also a signicantly better t to the data than a model including
































Figure 4.15: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3 response accuracy violin plots: distri-
butions of participant accuracy rates for trials in each condition. Black circles
represent means; horizontal lines represent quartiles.
Variable β z p 95% CI
lower upper
Negation
High pred. –1.00* –4.79 < .001 –1.41 –0.59
Med. pred. –0.82* –4.65 .001 –1.17 –0.47
Low pred. –0.19 –1.24 .216 –0.50 0.11
Med. pred.
A. –0.65* –3.21 .001 –1.04 –0.25
Neg. –0.46* –3.11 .002 –0.76 –0.17
Low pred.
A. –0.74* –4.64 < .001 –1.06 –0.43
Neg. –0.12 –0.84 .402 –0.39 0.16
Table 4.6: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3: simple eects of each factor on the pro-
portion of correct responses at each level of the other factors. For example, the rst
row provides the eect of negative polarity on the proportion of correct responses
in the high predictability condition. The reference levels of each factor are high


























Figure 4.16: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3 response accuracy eects: mean propor-
tion of correct responses across all conditions. Error bars represent 95% condence
intervals.
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(b) Response initiation times by condition
Figure 4.17: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3: distributions of response initiation
times, (a) using kernel density estimation, and (b) across conditions. Horizontal
lines represent quartiles.
indicating a signicant polarity × predictability interaction, which did not quite
emerge in Experiment 2.
Simple eects were investigated by estimating coecients for the full model.
These are listed in Table 4.7.
Response completion time
The distribution of response completion times (after trimming as described above)
was slightly skewed (Figure 4.20); although Hartigan’s dip statistic suggested
signicant non-unimodality (D = 0.026, p = .015), no clear second peak was evident
in this case.
Figure 4.19 summarises the variation in response completion time across con-
ditions. This was modelled across all conditions, with a full set of xed factors
and a random eect of predictability included by participant (models with a more
complex random eects structure failed to converge). Model comparisons testing
for the presence of main eects or interactions were signicant for both polarity
(χ2(3) = 60.0, p < .001) and predictability (χ2(4) = 62.3, p < .001). The full model



















Figure 4.18: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3 initiation time eects: mean response
initiation time across all conditions in Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95%
condence intervals.
Variable β t d.f. p 95% CI
lower upper
Negation
High pred. 52.52* 4.89 2697.49 < .001 31.46 73.59
Med. pred. 62.99* 5.62 2706.03 < .001 41.03 84.95
Low pred. 1.22 0.10 2713.54 .92 –21.61 24.05
Med. pred.
A. 36.97* 2.77 60.90 .007 10.84 63.11
Neg. 47.44* 3.40 72.33 .001 20.07 74.80
Low pred.
A. 40.43* 3.12 70.33 .003 15.06 65.80
Neg. –21.34 –1.58 80.59 .117 –47.73 5.05
Table 4.7: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3: simple eects of each factor on response
initiation time at each level of the other factors. For example, the rst row provides
the eect of negative polarity on initiation time in the high predictability condition.
The reference levels of each factor are high (for medium predictability), medium



















Figure 4.19: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3 response completion time across all
conditions. Error bars represent 95% condence intervals.
of both these factors, but not their interaction (χ2(2) = 22.8, p < .001), indicating a
signicant polarity× predictability interaction. Again, the main eects constituted
replications of the preceding experiment, while the interaction did not emerge in
Experiment 2.
Simple eects were investigated by estimating coecients for the full model.
These are given in Table 4.8.
Trajectory shapes
As for Experiment 2, the patterns across each dependent measure suggested some
level of clustering. Figures 4.21 and 4.22 present all trial trajectories and all data-
points sampled throughout the experiment, in further support of this.
This picture is again further supported by clear bimodalities in the AUC and
MD, computed for each trial as described above (Figures 4.23 and 4.24). The cluster-
ing analysis using k = 2 therefore remained a valid approach for this experiment.
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Variable β t d.f. p 95% CI
lower upper
Negation
High pred. 213.38* 10.04 31.80 < .001 171.74 255.03
Med. pred. 177.04* 7.84 32.17 < .001 132.80 221.28
Low pred. 57.81* 2.14 28.13 .04 4.90 110.71
Med. pred.
A. 143.50* 7.00 35.58 < .001 103.33 183.67
Neg. 107.16* 3.90 29.82 .001 53.32 160.99
Low pred.
A. 156.19* 7.70 43.35 < .001 116.43 195.94
Neg. 36.96 1.58 32.29 .124 –8.88 82.80
Table 4.8: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3: simple eects of each factor on response
completion time at each level of the other factors. For example, the rst row
provides the eect of negative polarity on response time in the high predictability
condition. The reference levels of each factor are high (for medium predictability),
medium (for low predictability), and armative (for negative polarity).





































(b) Response completion times by condition
Figure 4.20: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3: distributions of response completion
times, (a) using kernel density estimation, and (b) for trials in each condition,
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Figure 4.21: All response trajectories in mouse-tracking Experiment 3: a repre-
sentation of all trials included in the analysis; each line represents the trajectory
followed during a single trial, from the starting point in the centre at the bottom
























Figure 4.22: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3 heat map of cursor locations: a repre-
sentation of how frequently, across all trials, any participant’s cursor was sampled
at each location, using 6,400 (80 × 80) location bins. Darker colours indicate more
common locations. As in Figure 4.21, the starting point is in the centre at the
bottom of the screen, the target image in the top right corner, and the foil image
in the top left corner.
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(a) Area under the curve
















Figure 4.23: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3 area under the curve and maximum
deviation: distributions of measures characterising the deviance of individual trials,
across all conditions, using kernel density estimation. X axes represent arbitrary
units in each case, measuring (a) total area between the trajectory and a straight
line between its starting and nishing points, and (b) the distance between the


































Figure 4.24: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3: distributions of maximum deviation
(from a straight line between the starting and nishing points) of trajectories on
trials across each condition, using kernel density estimation. Blue plots represent





























































































Figure 4.25: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3 individual participant trajectories: the
centres of the trajectory clusters identied for each participant in the rst stage of
the cluster analysis.
Clustering of trajectories
Clustering was carried out as described above. Figure 4.25 illustrates the two
cluster centres that emerged for each individual participant; Figure 4.26 shows the
results of these cluster allocations combined for all participants.
The proportion of trials falling into each cluster across conditions is shown
in Figure 4.27. The proportion of direct-cluster trials was modelled across all
participants, with a full set of xed factors and a random eect of polarity included
by participant. (Models with a more complex random eects structure failed to
converge.) Model comparisons testing for main eects and interactions were
signicant for both polarity (χ2(3) = 61.7, p < .001), and predictability (χ2(4) =
162.0, p < .001). The full model was also a signicantly better t to the data than a
model including xed eects of both these factors but not their interaction (χ2(2) =
41.3, p < .001), indicating a signicant polarity × predictability interaction. These
ndings constituted a replication of Experiment 2 on all counts.
Simple eects were investigated by estimating coecients for the full model.
These are listed in Table 4.9.
To address the concern that more deviant trials simply represent those initi-
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Figure 4.26: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3 trajectory clusters emerging from the
cluster analysis. The trajectories of all trials are represented by thin lines (cf Figure
4), colour-coded according to the cluster they fall into. Heavy lines represent the
corresponding centres of the clusters.
Variable β z p 95% CI
lower upper
Negation
High pred. –1.39* –6.88 < .001 –1.79 –1.00
Med. pred. –0.99* –5.53 < .001 –1.35 –0.64
Low pred. –0.06 –0.35 .725 –0.40 0.28
Med. pred.
A. –0.90* –5.16 .001 –1.25 –0.56
Neg. –0.50* –3.53 < .001 –0.78 –0.22
Low pred.
A. –0.98* –6.76 < .001 –1.27 –0.70
Neg. –0.05 –0.35 .728 –0.32 0.23
Table 4.9: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3: simple eects of each factor on the
proportion of trials falling into the more direct cluster at each level of the other
factors. For example, the rst row provides the eect of negative polarity on the
proportion of direct-cluster responses in the high predictability condition. The
reference levels of each factor are high (for medium predictability), medium (for

































Figure 4.27: Mouse-tracking Experiment 3 eects on trajectory cluster: the mean
proportion of trials falling into the more deviant cluster across each condition.
Error bars represent 95% condence intervals.
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compared. As for Experiment 2, the mean initiation time was greater for trials
falling into the more foil-skewed cluster, and a paired samples t test showed that
this dierence was signicant (t(31) = –6.09, p < .001). To reiterate, this check is
important because, if initiation times were longer for trials falling into the more
direct cluster than for those falling into the more foil-skewed cluster, the evidence
would suggest that cluster shape per se could not tell us much about processing
during the trial; instead, it would seem to be the case that participants simply
went directly to the correct answer on trials where they waited long enough to
initiate their response to have gured this out, or took a quick guess (resulting
half the time in a mid-trial change of mind) early on. Because the opposite pattern
is observed, this bolsters condence that trials falling into the more foil-skewed
cluster represent something more than guessing: arguably, at least in some cases,
a positive attraction to the foil.
4.4 Discussion
Experiments 2 and 3 both replicated the consistent main eects observed across all
dependent variables in Experiment 1. That is, both negative polarity and decreas-
ing predictability consistently decreased the accuracy of participants’ responses,
making them slower to initiate and complete their responses, and more likely to
exhibit attraction to the foil response. This constitutes further evidence supporting
the conclusions arising from the main eects found in Experiment 1: namely, that
negation can have a detrimental eect on processing even for the type of pragmat-
ically licensed sentences presented in these experiments, and that reducing the
predictability of the critical word or sentence completion (as expected) makes the
task more dicult.
However, the ndings in terms of the interaction between polarity and pre-
dictability were very dierent to the weak and unclear evidence arising from
Experiment 1. Experiment 2 also presented relatively weak evidence for an inter-
action, which was statistically signicant only in the cluster analysis (although
this is the metric capturing the most relevant information about participants’ re-
sponses). However, this interaction was in the opposite direction to that observed
in Experiment 1. While the Experiment 1 ndings tended to suggest (in line with
the original hypothesis) that reducing predictability exacerbated the processing
diculties imposed by negation, this conclusion was not supported by Experiment


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.10: A summary of the main ndings across all three mouse-tracking
experiments. The abbrevations pol, pred and tv refer to the independent variables
of polarity, predictability and truth value, respectively.
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speeded (and more participants tested), the picture was much clearer: a polarity ×
predictability interaction strongly emerged, present across all dependent variables
and in the same direction as the weak pattern found in Experiment 2, with reducing
predictability eliciting more similar results for armatives and negatives, rather
than a bigger dierence.
The overall ndings for each dependent variable across Experiments 1, 2, and
3 are summarised in Table 4.10.
4.4.1 Was there a oor eect?
In interpreting this interaction, one concern is that it may arise from a oor eect.
That is, perhaps performance for negations was already so poor even on the easiest,
high-predictability trials that there was little room for it to fall further, whereas
performance for armatives was good enough in the easier conditions to allow
for a large drop in performance when predictability decreased. The lack of change
between medium- and low-predictability conditions for negations in Experiment
3 might be regarded as particularly indicative of this.
However, this interpretation is only reasonable if it is the case that no more
than approximately 50% of trials should ever fall into the large-deviation cluster.
This would be true if, in the case of the worst possible performance, allocation of
a trial to a cluster were based purely on guessing: an initial correct guess would
correspond to a trial falling into the more direct cluster, whereas an initial incorrect
guess would correspond to a trial falling into the foil-skewed cluster, and a guess is
equally likely to be correct or incorrect, meaning that approximately 50% of trials
would fall into each cluster. Although the conditions with the worst performance
in both Experiments 2 and 3 do show approximately 50% of trials falling into each
cluster, there are two main indications that this is probably not the result of a
oor eect. The second is discussed below in relation to how foil-skewed cluster
trials should be interpreted (whether as guesses, or as active attraction to the foil
response); here, I note simply that the proportion of trials falling into foil-skewed
cluster in this type of paradigm can exceed 50% in reality as well as in principle, as
it did in Experiment 1 (see Figure 3.15).
4.4.2 Anti-prediction
Another concern in interpreting the data, as mentioned in the Introduction to
Chapter 3 (section 3.1.3), is whether participants’ use of an “anti-prediction” strat-
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egy could be a possible explanation for the pattern observed. The availability of
this strategy only arises in a very specic case (high-predictability negations),
and even then only if participants do not process negation incrementally and
therefore cannot update their predictions on this basis. That is, if participants’
initial predictions are consistently wrong for negations, and they make predictions
of the form “not A” in preference to “B, C, or D”, then these eects could cancel
out, making participants’ performance on high-predictability negations appear
rather strong even though this results from compounding of two mistakes. This
interpretation is compatible with the trajectory data observed in Experiment 3
(and perhaps, to a much weaker extent, in Experiment 2), where the decrement in
performance between high- and medium-predictability negations is much larger
than the decrement between medium- and low-predictability. However, two pieces
of evidence indicate that anti-prediction is an unlikely explanation for this pattern.
First, in the case of both Experiments 2 and 3, the slope for armatives in the
trajectory cluster analysis between high and medium predictability is roughly the
same as the slope for negations. Anti-prediction was not an available strategy for
critical armative trials, so the slope for armatives can be attributed solely to
the change in predictability. This shows that predictability can impose at least this
magnitude of eect, without the involvement of anti-prediction.
Second, and rather more convincingly, the appeal of the anti-prediction strat-
egy to participants can be investigated by looking at armative trials where it
was available. This was not the case for any critical trials, but for some counter-
balancing (constant-predictability) armative trials (those associated with 4-item
images), there was a single possibility for the foil response option, and thus the
anti-prediction strategy was available. If participants preferred to use it in the case
of unincrementally-processed negations, they should also prefer to use it in this
case, where it should be in evidence in the form of a detrimental eect on their
performance (because the priming in this case would direct them initially towards
the wrong answer). Thus, participants’ performance on these counterbalancing
trials can be compared to their performance on low-predictability critical ar-
mative trials. (All counterbalancing trials were equivalent to low-predictability
critical trials, as there were three possible items for the target response option.)
In Experiment 2, 30% of the relevant armative counterbalancing trials fell into
the more deviant cluster of trials, as opposed to 38% of the comparable critical
trials, although a paired samples t test showed that the dierence did not reach
signicance, t(23) = –2.07, p = 0.049. In Experiment 3, the gures were 28% and
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43%, respectively, with the dierence this time reaching signicance (t(31) = –5.17,
p < .001).
A nding in this direction cannot absolutely rule out anti-prediction, because
the comparison is imperfect: the critical armative trials contained more objects
that could play the role of the foil, even though predictability was the same, so
a poorer performance in this condition might have arisen from the increased
memory load even if performance was aected in the counterbalancing condition
by interference from the anti-prediction strategy. However, for this to be the case,
the eect of the anti-prediction strategy would have to be extremely small, in order
to be completely overwhelmed by a memory load eect producing an overall large
dierence in performance (at least in the case of Experiment 3) in the opposite
direction. This nding can therefore be taken as weak evidence that participants
did not use the anti-prediction strategy, or that if they did so, its impact on the
data was probably very small, particularly in Experiment 3.
4.4.3 Interpreting the ndings
Having considered these potential nuisance interpretations of the data (concluding
that the pattern can be best explained primarily neither by oor eects nor by the
use of an anti-prediction strategy by participants), I turn to the main question of
what it can tell us about predictability, polarity, and their interactive inuence on
sentence processing.
The relative roles of predictability and memory load
One important question to consider is to what extent the manipulation of pre-
dictability in Experiments 2 and 3 isolated this factor specically. Because pre-
dictability was manipulated by adjusting the total number of objects in the visual
display, predictability was potentially confounded with the total memory load
on participants, and some of the main eect of predictability can probably be
attributed to the increase in task diculty on this basis. Storing multiple objects
for later recall in prediction making represents a drain on cognitive resources, and
as well as contributing to the main eect of predictability, this memory load eect
could in itself be responsible for some of the apparent predictability × polarity
interaction.
The constant-predictability trials presented for counterbalancing purposes
were used to test this. All of these trials were eectively “low-predictability” trials,
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as the correct answer could be one of three options regardless of whether there
were four, ve or six objects in the grid in total. Thus, rather than diering in
predictability of the available correct response option, they diered in how many
potential foils there were: one, two, or three. Participants’ performance could
therefore be compared between counterbalancing and critical trials that contained
the same number of objects. As the number of objects increases, any degradation in
performance in the counterbalancing trials can be attributed solely to the increase
in memory load; thus, the interaction between the number of objects and whether
the trial is a constant-predictability one (i.e., an original counterbalancing trial) or
a varying-predictability one (i.e., an original critical trial) should provide a measure
of the eect of predictability, as disentangled from memory load. This analysis
was carried out for the proportion of trials falling into each cluster in Experiments
2 and 3.
As illustrated in Figure 4.28, the slopes diered between varying-predictability
and constant-predictability lines, showing that there was an eect of predictability
over and above the increased memory load, but while this eect was clearly present
in armatives (in both Experiments 2 and 3), it was weaker or absent in negations.
To examine this interaction, mixed eects logistic regression models (as used in
the main analysis of results) were constructed separately for armatives and
negatives in each experiment to model the proportion of trials falling into each
cluster, including xed factors of predictability (constant or varying), number of
objects present in the display (4, 5, or 6), and the interaction between these two
factors. A random eect of predictability by participant was also included. (Models
with a more complex random eects structure failed to converge.)
For armative trials in Experiment 2, model comparisons testing for the
presence of main eects or involvement in an interaction were signicant for
both predictability (χ2(2) = 23.02, p < .001) and number of objects (χ2(2) = 75.70,
p < .001). The full model also represented a signicantly better t to the data
than a model including xed eects of both these factors, but not their interaction
(χ2(1) = 15.66, p < .001), indicating a signicant predictability× number of objects
interaction. For negative trials in Experiment 2, model comparisons testing for the
presence of main eects or involvement in an interaction were also signicant for
both predictability (χ2(2) = 9.37, p = .009) and number of objects (χ2(2) = 58.08,
p < .001). However, in this case the full model did not represent a signicantly
better t to the data than a model including xed eects of both these factors,





























































































































(d) Experiment 2: Negatives
Figure 4.28: Cluster allocations for varying-predictability and consant-
predictability trials in Experiments 2 and 3: comparisons of the proportion of
trajectories falling into each cluster. The lines representing varying-predictability
trials (original critical trials) are identical to those seen in Figures 4.14 and 4.27. The
slopes of the constant-predictability trials represent the eects of introducing addi-
tional objects, while keeping predictability constant; the dierence between these
slopes and those of the varying-predictability trials represent the eects of pre-
dictability, over and beyond the increased memory load resulting from additional
objects.
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predictability × number of objects interaction.
For armative trials in Experiment 3, model comparisons testing for the
presence of main eects or involvement in an interaction were signicant for
both predictability (χ2(2) = 48.33, p < .001) and number of objects (χ2(2) = 163.29,
p < .001). The full model also represented a signicantly better t to the data
than a model including xed eects of both these factors, but not their interaction
(χ2(1) = 33.86, p < .001), indicating a signicant predictability× number of objects
interaction. For negative trials in Experiment 3, model comparisons testing for
the presence of main eects or involvement in an interaction were signicant
for number of objects (χ2(2) = 64.01, p < .001), but not for predictability (χ2(2) =
4.85, p = .088). The full model also represented a signicantly better t to the data
than a model including xed eects of both these factors, but not their interaction
(χ2(1) = 4.30, p = .038), indicating a signicant predictability × number of objects
interaction.
The overall pattern emerging from this analysis is that the eect of predictabil-
ity over and beyond the associated eect on memory load in critical trials was
much stronger in both experiments for armatives than for negations. In the case
of negations, the interaction between predictability and number of objects was
not present at all in Experiment 2 and was rather weak in Experiment 3. Thus, al-
though some of the eects of predictability can be attributed to the association with
memory load (especially in the case of negative sentences), memory load cannot
be responsible for the polarity × predictability interaction observed in the main
analysis; in fact, the eect of memory load was fairly stable across armatives
and negations and fairly linear in the total number of objects presented, thus only
exaggerating somewhat the size of the main eect of predictability and interfering
very little with the polarity × predictability interaction. It can be concluded that,
as suggested by the original comparisons (especially in Experiment 3), reducing
predictability does have a more detrimental eect overall on armatives than on
negatives, the underlying cause of which is not an increase in memory load arising
from the experimental design.
Interpreting the interaction between polarity and predictability
Particularly in Experiment 3, the polarity × predictability interaction arises pri-
marily from the disparity between armatives and negations in the shift from
medium to low predictability, which induces a large change in the proportion
of trials falling into each cluster in armatives, and a very small or entirely ab-
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sent change in negatives (see Figure 4.27). As discussed in section 4.4.1 above,
a oor eect on performance for negations is not the most likely explanation
for this pattern. Rather than attempting to explain the relatively weak eect of
predictability on negatives, it may be more enlightening to explain the relatively
strong eect on armatives of increasing predictability relative to a low default.
That is, this pattern could be interpreted as representing a superadditive eect of
predictability and polarity, in which armative polarity and high (or medium)
predictability each do little in isolation to lift performance away from a baseline at
low predictability, but their combination (in the armative, high-predictability
condition, and to a lesser extent the armative, medium-predictability condition)
has a powerful benecial eect on performance.
Indeed, it is intuitively reasonable to imagine that prediction-making is an easy
and appealing strategy for armative sentence fragments with only one possible
completion, or perhaps with two, but the addition of any further complexity (in the
form of negation or reduced predictability) relatively easily obliterates this ease of
the task, rendering all other conditions eectively equivalent. Conceivably, partic-
ipants make trial-by-trial decisions (whether consciously or unconsciously), based
on the global complexity or resource consumption of the overall trial conditions,
as to whether to attempt to make a prediction at all.
Interpreting foil-skewed trials
The above interpretation of the data suggests merely that prediction-making breaks
down in suciently complex conditions; this fails to provide any information
specically about the incrementality (or lack thereof) of negation processing. The
same conclusion could be drawn whether poor performance results from guessing
or from active attraction to the foil response option (which would indicate initially
non-incremental processing, arriving at a positive initial prediction for the foil).
At rst glance, guessing might seem the most likely explanation for conditions
with a high proportion of deviant cluster trials, especially because the armative
condition (in which there is no reason for attraction to the foil response to occur
based on a lack of incremental processing) give rise to just as many large-deviation
trials at low predictability as the negative condition. However, closer examination
of the pattern of results obtained arguably leads to the conclusion that at least
some trials in some conditions fall into the more deviant cluster as a result of
attraction to the foil, rather than simple guessing.
First, as noted in the Results (sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4), trials falling into the
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more deviant cluster were, on average, initiated more slowly than those falling into
the less deviant cluster. The opposite pattern would be expected if highly deviant
trials arose from time-pressured participants initiating their mouse movements
quickly with a random guess.
Furthermore, because quickly-initiated trials were more likely to fall into the
more direct cluster, this cluster can be taken to represent trials where the participant
could quickly discern and execute the correct response. If an assumption is made
that all or most of the rest of the trials (those initiated more slowly) represent cases
in which the participant was forced to take an initial guess, after delaying their
response for too long and still not yet having arrived at an answer, these trials
would be equally likely to head initially towards the foil or the target, and thus
would be approximately equally likely to fall into each cluster. Therefore, if this
assumption were true and such trials were the only ones in the experiment, about
50% of trials would fall into each cluster. Of course, such slow-initiation trials were
not the only ones in the experiment; however, the remaining fast-initiation trials
(as already established) tended to fall into the more direct cluster, driving the total
proportion of foil-skewed trials (under the aforementioned assumption) down
rather than up. Therefore, given that the proportion of foil-skewed trials does
in fact approach 50% in some conditions, the only way the assumption that slow
trials represent guessing can hold would be if the proportion of fast-initiation trials
(increasing the size of the direct cluster) were very small. This can be checked
by counting how many trials altogether fall under the early peak of the bimodal
initiation time distribution: the proportion of trials with a faster initiation time
than the lowest point of the dip in the distribution between the two peaks was
28% in Experiment 2, and 39% in Experiment 3. These are substantial proportions,
indicating that something beyond guessing must be in operation in order for the
proportion of large deviation cluster trials to approach 50%.
Overall, the results suggest that non-incremental processing is likely to be
responsible for at least some of the attraction towards the foil response option
for negations. However, it remains unclear how to explain the very similar levels
of attraction towards the foil in the case of the low-predictability armative
conditions.
4.4.4 Conclusions
Both Experiments 2 and 3 showed a similar pattern of results. The main eects of
polarity and predictability identied in Experiment 1 were replicated; however, in
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contradiction of the hypothesis, the polarity× predictability interaction was in the
opposite direction to the weakly evidenced interaction seen in Experiment 1. That
is, decreasing predictability had a weaker eect on negatives than on armatives.
Although the broad pattern of results was the same in Experiments 2 and 3, the
ndings were not identical. In particular, Experiment 2 exhibited the same trends
as Experiment 3 in terms of the interaction, but this reached signicance only
for the cluster analysis of trajectories. The experiments were extremely similar,
diering only in the amount of pressure exerted on participants to respond quickly
(which was greater in Experiment 3) and statistical power (as data was collected
from more participants in Experiment 3). It thus seems reasonable to conclude
that the underlying eects were the same across both experiments; it was simply
easier to detect the polarity × predictability interaction in Experiment 3 because
of the increased power and the increased access to early cognition provided by
the additional pressure on participants to initiate their response quickly.
Not only does this set of results suggest that the “active ingedient” in pragmatic
felicity, as it interacts with negation, is not predictability (as hypothesised), it is also
inconsistent with Nieuwland and Kuperberg’s (2008) nding that pragmatically
licensed armatives and negations are processed equivalently easily; instead,
a strong main eect of negation was observed. It is possible that this can be
attributed to methodological dierences, although Dale and Duran (2011) obtained
results consistent with those of Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) using a mouse-
tracking paradigm. A more likely explanation seems to lie in the exact nature
of the sentences (or sentence fragments) and the contexts in which they were
presented in the present experiments.
In particular, although the sentences used in these experiments were licensed
by the context, this licensing arose through the nature of the general task (a
kind of memory game), rather than through rich contextual information that
might, for example, activate particular semantic elds or license the use of a
negation specically to deny or contradict an assertion or assumption present in the
discourse. In this way, the sentences presented in the experiments described here
may have been most similar to the “simple context” condition in Dale and Duran
(2011), as opposed to their pragmatically richest condition, the latter being the
case in which their results followed the same pattern as Nieuwland and Kuperberg
(2008). This is not to argue that the stimuli used here were improperly licensed,
but a distinction between licensed and fully contextually felicitous may be of
importance in this context. It is also important to note that because the same broad
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framing was the source of the licensing for all sentences in these experiments,
caution is required in generalising the ndings to conclude that the eects would
hold in dierent types of licensing context, including more naturalistic ones.
Finally, although these experiments have not provided a rm understanding
of the mechanism underlying the relationship between pragmatic felicity and
negation, they have highlighted some clear advantages and disadvantages of
certain methodological approaches over others. In particular, the truth-value
judgement paradigm interacts inconveniently with manipulations of polarity, as
well as adding a superuous layer of complexity and task diculty when the latent
process of interest is prediction-making. The sentence completion task provides
much clearer and less noisy access to the content of participants’ predictions in




This study was designed and carried out during a visit to the Linguistics department
at the University of Maryland in autumn/winter 2015. Colin Phillips contributed
greatly to the concept and design of the experiment and discussions with a number
of other UMD lab members were also helpful. Julia Bunton assisted with practical
lab matters (along with Anton Malko), supplied audio recordings of the materials,
and conducted several of the data collection sessions. Jon Burnsky and Hanna
Muller subsequently took over the project and have conducted several follow-up
experiments (briey described in the Discussion).
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Background
As identied in the course of the preceding experiments, clearer results in paradigms
aiming to measure incremental processing of linguistic input can be obtained by
tapping more directly into participants’ cognitive processes. Two strategies to
achieve this are to access richer information on earlier stages of processing, and
to use behavioural measures more directly related to the predictions made by
comprehenders. In this context, eye-tracking is evidently a methodology that
merits consideration. As with hand-movements made in the process of supply-
ing a response (exploited in mouse-tracking), people’s eye movements have been
found to reect their cognition: specically in relation to language processing,
individuals tend to direct their gaze towards a visual depiction of an object as soon
as it is referred to in an accompanying sentence (e.g. Allopenna, Magnuson, &
Tanenhaus, 1998).
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This relationship between eye movements and language processing has been
put to extensive use in studying the incrementality of language processing. For
example, Altmann and Kamide (1999) presented quasi-realistic visual scenes and
auditory sentences in which the verb either picked out a certain entity in the scene
as most likely to function as the object of the verb, or could take one of multiple
available objects (“The boy will eat/move the cake”). Participants shifted their
gaze sooner to the location of the object referred to in the case of the restrictive
verb than in the case of the non-restrictive verb, illustrating their incremental
incorporation of information on the semantics of the verb and its impact on
upcoming material in the sentence. Kamide et al. (2003) showed using a similar
approach that this principle extends to other types of syntactic and semantic
processing and prediction: for instance, the verb can also be used to predict an
indirect object appearing later in the sentence (e.g., a goal rather than a direct
object); an agent preceding the verb can contribute to the prediction of a theme
following the verb; and in a head-nal construction (in Japanese), the verb can be
constrained by arguments appearing before it. Other work has explored the extent
to which various types of linguistic and paralinguistic information can be used to
update predictions incrementally (e.g. Sedivy et al., 1999, on scalar implicatures of
scalar adjectives).
Various experimental paradigms exploring negation have made use of the
fact that visual stimuli can be paired with linguistic input to investigate which
representations are primed or activated to a greater extent at dierent stages of
processing (e.g. Kaup et al., 2006; Lüdtke et al., 2008; Tian et al., 2010). However,
these approaches tend to make use of accuracy or response time based measures;
relatively few studies have used visual world-type paradigms accompanied by
eye-tracking techniques to investigate the processing of negative sentences.
Orenes et al. (2014) employed a visual world paradigm to examine how negation
is conceptualised in a “binary” as compared to a “multary” context. They presented
a visual world consisting of four coloured shapes, preceded by a binary (“The
gure could be red or green”) or multary (“The gure could be red, green, blue
or yellow”) context sentence. The image was then accompanied by an armative
or negative sentence of the form “The gure is / is not red”. In the armative
case, participants rapidly (within about 400 ms of the onset of the adjective in the
critical sentence) shifted their gaze towards the shape of the mentioned colour,
regardless of whether the context provided was binary or multary. In the negative
case, participants looked at the alternative (in this case, the green shape) in the
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binary condition, where there was a dened alternative to the mentioned colour.
However, in the multary context, they were more likely to look at the shape of the
mentioned colour than at any of the alternatives, even though it was the only one
explicitly ruled out in the description. The authors interpret the overall pattern as
evidence that negation can be interpreted symbolically — that is, as a mental “tag”
attached to a specic concept or entity — in cases where the negation does not
combine with the negated entity to form a representation of an alternative.
Orenes et al. (2016) followed this experiment with an eye-tracking study on
the eects of the felicity of armative and negative sentences, as manipulated by
contextual information. They presented displays containing images representing
opposing concepts or entities (e.g., a rich man and a poor man) and measured
looks to each of these images in several conditions. Linguistic stimuli consisted of
two sentences. The second picked out one of the images as a target, either in an
armative or a negative form (e.g., either “Her dad was rich” or “Her dad was not
poor” rendered the image of the rich man the target). Preceding this sentence, a
context sentence provided information that was consistent (“She supposed that
her dad had enough savings”), inconsistent (“She supposed that her dad had little
savings”), or neutral (“Her dad lived on the other side of town”) with respect to
the critical sentence. They found that looks to the target image increased earlier
for negative sentences preceded by an inconsistent context sentence compared to
a neutral context sentence, whereas participants took longer to look at the target
in the case of negative sentences preceded by a consistent context sentence. This
was taken as evidence that the inconsistent pragmatic context pre-activated the
concept (in this case, poor, as embodied in the image of the poor man) that would
subsequently be negated in the critical sentence, meaning that only one further
step was required for interpretation (from not poor to rich); in contrast, in the
consistent case, the opposite context was activated, meaning that an additional
step was required (from rich to not poor back to rich). However, looks to the target
image increased sooner when the critical sentence was armative than when it
was negative, regardless of the context sentence, suggesting that negation always
incurs a processing diculty, even when the pragmatic context is facilitatory. This
pattern could explain why pragmatic context is often found to be benecial for the
processing of negation, as negative sentences are more readily interpreted when
they are presented as a contrast to or denial of a previously asserted or assumed
state of aairs.
The latter experiment specically related to binary or “bipolar” predicates, i.e.
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those with a specic opposite (rich vs. poor); as pointed out in previous chapters,
processing of negation is often facilitated in this type of case, as there is a ready-
made contrast frame (Löbner, 2000) directing interpretation of the negation to a
specic meaning. Combined with the preceding pragmatic context, this also makes
such sentences highly predictable, reducing the need for a “search for alternatives”
(Ferguson et al., 2008). However, as in previous studies manipulating pragmatic
felicity, it is dicult to use similar paradigms to explore the impact of episodic
predictability while controlling for pragmatic felicity.
5.1.2 The present study
The present study adopted a preliminary approach, aiming to investigate the extent
to which participants’ gaze in a visual world paradigm could be manipulated by
the use of armative and negative sentences involving descriptions of the visual
world. The experiment was designed with a view to building more complex
paradigms on this basis, to allow for further investigation of the factors (including
predictability) that would aect participants’ ability to incrementally update their
predictions about upcoming material in the course of processing an incoming
negative sentence.
To achieve this preliminary aim, a design was constructed in which participants
heard sentences describing the location of a target object in a grid presented
visually (a similar approach to the designs used in Chapters 3 and 4). They could
incrementally use the information in the sentences (which took the form “The
left side contains the cactus. It also contains / doesn’t contain the pitcher”) to
narrow down the possible candidates for a target object, which would eventually
be identied uniquely, at intermediate points in the sentence. In the case of a
negative sentence (“doesn’t contain”), participants would need to interpret the
negation in order to make the correct inference about the possible candidates;
waiting for the full proposition in order to interpret the negating element would
lead to predicting that foil objects in the visual world (in this case, those in the
leftmost column) would be good candidates for the target, leading to looks to the
foils rather than possible candidates.
As well as the critical sentence, this design also included context sentences
(as in the example above). The context sentence preceded the critical sentence
containing the name of the target object. The purpose of these was twofold. First,
it was desirable to equate the timing and structure of the armative and negative
critical sentences as closely as possible. The use of a context sentence enabled the
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felicitous inclusion of the word also in the armative sentences in place of doesn’t,
which was required in the negative sentences. Second, the initial sentence provided
a context in which both the armative and negative sentences were pragmatically
licensed. Previous work (Dale & Duran, 2011; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008, etc.)
has shown that pragmatic felicity is an important condition to enable negative
sentences to be processed incrementally as readily as alternatives; in this case,
the negative sentences formed a specic, relevant contrast with an armative
presented in the immediately preceding sentence, ensuring that participants would
not interpret these negations as unlicensed or appearing “out of the blue” when





Materials consisted of images and accompanying auditorily presented sentences,
with the images used as episodically-presented contexts for the sentences in a
similar way to the mouse-tracking experiments (Chapters 3 and 4). Each image
consisted of a 3 × 3 grid, ve cells in which were occupied by a picture of an
everyday object. These were drawn from a set of 120 such objects, selected for
consistent naming in American English.
The objects were arranged in the grid in a conguration such that one row or
column was completely lled and another had a single empty cell (see Figure 5.1
for an example). The middle row or column was always left empty. Thus, one item
was always an “odd one out”, alone in its column or row. Another of the items
(not the “odd one”) functioned as the target.
Each set of ve objects was used to produce two images, identical except for
an exchange in position and role of the items in the target column or row (for
counterbalancing purposes). Each image was also associated with two possible
auditory inputs (armative and negative). In both cases, the auditory input began
with the same context sentence, mentioning the location of the “odd” object (e.g.,
“The left side contains the cactus”). This was then followed by an armative or
negative critical sentence. The armative version of the critical sentence began
“It also contains the...” and the negative version began “It doesn’t contain the...”.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: Example pair of eye-tracking experiment image stimuli. In the case
of (a), the cactus is the object mentioned in the context sentence preceding the
critical sentence (“The left side contains the cactus”). The target, appearing in the
critical sentence, is either the magnet (in the armative case: “It also contains the
magnet”) or the jug (pitcher; in the negative case: “It doesn’t contain the pitcher”).
Thus, in the armative case, the possible candidates for the target during the
critical window (just before the name of the target object) are the feather and the
magnet; in the negative case, the candidates are the stapler and the pitcher. In the
case of (b), the context sentence is identical, but the roles of magnet and pitcher
are reversed in the sentences, and their locations in the grid are correspondingly
reversed.
In each case the sentence concluded with the name of the target object. Only
true sentences were presented. Thus, each pair of images was associated with
four possible trials (two armative and two negative, with each target object
featuring in one trial of each type). Only one of these trials was seen by any given
participant.
Auditory stimuli were recorded by a female native speaker of American English
and manipulated using using the Audacity(R) recording and editing software
(Audacity 2.1.2, Audacity Team, 1999–2016) and the SoX audio le manipulation
utility (Chris Bagwell and SoX contributors, 2013) to splice the names of the
requisite objects into standard recordings of the main parts of each sentence
(“The left/right side / top/bottom row contains..” and “It also contains / doesn’t
contain...”).
Each target item was also associated with a comprehension question which
asked about either some detail of the object’s appearance (e.g. its colour) or its
location in the grid, along the opposite axis to the location specied in the auditory
input (e.g. “Was the magnet in the top row?”). The purpose of the comprehension
question was to ensure that participants were incentivised to direct their attention
as quickly as possible towards the target object, so as to take in as much information
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as possible about this object before the grid disappeared.
In total, 10 pairs of grids were created, producing 480 possible trials. These
were distributed across 8 versions of the experiment, each consisting of 60 trials.
In addition to the experimental conditions, the described location (left column,
right column, top row, or bottom row), the identity of the target object, and the
locations of distractors were counterbalanced across participants.
5.2.2 Participants
Participants were 18 students from the University of Maryland community. Data
from two participants were excluded from the analysis (one withdrew part-way
through the experiment, and the second was a non-native English speaker). Of the
16 remaining participants, two were male, and the mean age was 21.3 years. All
were native American English speakers (three were also bilingual). Participants
provided written informed consent to participate and were compensated for their
time with a payment of $10.
5.2.3 Procedure
Participants were tested individually using an Eyelink 1000 eye-tracking apparatus,
with an Eyelink 2000 camera (25 mm lens), tower mount, and forehead and chin
rests to avoid head movements. At the start of the testing session each participant
was seated approximately 1 m from a monitor where the visual stimuli would be
displayed. Auditory stimuli were presented through speakers situated on either
side of the monitor. The eye-tracking camera was trained on the participant’s
right eye, and the height and focus adjusted as required. The standard Eyelink
nine-point calibration procedure, with xation points displayed on the stimulus
display monitor, was carried out at the start of the experiment to ensure that eye
movements would be logged accurately. A maximum error of 0.5° was accepted;
calibration was repeated if this threshold was exceeded. After successful calibration
and validation, the experiment began. Calibration was repeated at the start of
each block of trials, and between trials when excessive drift in the calibration was
detected.
Trials were presented to the participant using the Experiment Builder software
(SR Research), in the form shown in the example in Figure 5.2. A xation target in
the centre of the screen preceded each trial and the trial began when the Eyelink
system recorded the participant as xating on this target, in order to correct drift.
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"The left side contains the
cactus. It ..."






Figure 5.2: Eye-tracking experiment example trial with an armative sentence. To
initate the trial, the participant must xate on a cue at the centre of the screen. The
grid then appears and remains on the screen for 1,000 ms before the onset of the
auditory stimulus. Dashed red lines represent regions where the participant might
be expected to look for a disproportionate amount of time during each phase of
the trial. After the grid disappears, a yes/no comprehension question related to
the target object is displayed until the participant gives a response.
The visual stimulus (grid of images) then appeared on the screen. After 1,000
ms the auditory stimulus was played through the speakers. The visual stimulus
remained on the screen during presentation of the context and critical sentence,
and then for a further 1,000 ms (approximately 7,000 ms in total); participants’
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monocular pupil locations were logged during the entire period, at a frequency of
2,000 Hz. After the image disappeared, a comprehension question asking about
the target object was displayed on the screen and participants responded “yes”
or “no” by pressing a button on a controller. Trials were presented in a random
order in 6 blocks of 10 trials each, with the opportunity for participants to take
a break (which was followed by recalibration of the eye-tracker) between blocks.
The experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Comprehension response accurary
Participants were readily able to answer the comprehension question accurately,
with a mean response accuracy of 93.8% (SD = 0.05). The proportion of correct
responses did not dier between armative (M = 93.5%, SD = 0.06) and negative
(M = 94.0%, SD = 0.04) conditions, t(15) = –0.31, p = .763.
5.3.2 Eye movements
Data preparation
Fixation data were extracted for all trials except those with incorrect responses
to the comprehension question (6% of all trials) and those with more than 2,000
missing xations, e.g. because the camera had drifted out of calibration (5% of the
remaining trials). Data from the remaining 853 trials were prepared for analysis as
follows. First, the xations from each trial were separated into three sets: those
occurring before the critical time window of interest (before the onset of either
also or doesn’t); those occurring during this critical window (up to the onset of
the name of the target object); and those occurring after the critical window (after
the onset of the target). During the critical window, participants had enough
information to deduce the row or side of the target object (as they knew it was
either the same as that of the object mentioned in the critical sentence, in the case
of hearing also, or the opposite, in the case of hearing doesn’t), but not the specic
identity of the target. Fixations were divided into these groups based on markers
inserted into the eye movement logs at the precise onset of the relevant word in
each trial.
Next, xations within each window were allocated to time bins of equal length,
each lasting approximately 100 ms. (The exact duration of each bin varied slightly
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depending on the content of the particular trial, e.g. the name of the mentioned
object in the context sentence.) Thirty-four bins were used for the pre-critical win-
dow, 13 for the critical window, and 25 for the post-critical window. Data sampled
during saccades (as detected by the Eyelink system’s automated processing) were
discarded.
The location of each xation was categorised based on its screen coordinates
and the type of cell at that location on the trial in question. The categories were as
follows: mentioned (the object mentioned in the context sentence preceding the
critical sentence); target (the target object, i.e. the one mentioned in the critical
sentence and the subject of the comprehension question); alternative to target
(non-mentioned object in the same row or column as the target); foil (either of the
two non-mentioned objects in the opposite row or column to the target); centre
(the central cell, which was always blank, and where participants were always
required to xate at the start of the trial); other blank (any of the three non-central
blank cells in the grid); and none (xation outside the grid).
Within each time bin, the proportion of xations to each type of cell was
computed. The average proportion of xations to each cell, across all participants,
over the full time course of a trial is shown in Figure 5.3.
Analysis of xations in the critical window
Before the critical window, participants began by xating on the central, blank
cell (they were required to xate on a calibration point in this location in order
to initiate the trial), and then shifted their attention to cells containing objects,
xating specically on the one mentioned in the context sentence. After the critical
window, the name of the target became available to participants, and they rapidly
shifted their attention to the location of this object. These patterns are evident
in Figure 5.3 for both armative and negative sentences. However, participants’
xations in the critical window between these two events, and how they diered
between conditions, were of specic interest.
During this window, participants had already begun shifting their attention
away from the object mentioned in the context sentence (because they knew that
it would not be the target object), but did not yet know the identity of the target
object. However, if they were able to incorporate incrementally all the information
provided in the sentence so far, they could narrow down the possibilities for the
target object based on its location relative to the one mentioned in the context
sentence. Thus, the proportion of looks to the target and its alternative, vs. looks to
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mentioned in context sentence
centre
other blank cells or outside grid
Figure 5.3: Eye-tracking experiment: the time course of eye movements during
at average trial in each condition. Each time bin represents an average over
approximately 100 ms. Note that the target and alternative (represented by blue
lines) are located on the same side as the initially mentioned object in the armative
case (left panel) and the opposite side in the negative case (right panel), whereas
the opposite is the case for the foils (represented by green lines). Thus, the roles
of these two pairs of objects in the early window are reversed between conditions.
either of the foils (the objects in the non-target location) could provide information
on whether participants had taken into account all available information, including
negation, in executing eye movements during this window.
Accordingly, a linear mixed regression model was constructed to investigate
the proportion of xations recorded to regions of interest during the critical
window on each trial, using the lmer function of the R package lme4 (Bates et al.,
2015). Region type (target or alternative to target vs. foils) and sentence polarity
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(armative or negative) were included in the full model as xed factors, along
with the interaction between these two factors. A random eect of polarity by
participant was also included (more complex random eects structures caused the
model to fail to converge). This full model was compared to models omitting the
main eects and interactions of each factor in turn in order to establish which
terms in the model represented signicant eects.
The full model represented a better t to the data than one including a xed
eect only of region type, χ2(2) = 138.5, p < .001, indicating that there was either
a main eect of region type or an interaction involving this variable. The full
model also represented a better t to the data than one including a xed eect
only of polarity, χ2(2) = 230.0, p < .001, indicating that there was also either a
main eect of polarity or an interaction involving this variable. Finally, the full
model also represented a better t to the data than a model including xed eects
of both these factors, but not the interaction between them, χ2(1) = 138.5, p < .001,
indicating that there was a signicant interaction between polarity and region
type.
Coecients representing the simple eects of each factor at each level of
the other factor were computed based on the full model. These are listed in
Table 5.1, and the overall pattern of eects is illustrated in Figure 5.4. Overall,
these patterns show that negation had a detrimental eect on the proportion of
xations during the critical window to the possible candidates for the target object
(i.e., the region containing the target and alternative), as opposed to the foils: in
the armative condition, participants were more likely to look at the target or
alternative (proportion of looks: M = 0.47, SD = 0.35) than at the foils (M = 0.14,
SD = 0.25), whereas in the negative condition, they were approximately equally
likely to look at the target or alternative (M = 0.29, SD = 0.35) and at the foils (M =
0.32, SD = 0.35).
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Variable β t d.f. p 95% CI
lower upper
Negation
Target/target alternative –0.18* –8.48 1624.7 < .001 –0.22 –0.14
Foils 0.18* 8.49 1624.7 < .001 0.14 0.22
Foil region
Armative polarity –0.33* –15.63 1679.1 < .001 –0.37 –0.29
Negative polarity 0.03 1.30 1679.1 .18 –0.01 0.07
Table 5.1: Eye-tracking experiment: simple eects, estimated for the full model, of
each factor (polarity and region) at each level of the other factor. Reference values
are armative for polarity and target/alternative for region. For example, the rst
line represents the dierence in proportion of looks to the target and alternative




















Figure 5.4: Eye-tracking experiment eects on proportion of looks: a summary
illustration of the average proportion of looks, during the critical window, to each




In this simple preliminary study looking at participants’ anticipatory eye move-
ments during processing of armative and negative sentences, participants were
apparently better able to make use of all available information at an intermediate
stage of input in the case of armatives. They were more likely to look at the
possible candidates for the target object even before hearing the specic name
of the target in the armative condition, while they were approximately equally
likely to look at possible candidates and foils that could already be ruled out as
targets in the negative condition.
However, this interpretation of the results ignores the fact that participants
were more likely to already be looking at one of the candidates for the target in
the armative condition. As shown in Figure 5.3, in the armative case, more
than 25% of total xations just before the onset of the word also were already
on either the target or the alternative candidate for target, which were not yet
designated as such; in contrast, at the same time point (just before doesn’t) in the
negative case, only about 12% of total xations were already on either the target or
the alternative candidate. This disparity in starting points arose as a result of the
relationship between the positions of the object mentioned in the context sentence
and the ultimate target object (and alternative candidate). On armative trials,
the mentioned object was always in the same row or column as the target, and the
opposite row or column to the foils.
After the onset of either also or doesn’t, the proportion of looks to the possible
candidates for the target then rose at approximately the same rate throughout
the critical window until the target object was named explicitly; but because the
starting point was lower in the negative condition, a comparison of the total
proportion of xations throughout the critical window showed that participants
were more likely to look at the correct candidates in the armative case.
This aspect of the design had two separate confounding eects. First, the row or
column containing the target was explicitly referred to during the context sentence
(before the name of the mentioned object) on armative trials, whereas the row
or column containing the foils was explicitly referred to on negative trials. Thus,
participants’ looks to the corresponding regions increased prior to the name of
the mentioned object during the context sentence. Although a large proportion of
looks (peaking at around 64%) were to the mentioned object following the onset of
its name and before the onset of the critical word doesn’t or also, this object was still
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far from capturing all of participants’ attention all of the time during this window,
and most of the remaining xations were to the objects in the same column or
row. This is similar to an eect that was also in operation in the mouse-tracking
experiments (Chapters 3 and 4), whereby the location initially mentioned was the
relevant one in the case of armatives, and had to be subsequently suppressed in
the case of negatives.
Second, when participants shifted their gaze away from the mentioned object
during the critical window, they had further to travel to the candidates for the
target in the case of negative trials (where they needed to cross the grid to the
opposite column or row) than in the case of armative trials (where the candidates
were located in the same column or row as the mentioned object). This increase in
distance, although relatively small (eectively, the hypotenuse as opposed to the
leg of an isosceles right triangle), may still have imposed costs: for example, the ac-
curacy of saccades has an inversely proportional relationship with their amplitude
(Kowler & Blaser, 1995). Furthermore, conceptually speaking, it is possible that
the increased distance in the case of negative trials acted as a substantial barrier.
Because the context sentence “carved up” the grid for a particular trial conceptually
into either columns or rows, and the middle column or row (as applicable) was
always empty, participants may have conceptualised the location of the mentioned
object as having a disproportionately greater anity with that of those objects in
the same column or row, even if the physical distance was not much further.
This aspect of the design means that it is not easy to interpret the results of
the experiment denitively. However, as it was intended primarily as a “proof of
concept” or pilot study to investigate whether this type of visual world paradigm
would work well as a way to index participants’ anticipations about upcoming
material with negative sentences in this type of episodic context, the concept
was subsequently expanded to reduce the spatial confound and to investigate the
impact of other factors.
To mitigate the problem in which armative sentences were always associated
with a target in the same row or column as the object mentioned in the context
sentence, and negative sentences with the reverse, two variations (armative and
negative) on the context sentence were used in subsequent experiments, each
of which could be paired with an armative or a negative critical sentence (see
Table 5.2). While this design did not change the relationship between the location
of the mentioned object and that of the target, it did dissociate the independent
variable of interest from the particular column or row mentioned in the initial
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Condition Context sentence Critical sentence
A-A The left side contains the cactus... ...and it also contains the magnet
A-Neg The left side contains the cactus... ...but it doesn’t contain the pitcher
Neg-A The right side doesn’t contain the cactus... ...but it does contain the pitcher
Neg-Neg The right side doesn’t contain the cactus... ...and it doesn’t contain the magnet
Table 5.2: Further eye-tracking experimental conditions: an expanded set of condi-
tions used in subsequent experiments to mitigate the confounding eect of the
region named in the context sentence.
context sentence.
In further experiments following a slighly distinct line of interest, the nature
of the information available to participants about the objects in the grid was ma-
nipulated alongside the polarity of the critical sentence (and the context sentence,
for counterbalancing, as described above). These designs reected hypotheses,
based on evidence that the shapes of objects and other related perceptual infor-
mation are activated during language processing (e.g. Zwaan et al., 2002), that
comprehenders need to be able to predict a specic full proposition (i.e., including
the name of a possible target object) in order to correctly incorporate negation
into that prediction and test it against the world (in this case, the visual world).
To investigate whether participants would produce anticipatory looks to the
relevant part of the grid even when unable to make a specic prediction about the
target object, an “invisible world” version of the experiment was conducted, in
which the locations of all objects (except the one mentioned in the context sentence,
which was displayed at all times) were indicated with crosses shown only briey at
the start of the grid presentation. Objects then appeared in full at the same time as
the onset of the target word. In this case, participants’ performance in producing
anticipatory looks to the target regions (during the equivalent critical window to
the original experiment described here) was degraded for both armatives and
negatives, but particularly in the latter case.
In a third experiment, to investigate whether partial information was sucient
to produce the same eect, silhouettes (present throughout the trial) were used in
place of full objects, with the full image again revealed at the same time as the onset
of the target object name in the sentence; in this case, results were more similar
to the original experiment, with a smaller dierence between armatives and
negatives than in the “invisible world” case. These results are taken to tentatively
support the hypothesis that information about the identity of potential candidates
for a target (even if it is not accompanied by details of their appearance) is sucient
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to allow comprehenders to make and test predictions about upcoming material,
including the incorporation of negation into these predictions. Analysis of the data
and further work in this follow-up series of eye-tracking experiments is ongoing.
Overall, the preliminary eye-tracking experiment provided a somewhat promis-
ing avenue for further investigations in which predictability could be manipulated.
Participants’ anticipatory eye movements oer a particularly interpretable window
into the time course of their prediction-making during sentence processing, which





6.1 Summary of motivation
The work presented in this thesis was conducted to investigate factors aecting
the incrementality of linguistic processing using a variety of methodological ap-
proaches probing online cognitive processes. The phenomenon of negation was of
specic interest, as there is reason to believe this operation might present a special
case in terms of incremental processing, arising both from its underlying nature
and from previous research presenting an unclear picture on the extent to which
negating elements can be incorporated incrementally by comprehenders into their
partial representation of an utterance and used to update their predictions for up-
coming material. Negation has been found to disrupt incrementality in some cases
(Ferguson et al., 2008; Fischler et al., 1983; Lüdtke et al., 2008), but this disruption
is reduced or disappears in other cases — primarily, when the discourse context
supports the pragmatic use of negation (Dale & Duran, 2011; Johnson-Laird &
Tridgell, 1972; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008).
The specic research questions investigated here related to whether the pre-
dictability of later material in a sentence can inuence the extent to which negation
can be incorporated incrementally into the comprehender’s interpretation of the
partial sentence. Over the course of several experiments adopting dierent method-
ologies, the aim was to access participants’ predictions about upcoming material
as an index of the processing they were able to carry out online, while input
was incoming. The focus was on manipulating predictability through the use of
episodic scenarios rather than relying on participants’ real-world knowledge to
manipulate both the pragmatic felicity and the predictability of linguistic stimuli
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in conjunction. The advantages of the use of episodic contexts for such manip-
ulations include the avoidance of confounding factors arising from long-term
semantic associations, and the possibility of presenting identical linguistic stimuli
(accompanied by dierent contexts) across dierent conditions.
This approach was founded on the notion that predictability is an essential
component of how an utterance can be understood as pragmatically felicitous to
a greater or lesser degree. A felicitous utterance, in context, is informative, but
achieves this without introducing information that has no reason to be brought into
the discourse (Grice, 1975). Thus, the overarching hypothesis was that even when
sentences were equally pragmatically felicitous, a reduction in the predictability
of a critical word would disrupt processing to a greater extent in the case of
negatives than in the case of armatives; under conditions of reduced predictability,
comprehenders would be unable to update their predictions to account for the
presence of negation and thus would initially make actively erroneous predictions,
resolving this only at a later stage in processing.
6.2 Summary of ndings
Chapter 2 presented an EEG-based experiment, in which participants viewed
animations consisting of a unique object (on which one of two actions uniquely
operated) and two other objects (on which the other action operated), then veried
high- or low-predictability sentences describing the animation. The results of
this experiment were both surprising and rather dicult to interpret theoretically.
Although a reversal of the N400 responses to true and false sentences was observed
in the case of negative sentences with low predictability, the same reversal was
found in response to armative sentences with low predictability. In particular,
the large amplitude of the N400 component in response to the critical word in a
true armative sentence (especially one that was still relatively predictable, even
in the low predictability condition) suggested that this paradigm did not capture
exclusively the eects of participants’ predictions for upcoming material. The most
likely interpretation was that this pattern reected the use of a strategy focusing on
the “unique object” to ease working memory load, or perhaps automatic activation
of the most salient (i.e., unique) object in the animation rather than the object
most likely to complete the sentence. This approach was therefore found to be
suboptimal to assess the research question.
In Chapter 3, a shift was made to a mouse-tracking methodology, with a
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similar paradigm using static images (with specied locations in a grid) rather than
animations. This enabled the expansion of the predictability factor to three levels
without over-taxing participants’ working memory and attention span. The use of
three levels of predictability in turn enabled comparisons between levels (medium
and low predictability) where neither stimulus contained a unique object, and the
dierence in salience between the targets may have been reduced. The results of
this experiment were generally in line with the hypothesis (although a consistent
main eect of negation, even in high-predictability conditions, was surprising),
but the presence of the relevant interactions was somewhat inconsistent across
dierent dependent variables. Importantly, the additional interaction of truth value
with the independent variables of interest was problematic for the interpretation
of the overall pattern.
As described in Chapter 4, the methodological pitfalls of the truth value judge-
ment task were avoided in a further two closely-related mouse-tracking experi-
ments, in which participants were tasked with selecting a picture to best complete
a sentence rather than judging the truth value of a full sentence. This allowed more
direct access to their predictions for upcoming material, and produced a surprising
set of results, in which the opposite of the hypothesised pattern was observed:
as well as a consistent main eect of negation once again, it was found that a
reduction in predictability imposed a more detrimental eect on processing of
armative than of negative sentences. This pattern was replicated across multiple
dependent variables and obtained more clearly in mouse-tracking Experiment 3 (a
speeded version of Experiment 2). The interpretation of its surprising nature was
tackled in section 4.4, and is further discussed below (sections 6.3 and 6.4).
Finally, in Chapter 5, an alternative methodological avenue for investigating
the eects of negation using episodic contexts was explored, namely eye-tracking.
Predictability was not manipulated in this experiment, but the use of a visual
world paradigm with linguistic stimuli describing the locations of objects in the
visual world was found to show potential as a way of investigating processing
dierences between armative and negative sentences. Although clear dierences
in participants’ eye movements were observed, with fewer looks during the critical
window towards possible candidates for the eventual target in the negative condi-
tion, this could be attributed largely to the confounding eects in the exact nature
of the task for negative as compared to armative sentences. Therefore, further
work is necessary to explore how the incremental incorporation of negation into
a sentence representation (or lack of such incorporation) aects comprehenders’
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eye movements, particularly when the predictability of the target is manipulated.
6.3 Situating the ndings relative to other work
Across all the experiments presented here, the ndings have been (at least super-
cially) more in line with accounts of the processing of negative sentences that
suggest that this can be more dicult than the processing of armatives even un-
der very favourable conditions. This view is more consistent with non-incremental
accounts of the processing of negative sentences than with accounts that suggest
that negation can be strictly incrementally incorporated into partial sentence
representations, although this evidence does not require a specic commitment
to the view that the comprehender must wait for a full proposition to become
available in order to carry out some form of two-stage processing. Additionally,
even in this case, the ndings do not necessarily distinguish between more specic
accounts of the mechanism underlying non-incremental incorporation of negation,
e.g. schema-plus-tag accounts (e.g. Mayo et al., 2004) vs multi-step simulation ac-
counts (e.g. Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; Kaup et al., 2006). The rm statement that can be
made about these ndings is that they appear to be somewhat consistent with the
view that negation is systematically more costly. Specically, a clear distinction in
processing between armatives and negatives was observed in every experiment
except the rst (Chapter 2), across almost all experimental conditions, suggesting
that the latter incur some type of processing diculty that is not inicted by
the former type. This was the case even though all experiments presented only
sentences pragmatically licensed by the episodic context, a consideration that has
been proposed as the essential factor in facilitating processing of negation. Under
this interpretation, it is necessary to conclude that in cases where equivalence be-
tween armatives and negatives is observed (e.g. Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008),
this can be attributed to special circumstances elicited by presenting sentences
in a pragmatic context specically designed to enhance the felicity of negative
sentences.
However, in the work presented here, consistent interactions between pre-
dictability and polarity were also observed in the experiments with the most
methodologically reliable and statistically robust ndings (Chapter 4). Therefore,
an interpretation in which negation simply requires an extra processing step, even
when its use is pragmatically licensed (but not pragmatically supported by a rich
context), is inadequate to fully explain the results. High levels of predictability
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appear to facilitate processing of armative sentences to a greater extent than
they facilitate processing of negative sentences. This is discussed further below.
First, however, it is important to situate the type of stimuli presented in this
work in the context of those used in similar research. A comparison of both
the pragmatic felicity and the predictability of linguistic input is necessary to
explore possible reasons for the dierences between these and other ndings.
In the experiments described here, a deliberate choice was made to manipulate
predictability through the use of episodically generated contexts, rather than using
real-world knowledge or associations. As discussed in the relevant chapters, this
approach has some advantages (such as the ability to control predictability and
other aspects of the stimuli precisely), but it also introduced certain trade-os.
In particular, the articial or constrained nature of the episodic scenarios may
have meant that the pragmatics of the full situation comprising each stimulus
were atypical or somewhat lacking in context, despite the careful licensing of the
sentences by the context. This characterisation applies to a greater extent to the
static grids and descriptions used in the experiments described in Chapters 3, 4
and 5; the animations presented in the EEG experiment (Chapter 2) provided a
richer contextual grounding for the accompanying sentences, and more specic
pragmatic reason to deny the occurrence of events (actions that were attempted but
failed to take eect). However, the use of animations presented its own challenges:
each trial was lengthy, placing limits on the amount of data that could be collected,
and it would be dicult to expand this paradigm to scenarios with multiple levels of
predictability, as the task was already taxing for participants. Thus, across most of
the experiments presented here, the sentences were probably best characterised as
pragmatically licensed, but not contextually enriched. This distinction is probably
one with a rather fuzzy boundary, but might be illustrated by comparing the
sentences presented by Dale and Duran (2011) in their Experiment 2 (“You want
to lift an elephant? Elephants are not small”) vs. their Experiment 3 (“‘You want
to lift an elephant?’ the mother said to her child, ‘but elephants are not small.’ ”)
In the former case, the simple preamble means that the negation does not emerge
out of the blue. However, the latter case goes beyond this to present a miniature
discourse in which the underlying communicative intent for the entire utterance
is clear.
The sentences presented across the present experiments were in at least one
sense very strongly predictable compared to those used in other experiments, and to
sentences usually encountered in natural dialogue. Given the constrained contexts,
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which amounted to miniature “worlds” with small, xed sets of populating entities,
the high predictability sentences only had one referent that could complete them
truthfully, and even the conditions with lower predictability presented only two
or three options for the critical word. In experiments presenting a mixture of true
and false sentences (Chapter 2’s EEG experiment and Chapter 3’s mouse-tracking
Experiment 1), participants could not logically make a guaranteed prediction for
which word would in fact complete the sentence, even when only one candidate
would make it true, as a false sentence was equally likely. However, as rapid
prediction-making (as an integral component of sentence processing) tends to be
automatic rather than strategic, the ratio of false to true sentences encountered in
the experimental setting did not necessarily aect this. In sentence completion
(Chapter 4; mouse-tracking Experiments 2 and 3) and eye-tracking experiments
(Chapter 5), participants never encountered any false sentences, meaning that any
potential eect of the true:false ratio was not in operation.
In this sense, then, the stimuli were predictable to an articially high degree.
However, as noted above, they may in some cases have been presented in a context
that uses an atypically articial means of pragmatic licensing, and furthermore,
the predictions that participants could make were based on immediately preceding,
episodic information. While comprehenders are certainly able to take such infor-
mation into account in their assessments of these sentences, there is a sense in
which this type of prediction may be more dicult for comprehenders to generate
online, compared to the type of predictions that must be generated during natural
language comprehension. Sentences presented within a natural discourse with a
rich contextual embedding, striking a pragmatic balance between relevance and
informativity, may in some ways be easier to predict because comprehenders can
base their hypotheses on their understanding of the speaker’s intent and their
real-world knowledge. These predictions may be easier to make because they
are facilitated by strong, long-term associations between concepts. For example,
although the sentence “A robin is a...” could be accurately completed by a number
of possible expressions (bird, creature, symbol of Christmas, delightful chap, and so
on), the semantic associations it presents may make these predictions easier to
generate than a prediction that relies on a temporary and asemantic association
between the entity and an arbitrary predicate (e.g. “the top row contains”). Fur-
thermore, the surrounding discourse context, in a natural language setting, may
provide rather extensive clues as to which of those predictions might be best (an
encyclopedia article vs. a poem, for instance). In contrast, somewhat arbitrary
171
associations that are relevant only episodically have none of these advantages
and additionally impose a working memory burden on comprehenders (in storing
these associations in short-term memory) before prediction-making can even be
considered. The ease of episodically calculated predictions and more long-term
association-based predictions could be important in the case of negations, in light
of the following discussion.
6.4 Global and local processing
It is integral to the role of negation that operations involving negation activate
concepts or entities specically for the purpose of suppressing them in favour of
their opposite (to the extent that this is dened). For example, in a sentence of
the type used in Chapters 3 and 4 such as “The top row doesn’t contain the ...”,
the concept of the top row and objects located there are initially activated, and
the comprehender must use the fact that doesn’t subsequently appears to transfer
their attention from objects associated with the top row to those associated with
its “opposite” (which, in this case, is clear to them through a combination of
general world knowledge and the specic context of the experimental scenario:
the bottom row). Thus, there is a crucial distinction to be made in the processing
of negation between what is activated locally (for example, at earlier points of an
utterance before a negating element occurs, or before its implications for the full
representation of the sentence have been fully computed) and what needs to be
activated by the globally-interpreted representation of the sentence following the
incorporation of negation.
The burden imposed on processing by this feature of negation (at least in the
compositional form of a negating particle and verb or other predicate), and the
extent to which it impedes incremental updating and prediction-making during
input, depends on several factors. Simple word order is important: if negation
appears before the negated concept (as in the type of sentences used in Chap-
ter 2: “The wizard didn’t raise the position of the basket”), it may be possible
for the comprehender to adjust their response to this concept commensurately.
Conversely, when negation appears after the concept to be negated (as in the
type used in Chapter 3: “The top row doesn’t contain the basket”), there may be
further eects at work in which a greater distance between the two may impose
an increasing level of diculty on suppressing what has already been strongly
activated. (Such activation arises not necessarily only from single words; it can
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be based on compositional analysis of preceding parts of the sentence. Studies
manipulating the predictability of words using real-world knowledge often demon-
strate or indeed rely on this: for example, the specic prediction palms is made as
a completion for “They wanted to make the hotel look more like a tropical resort.
So along the driveway, they planted rows of...” as a result not of any single word,
but thanks to contributions to the full meaning of the sentence made by tropical,
resort, and planted; Federmeier & Kutas, 1999.) However, other factors also appear
to matter for the incremental processing of negative sentences, including those
at issue in the work here: contextual pragmatics and predictability. These are
probably important because of the way in which they govern the ease with which
the “nuisance” activation arising from the negated concept can be replaced with
the most relevant alternative.
In particular, contextual pragmatics and predictability dictate the extent to
which a clear contrast frame for the negated concept is available. As discussed in
the General Introduction and in Chapter 4, predicates may have a clear opposite
(e.g., open vs. closed; see Kaup et al., 2006; Mayo et al., 2004), in which case a
negation has a ready-made, obvious meaning. Alternatively, there may be multiple
alternatives (as in the “multary” contexts presented by Orenes et al., 2014), in which
case the comprehender is more likely to retain activation of the negated concept as
the only possible way or representing the set of all likely meanings. In the case of
an intermediate stage during online processing of a partial proposition, in which
negation has only just appeared, the extent to which the comprehender can make
accurate predictions depends on the potential contrast sets narrowed down by
earlier parts of the sentence. For instance, in the case of “A robin is not a...” (Fischler
et al., 1983), the scope of possible dimensions along which negation could occur is
almost innite. Critically, the semantic associations of the negated concept are not
the only factor contributing to the extent to which this computation is possible or
easy: contextual factors also contribute. In contrast to the “robin” sentence, in the
case of a more pragmatically felicitous utterance embedded in a richly specied
context, the speaker’s intent in uttering a negation is likely to be relatively clear
to the comprehender (for instance, as in the enriched sentences presented by
Dale & Duran, 2011). This information, combined with an incrementally updated
representation of the critical part of the utterance, allows the comprehender to
formulate an accurate prediction about upcoming material that incorporates the
meaning of the negation.
In the sentences presented in the mouse-tracking experiments discussed here,
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two factors relating to predictability seem to be important in modulating the
ease with which accurate predictions based on negation can be made. First, the
experimental context that applied across all trials, in which the same type of grid
was consistently presented and only objects actually present in the grid were ever
named (Chapter 3) or presented as response options (Chapter 4), made it clear
to participants that the expression the top row doesn’t could be taken as having
a meaning or predictive capacity exactly equivalent to that of the bottom row,
and vice versa. (If the experiments had included sentences in which objects not
present in the grid were mentioned, a possible completion to “The top row doesn’t
contain...” could always have been a non-present object; in fact, because this was
not the case, possible completions were always objects located in the bottom row.)
This information about the “world” in which the sentences were presented meant
that, within the context, the linguistic stimuli were pragmatically licensed and
their meaning picked out in a similar way to the facilitation of more “natural”
sentences based on realistic linguistic context. Second, the predictability of the
sentences once all the information was incorporated, including negation, was
governed by the manipulation of the visual context. Thus, on critical negative
trials, participants needed to switch their attention from the row containing three
objects to a row containing variably one, two, or three objects, depending on
condition. This switching process and the associated predictions to be made were
probably inuenced by the variation in salience of rows with dierent numbers
of items, as well as the presence of negation in itself, as shown by the polarity ×
predictability interaction described in Chapter 4 (section 4.4.3).
In both these cases, relationships constructed articially by the experimental
design, rather than through deeply embedded semantic assocations, underlaid
the computations necessary to make predictions. As discussed above, this choice
about the experimental paradigms employed was made for well-founded reasons,
but it may contribute to how the results should be interpreted in light of what
predictability means in this context. Negating the predicate open to arrive at
closed, in a pragmatic context lending clear support to this interpretation of the
speaker’s intent, may be a very dierent process requiring dierent strategies
to the operations involved in negating the predicate top row and its arbitrary,
episodically-generated associations with three everyday objects to arrive at bottom
row and its similar associations with two dierent and semantically unrelated
objects, even when the experimental context makes this process of operations very
clear analytically.
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In summary, while negation often induces the need for a switch in the subject
of attention or activation, and predictability may be one of the factors governing
how easy or dicult this switch is, multiple facets of predictability may inuence
the diculty in dierent ways, aecting the extent to which comprehenders can
make accurate predictions accounting for the presence of negation.
6.5 Limitations and generalisability
The experiments described here present a mixed picture of the impact of varying
levels of predictability on the incremental interpretation of negation. However,
the most methodologically sound nding was replicated (Chapter 4) and several
potentially interesting avenues explored. The generalisability of these results
is restricted to some degree by many of the factors discussed above: it is not
necessarily clear how the ndings generalise to cases of variable predictability
in settings that are not governed by the type of clear and constrained context
generated by the experimental paradigms, for example, nor even whether it is
meaningful to refer to this type of predictability in a natural discourse context, in
which predictability of upcoming material is rarely dictated by the existence of a
clear set of candidates. However, the interpretations proposed above do clarify
the nature of the relationship between contextual predictability governed by
pragmatic considerations, and the type of analytical or non-semantic predictability
manipulated here. The dierence between the two may represent an important
factor in the incremental interpretation of negation.
Some further limitations that apply across these experiments include the fact
that it remains unclear how to interpret the mouse-tracking ndings in detail
without postulating that a oor eect was involved, even though the data support
the view that there was not such an eect present; it would therefore be useful to
understand in more detail the patterns that emerge in terms of trajectory clustering
across a wider range of paradigms. The experiments were also restricted, as
discussed above, to exploring a small part of the predictability spectrum, with
even the low predictability conditions involving relatively high cloze probabilities.
It would be dicult to explore sentences with lower predictability still while
maintaining the reliance on episodic contexts for manipulation, rather than shifting
to a paradigm relying on long-term knowledge.
Because dierent types of sentences were used across experiments employing
dierent methodologies, it is not always clear exactly what caused the dierences
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in ndings across experiments. This means that not all eects obtained here have
been accounted for; some remain dicult to understand.
Finally, this series of experiments does not provide evidence to support or
contradict specic theories of the mechanisms underlying processing of negation,
even in cases where it suggests that a two-step mechanism might be in play under
certain circumstances; for example, this evidence cannot distinguish between
tagging and simulation theories.
6.6 Future work
Two lines of further investigation have been extended from the work presented
here. First, as described briey in Chapter 5, the eye-tracking paradigm piloted in
the initial experiment reported on has been developed to investigate further the
impact of providing varying amounts of information on potential targets to the
participants. This series of experiments reects the hypothesis that, at least under
some circumstances, negation cannot be incorporated fully into a comprehender’s
interpretation of a sentence until a complete proposition is available for negation,
and thus that the ability to predict a fully eshed-out candidate proposition (in-
cluding, in this case, the specic name of a target object) governs the ease with
which the information from a negating element can be included. This is tested
through the use of images that make only location information or only a silhoutte
initially available to the participant.
Second, a report on a Russian-language replication of the picture choice mouse-
tracking experiments (Chapter 4) is in preparation. Russian’s somewhat freer word
order allows the negating element (net) to be placed in either a late or an early
position in the sentence relative to the predicate that is negated (glosses: “This
time is / is not on the top row...” vs. “This time on the top row is / is not...”). This
manipulation allows for an exploration of the extent to which activation of the
location containing the foil objects before the negation is heard is the driver of
the eects observed in the English-language version (which is equivalent to the
late-position Russian condition).
Future work could also use the eye-tracking paradigm to examine the eects
of manipulating predictability in a similar way to the mouse-tracking paradigm.
Participants’ eye movements in these cases could provide further and clearer
evidence on the extent to which a predictability manipulation aects their ability
to make predictions on the basis of negation, as well as a clearer window on the
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time course with which they are able to do so. For experiments of this type, it is
important to account for the fact that confounds with polarity can operate as a
result of the fact that attention may be drawn to a particular part of the visual
world prior to the critical part of the linguistic input; this should be avoided or
accounted for in analyses.
Finally, it would be interesting to examine the eects of presenting sentences
of the type used in this work with lower predictability than those used in the exper-
iments here. Although this presents a methodological challenge (because it would
be dicult to simply expand the paradigm further without entirely overloading
participants’ working memory and preventing them from completing the task), a
solution would allow for more direct comparison between results in this type of
paradigm and those from research such as Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008) and
Dale and Duran (2011), in which the sentences presented are highly predictable as
well as pragmatically felicitous, but in most cases still not as absolutely predictable
as the ones used here.
6.7 Conclusion
Overall, this series of experiments highlights a set of circumstances in which
negative sentences incur a processing cost, relative to armatives, even when all
sentences are pragmatically licensed and in fact highly predictable. Contrary to the
original hypotheses, this relative cost actually diminished rather than increasing
upon reducing the critical word’s predictability: that is, varying predictability in
this paradigm had a larger eect of armatives than on negatives, suggesting that
it is relatively dicult for comprehenders to formulate accurate predictions during
this kind of negative sentence at all, even when there are few candidates for the
prediction. This can probably be attributed to the clash between local associations
and the global meaning of a partial sentence representation that occurs in the case
of many negative sentences, especially when (as here) they are not supported by a
richly-constructed and therefore highly constraining pragmatic context.
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